臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文旨在研究公允價值會計的採用對會計盈餘於決定經理人薪酬權重之影響。

本論文首先探討美國財務會計準則第159號公報：原始認列時將金融資產與金融負債指定為透過損益按公允價值衡量適用對會計盈餘與經理人薪酬的關係之改變。企業於原始認列時將金融資產與金融負債指定為透過損益按公允價值衡量(FVO)所產生的未實現評價損益依規定應認列於當年度盈餘中；然而，該盈餘中的未實現評價損益並非經理人實際的經營績效，故本論文欲了解企業於原始認列時將金融資產與金融負債指定為透過損益按公允價值衡量後，企業是否會調降以會計盈餘決定經理人薪酬的權重。擷取2002年至2011年之資料加以分析，研究發現美國財務會計準則第159號公報適用後，企業於原始認列時將金融資產與金融負債指定為透過損益按公允價值衡量(FVO)所產生的未實現評價損益會使企業調降以會計盈餘決定經理人薪酬的權重。

此外，本論文亦探討當淨金融資產之絕對公允價值越大時，企業是否也會調降會計盈餘在經理人薪酬計畫中的權重。擷取2007年至2011年之資料分析，結果發現在美國財務會計準則第159號適用後，當企業淨金融資產之絕對公允價值越大時，該企業會調降以會計盈餘決定經理人薪酬之權重。本論文進一步將淨金融資產之絕對公允價值依照美國財務會計準則第157號公報之內容拆解為三個等級，研究企業以第3等級衡量淨金融資產之絕對公允價值越大時，企業調降以會計盈餘決定經理人薪酬之權重的幅度是否會比第1等級及第2等級輸入值大，研究發現結果並不顯著。

In this paper, I examine how fair value accounting affects the contractual role of reported earnings and whether the use of fair value accounting reduces the use of reported earnings in determining CEO’s cash compensation.

I first investigate whether adopting FVO would decrease the use of reported earnings in CEO’s cash compensation after the adoption of SFAS 159. Empirical evidence suggests that firms place a smaller weight on earnings when determining CEOs’ cash compensation contracts after the adoption of SFAS 159.

Focusing in the post SFAS 159 period, I investigate the effects of the magnitude of net fair value assets on the weight on earnings when determine CEOs’ cash compensation. I find that when the absolute value of net fair value assets is larger, firms are also like to place smaller weight on earnings when determine CEOs’ cash compensation. This result provides evidence that net fair value assets affect the use of accounting information in compensation contracts.

Decomposing net fair value assets into three different levels, I do not find significant evidence on Level 3 net fair value assets having a more unfavorable effect on the relation between reported earnings and the CEO’s cash compensation than Level 1 and Level 2 net fair value assets.

謝辭 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機與目的 4
第三節 研究架構 5
第二章 文獻探討 6
第三章 研究方法 10
第一節 研究假說 10
第二節 變數定義與衡量方法 12
第三節 實證模型 17
第四節 研究樣本及資料來源 20
第四章 實證研究結果與分析 26
第一節 敘述性統計分析 26
第二節 實證結果分析 32
第五章 結論 40
第一節 研究結論 40
第二節 研究限制與建議 41
參考文獻 43

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