臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文係建立於以薪酬顧問與總經理薪資之關聯性為研究主題之相關文獻。薪酬顧問主要工作為輔助企業發展其自身之薪資標竿個體，本研究探討薪酬顧問與薪資標竿個體選擇之關聯性，了解薪酬顧問是否可以幫公司選擇輔合股東利益的標竿個體，或者是幫助公司總經理合理化其薪資溢酬。研究顯示，雇用薪酬顧問之公司較可能選擇擁有較高薪資水準之標竿個體，並以其合理化較高之總經理薪資。此發現與管理階層擴權觀點一致。除此之外，雇用規模較大之顧問無法減緩投機性之薪資標竿選擇。最後，證據支持若顧問提供其他非薪酬顧問服務予公司，對於標竿個體之選擇將相較於顧問未提供其他服務者，更會操弄標竿個體之選擇。此偏誤選擇與公司治理之好壞並無關連，而係由薪酬制度之結構所導致。

This paper builds on prior research on compensation consultants and executive pay, which argues that consultants are hired to justify higher levels of compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Waxman, 2007). As compensation consultants mainly develop peer comparison and benchmarking groups for their clients, this study examines the relation between compensation consultants and the choice of compensation peer groups. I find evidence that firms hiring consultants are more likely to justify their CEOs'' compensation by referencing companies with highly paid CEOs with whom they claim to compete for managerial talent. Consistent with managerial power view, consultants select peers in a manner that biases compensation upward. The evidence also shows that benchmarking manipulation becomes more severe for firms hiring large consultants. Large consultants cannot mitigate firms'' opportunistic peer benchmarking of CEO compensation. Finally, I find that consultants providing non-compensation services (NCS) may give biased advice on the choice of peer groups. The bias in peer group selection, however, is unrelated to corporate governance and instead appears to be an institutionalized or structural part of the pay setting process.

誌謝 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
Index iv
List of tables v
1. Introduction 1
2. Compensation Consultants and the Use of Peer Groups 7
2.1 Compensation Benchmark Peer Groups 8
2.1.1 Peer Groups as a Gauge of Managerial Labor Markets 10
2.1.2 Peer Groups and Opportunism 11
2.2 Relative Performance Evaluation Peer Groups 13
2.3 Consultants 16
2.3.1 Required Disclosure of Compensation Consultants in the USA 16
2.3.2 The Role of Consultants in the Executive Compensation-Setting Process 18
3. Hypotheses 22
3.1 Peer Firms and Consultants 22
3.2 Peer Firms and Large Consultants 23
3.3 Peer Firms and NCS 25
4. Research Design 26
4.1 Sample Selection 26
4.2 Model Specification 27
4.2.1 Selection of Compensation Peer Groups 27
4.2.2 Hypothesis One 30
4.2.3 Hypothesis Two 31
4.2.4 Hypothesis Three 33
5. Empirical Results 34
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 34
5.2 Economic Determinants of Compensation Peer Groups 35
5.3 Results for H1 36
5.4 Results for H2 37
5.5 Results for H3 37
6. Additional Tests 38
6.1 The Impact of Consultant Size on Firm Characteristics 38
6.2 The Impact of Peer Median Pay on CEO Compensation of the Firm 40
6.3 The Impact of Corporate governance on Peer Benchmarking 42
7. Conclusion 44
Reference 46
Appendix A: Example from Proxy Statement Describing the Role of Consultant and Peer Group Practice 52
Appendix B: Examples of Compensation Peer Group in 2009 54
Appendix C: Variable Definitions 56

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