過去有許多文獻探討過公司非法行為，不同於之前文獻，本研究站在極大化公司價值的概念上，經由經濟模型探討公司非法行為發生的可能性與影響公司非法行為發生的特性。研究結果顯示，在經理人與董事會沒有主觀自信偏誤的情況下，公司成功獲取非法風險溢酬的機率遞增於公司規模和公司成長率。另一方面，基於非法行為的成本與利益考量，公司非法行為存在一個非法行為合宜區域(FIAT)。在此區間內，適度增加企劃案的非法程度可以為公司創造出更高的非法風險溢酬，誘使公司從事非法行為。本研究同時證明，FIAT與公司規模以及公司成長率為遞減關係，即規模較小或處於成長率低的環境，如景氣蕭條時，公司為求生存發展，比較容易鋌而走險的選擇從事非法行為，此結果與實證文獻發現相同。我們再進一步擴展到公司管理當局(包括CEO與董事會)具有自信偏誤的主觀認知，模型分析結果顯示，只有董事會對非法公司行為的成功機率比CEO抱持著至少較為樂觀的態度時，非法公司行為才有可能會發生。另一方面，當CEO對非法成功的信心態度屬於極端缺乏自信時，則公司將不會發生非法行為；當CEO的信心態度屬於極端過度自信時，則公司的非法行為將必然被查覺；當CEO的信心態度屬於缺乏自信時，適度的增加其企劃案的非法程度，較易成功的為公司竊取額外的非法風險溢酬；當CEO的信心態度屬於過度自信時，則容易讓公司有機會暴露於非法行為被查覺的風險上。最後，我們將模型延續為兩期，結果發現公司在前一期成功獲取非法風險溢酬的條件下，管理當局對於下一期的非法企劃案，會顯得較為風險趨避；反之，公司若在前一期從事非法行為被查覺，且被懲罰的成本並未導致公司下一期無法繼續正常運作的條件下，則管理當局對於下一期的非法企劃案，將會顯得更為風險愛好。

There is an extensive literature discussing on illegal corporate behavior. Different from previous documents, this study adopts the perspective of corporate value maximization, and examines the possibility of illegal corporate behavior occurring and the characteristics that influence it using a multi-period economic model. Our theoretical model shows that if the managers and the boards possess no subjective confidence bias, the relationship between the illegal behaviors being successfully implemented, the size and growth rate of corporate is an increasing relationship. On the other hand, the illegal corporate behavior is present in a feasible illegal activity terrain (FIAT) when the cost and profit of illegal actions are taken into consideration. Within this FIAT, adequately increasing the illegal level of the project can create a higher illegal risk premium for the corporate that encourages it to be engaged in illegality. Our study also demonstrated that the relationship between the FIAT, the scale and growth rate of corporate is a descending relationship: Smaller corporate or corporate with a low growth rate are more likely to engage illegality in economy recession or for the sake of the survival of the corporate. This result is consistent with those empirical findings presented in the literature. Our study further extended the model to the subjective perception of confidence bias of corporate administrative authorities (including the CEO and the board). The finding suggests that illegal corporate behavior would only take place when the board is more optimistic than the CEO on the success rate of illegality. Furthermore, we classified the confidence level of the CEO into different categories, and the result suggests that when the CEO is extremely unconfident about the success of illegality, no illegality will take place. When the CEO is extremely overconfident, the illegal corporate behavior will definitely be exposed. When the CEO is underconfident, adequately increasing the illegal level of the project will make gaining extra illegal risk premium more easily. When the CEO is overconfident, the illegal corporate behavior is more likely to be exposed. Finally, there are some implications on recidivism. Those who have been caught tend to exert more efforts on illicit gains, while those not detected of frauds actually risk less of their futures. Therefore, for monitoring concerns, more attention may be warranted on the companies or personnel suspect of wrongdoing.

