臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以中國大陸為研究對象，探討盈餘管理與舞弊之關聯性，並納入外部審計因素做檢測。由於盈餘管理與舞弊均擁有相似之動機及手法，故欲了解盈餘管理程度較高的公司，於未來發生舞弊之可能性是否更高。再者，非前十大會計師事務所因其查核品質較差，因此當公司盈餘管理程度較大時，未來發生或被主管機關偵知舞弊的可能性將更為顯著。研究結果顯示前一年度及平均三年度之盈餘管理程度越大，未來舞弊發生的可能性也就越高，意指盈餘管理程度可作為舞弊發生之前兆。此外，由非前十大事務所查核之客戶，其因盈餘管理導致舞弊之情況較為嚴重，表示事務所規模作為審計品質之指標，可有效抑制因盈餘管理而引發之舞弊行為。增額測試部分，另探討有關國有控股、審計意見及舞弊樣本之重新界定，其結果更加強實證分析之穩健性。本研究不僅充實盈餘管理與舞弊關聯性之實證研究，亦提供政府機關或會計師事務所稽核公司之標準，以降低投資人及債權人投資風險。

This paper examines the relationship between earnings management and fraud, and adds the effect of audit in China. Because there are the same motive and methods manipulated in earnings management and fraud, this paper develops hypotheses that if companies have more earnings management, they would have more likelihood of fraud. Moreover, companies which are audited by nonbig 10 use more earnings management, they would have more likelihood of fraud due to badly audit quality. Empirical results show that companies have more earnings management which is lagged one year and average of three years, they would have more likelihood of fraud. Besides, companies which are audited by nonbig 10 use earnings management would easily lead to fraud. This paper also inspects the situation of state ownership, audit opinion and modified fraud sample in order to enhance our result. This paper is not only rich this type of research but also provides the standard of auditing for government and accounting firms to audit companies to decrease investment risk.

目錄

第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究問題 3
第三節 預期研究貢獻 3

第貳章 文獻探討 5
第一節 舞弊之概述 5
第二節 舞弊之相關文獻探討 9
第三節 盈餘管理之概述及相關文獻探討 15
第四節 外部審計之概述及相關文獻探討 24

第參章 研究方法 32
第一節 本研究之觀念性架構 32
第二節 研究假說 33
第三節 樣本期間、選取與資料來源 36
第四節 變數定義與衡量 39
第五節 研究設計與實證模型 47

第肆章 實證結果 51
第一節 樣本篩選與配對 51
第二節 敘述性統計分析 53
第三節 Logistic迴歸結果 59

第伍章 增額測試與敏感性分析 65
第一節 國有控股之影響效果 65
第二節 會計師之審計意見 70
第三節 舞弊樣本之重新界定 73

第陸章 研究結論與建議 77
第一節 研究結論 77
第二節 未來研究建議 79
第三節 研究貢獻 80
第四節 研究限制 81

參考文獻 82
中文文獻 82
英文文獻 83



表目錄
表2-1 2011年會計師事務所承接中國大陸上市公司年報審計業務量統計表 25
表2-2 2012年會計師事務所綜合評價前十家信息 25
表3-1 舞弊發生年度與年數表 38
表3-2 2002-2011年中國大陸會計師事務所綜合評價前十家信息 45
表4-1 舞弊樣本篩選表 51
表4-2 樣本產業分布 52
表4-3 財務報表變數與市場衡量變數之配對結果 53
表4-4 單變量分析表 55
表4-5 皮爾森相關係數表 58
表4-6 假說一之迴歸結果 60
表4-7 假說二之裁決性應計數迴歸結果 62
表4-8 假說二之實質盈餘管理迴歸結果 63
表5-1 主變數之單變量分析 66
表5-2 國有控股之裁決性應計數迴歸結果 68
表5-3 國有控股之實質盈餘管理迴歸結果 69
表5-4 會計師審計意見之迴歸結果 72
表5-5 剔除推遲披露樣本之假說一迴歸結果 74
表5-6 剔除推遲披露樣本之假說二迴歸結果 75

圖目錄
圖3-1 H1之觀念性架構圖 32
圖3-2 H2之觀念性架構圖 33
圖3-3 樣本公司舞弊類型 37

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