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研究生:張亦凡
研究生(外文):I-fan Chang
論文名稱:核心代理問題與資本結構
論文名稱(外文):CORE AGENCY PROBLEM AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE
指導教授:陳瑞璽陳瑞璽引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ruey-Shii Chen
口試委員:陳瑞璽
口試委員(外文):Ruey-Shii Chen
口試日期:2013-06-12
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:大同大學
系所名稱:事業經營學系(所)
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2013
畢業學年度:101
論文頁數:109
中文關鍵詞:資本結構現金流量權與投票權代理問題
外文關鍵詞:Capital structureCash flow rights and Voting rightsAgency problem
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近幾年來,全球性企業財務弊案的狀況比比皆是,因此才再度成為全球關注的焦點。近年來台灣企業產生一連串的危機,無論是財務危機或是經營不善的企業在各產業中頻傳。而不單單只是國內企業出現許多財務報告不實案件,國外企業也是如此,並發現公司治理機制有管理與制度的漏洞為這些企業的共同點。若企業產生財務危機或經營產生困難時,產生衝擊的不只是企業本身,對社會造成的衝擊也不容小覷,包含上下游產業會受到衝擊而產生經營困難,投資人和債權人也會受到波及。
金字塔結構中現金流量權與投票權越偏離,所產生的代理問題越嚴重,本研究探討企業使用金字塔結構時,給予控股股東過多的私人利益,因此探討控股股東是否會傾向以自身的利益來分配企業資源。本研究也探討了,當控股股東使用債務融資做為激勵誘因時,所從事的不同類型掠奪活動之激勵誘因。而管理著為了避免自身股權被稀釋,便提高債務水準來增加投票權權力,這也是本研究值得探討的目的。當企業價值增加所產生代理問題時,而金字塔結構中的債務是否具有足夠的潛力來當作約束機制,以及金字塔結構與非金字塔結構企業之槓桿差異,其目的是否是為了減少稅務。除了上述幾個研究目的以外,金字塔結構企業之子公司向外部債權人借貸的風險狀況,也是本研究中要探討的部分。而本研究使用之上市上櫃資料主要來自台灣經濟新報 (TEJ)的財務資料庫、公司治理資料庫以及股權結構資料庫,本研究的樣本觀察期間為1996-2012年,資料皆為年資料,共有17901筆樣本。
最後本研究發現控制權與現金流量權的分離程度越大,公司的舉債越少。而企業中,有使用金字塔結構的公司與未使用金字塔結構的公司相比,具有顯著較低的舉債水準。當企業使用金字塔結構或是屬於家族企業時,相較於未使用金字塔或不屬於家族企業的公司來說,舉債水準較低。而有形性 (Tangibility)比例越高,公司舉債便越多。公司獲利能力 (Profitability)越好,舉債越少,公司的獲利越多,能夠使用公司本身資金去支付費用的能力,理所當然也會越強。而市值帳面價值比 (Market-to-Book Ratio)對企業的舉債程度均無影響力。由於公司規模 (LSALES)的估計係數在迴歸式中,呈現顯著正相關,也就是公司規模越大,舉債比例越高。
Taiwan enterprises generate a series of crises, it is include financial crisis and poor management of the companies in each industry. When enterprises have a financial crisis or operating difficulties, the impact is not only enterprise itself but also affect the social, contains the upstream and downstream of industry will suffer the impact and generate the operating difficulties, also investors and creditors will be affected. Not only domestic enterprise generate many financial reporting false cases, and foreign enterprises as well, we also find the management and system loopholes in the corporate governance mechanism, for these loopholes in the companies have in common.
In the pyramid structure, when cash flow rights and voting rights are more diverge, the agency problems will be more serious. Our study was discussed the corporate that used pyramid structure, the controlling shareholder will get too much private interests, therefore, we must to discuss that whether the controlling shareholder will tend to their own interest to allocate the corporate resources or not. The study also discusses, when controlling shareholder use the debt financing as a motivational incentive that are engaged in different types of expropriation active. While manager in order to avoid their shareholding be diluted, so we need to increase the debt level to increase the voting rights, that is why our study worth to discussing. When the corporate value increasing and the agency problems will generate, the debts in the pyramid structure, whether it has enough potential as a restraint mechanisms, as well as the leverage differences between pyramid structure corporate and non- pyramid structure corporate, whether its purpose is to reduce the tax. The generate risk profile when the subsidiary of the pyramid structure corporate lending from external creditors, it’s also part of our study need to discuss. Our study used data mainly from the listing of Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) financial databases, corporate governance database and ownership structure database, the study sample observation period 1996-2012, data are annual data, a total of 17,901 samples.
Therefore, the increase in debt due to the company's stock market capitalization decreased, so using the pyramid structure or greater divergence of control rights and cash flow rights, the company's share price is lower. This research found that when companies use the pyramid structure or part of the family business, compared to not using pyramid structure or does not belong to the family business of the company, debt levels low. The higher the proportion tangibility, the debt of company will become more. When company’s profitability become better, the debt will become less, the more profitable of the company, it can use its ability to pay the expense. The market to book value of the enterprise's debt levels had no influence. Because of LSALES regression coefficient, showing a significant positive correlation, that is, the larger the company, the higher the debt ratio.
目錄

摘要i
誌謝辭iii
目錄iv
表目錄vi
第一章 緒論1
第一節 研究背景與動機1
第二節 研究目的3
第三節 論文架構與研究流程4
第二章 文獻探討6
第一節 股權結構6
第二節 現金流量權與控制權偏離之現象10
第三節 代理理論與代理問題13
第四節 資本結構理論18
第三章 研究方法22
第一節 控制權與現金流量權定義22
第二節 假說發展23
第三節 資料說明與模型26
第四章 實證結果29
第一節 樣本特性29
第二節 實證結果34
第五章 結論與建議38
第一節 結論38
第二節 建議39
參考文獻41
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