中文摘要………………………………………………………………………… ⅰ
英文摘要………………………………………………………………………… ⅱ
目錄……………………………………………………………………………… ⅳ
表目錄……………………………………………………………………………　ⅵ
圖目錄……………………………………………………………………………　ⅶ
第壹章 緒論……………………………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究背景與動機……………………………………………… 1
第二節 研究目的與方法……………………………………………… 3
第三節 章節架構……………………………………………………… 4
第貳章 文獻探討………………………………………………………… 5
第一節 道德與法律層面……………………………………………… 5
第二節 景氣興衰與公司規模………………………………………… 7
第三節 自信心態度…………………………………………………… 8
第参章 理論架構………………………………………………………… 9
第一節 時程安排……………………………………………………… 9
第二節 執行第t期非法投資企劃案後的公司期末預期價值………… 12
第肆章 客觀模型分析…………………………………………………… 13
第一節 公司實際客觀預期價值V.S.非法程度………………………… 13
第二節 容易從事非法行為V.S.公司規模與景氣環境………………… 14
第三節 非法成功不被查覺V.S.公司規模與經濟景氣………………… 17
第四節 公司容易從事非法行為V.S.非法行為容易成功…………… 19
第伍章 考慮CEO與董事會自信心態度偏誤之分析………………… 21
第陸章 跨期模型累犯分析……………………………………………… 24
第一節 兩期企劃案執行後公司的期末預期價值……………………… 24
第二節 第t+1期的非法行為合宜區域(FIATt+1)……………………… 26
第三節 影響公司非法行為累犯之關鍵因素…………………………… 28
第柒章 結論 …………………………………………………………… 30
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………… 32
附錄 命題證明 ……………………………………………………… 37

Adams, R. B. and D. Ferreira (2007) "A theory of friendly boards," The Journal of Finance, Vol. 62(1), 217–250.
Baucus, M. S. and D. A. Baucus (1997) "Paying the piper: An empirical examination of longer-term financial consequences of illegal corporate behavior," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 40, 129–151.
Baucus, M. S. and J. P. Near (1991) "Can illegal corporate behavior be predicted? An event history analysis," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 34, 9–36.
Bowles, R. and N. Garoupa (1997) "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, 75–87.
Bris, A. (2005) "Do insider trading laws work?" European Financial Management, Vol. 11, 267–312.
Brown, M. E. (2007) "Misconceptions of ethical leadership: How to avoid potential pitfalls," Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 36, 140–155.
Buccirossi, P. and G. Spagnolo (2006) "Leniency policies and illegal transactions," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 90, 1281–1297.
Clinard, M. B., P. C. Yeager, J. Brissette, D. Petrashek and E. Harries (1979), Illegal corporate behavior, U.S. Department of Justice: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.
Cochran, P. L. and D. Nigh (1987) "Illegal corporate behavior and the question of moral agency: An empirical examination," Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, Vol. 9, 73–91.
Committee on Corporate Laws (1994), Corporate Directors Guidebook, American Bar Association.
Crittenden, V. L., R. C. Hanna and R. A. Peterson (2009) "Business students’ attitudes toward unethical behavior: A multi-country comparison," Market Lett, Vol. 20, 1–14.
Crocker, K. J. and J. Slemrod (2005) "Corporate tax evasion with agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 89, 1593–1610.
Dalton, D. R. and I. F. Kesner (1988) "On the dynamics of corporate size and illegal activity: An empirical assessment," Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 7, 861–870.
Davidson, W. N. and D. L. Worrell (1988) "The impact of announcements of corporate illegalities on shareholder returns," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 31, 195–200.
De Angelo, L. E. (1981) "Auditor independence, low balling, and disclosure regulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 3, 113–127.
Gellerman, S. W. (1986) "Why ''good'' managers make bad ethical choices," Harvard Business Review (July-August), 85–90.
Griffin, D. and A. Tversky (1992) "The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence," Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 24, 411–435.
Jensen, G. F., M. L. Erickson and J. P. Gibbs (1978) "Perceived risk of punishment and self-reported delinquency," Social Forces, Vol. 57(1), 57–78.
Jost, P. J. (2001) "Crime, coordination, and punishment an economic analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, 23–46.
Karpoff, J. M., D. S. Lee and G. S. Martin (2008) "The consequences to managers for financial misrepresentation," Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 88, 193–215.
Kesner, I. F., B. Victor and B. T. Lamont (1986) "Board composition and the commission of illegal acts: An investigation of fortune 500 companies," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 29, 789–799.
Kunda, Z. (1987) "Motivated inference: Self-serving generation and evaluation of causal theories," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 53(4), 636-647.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (2000) "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, 141–186.
Lazear, E. P. and Rosen, S. (1981) "Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, 841–864.
McKendall, M., B. DeMarr and C. Jones-Rikkers (2002) "Ethical compliance programs and corporate illegality: Testing the assumptions of the corporate sentencing guidelines," Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 37, 367–383.
Mellahi, K. (2005) "The dynamics of boards of directors in failing organizations," Long Range Planning, Vol. 38, 261–279.
Odean, T. (1998) "Are investors reluctant to realize their losses," The Journal of Finance, Vol. 53(5), 1775–1798.
Reidenbach, R. E. and D. P. Robin (1990) "Toward the development of a multidimensional scale for improving evaluations of business ethics," Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 9, 639–653.
Rose, J. M. (2007) "Corporate directors and social responsibility: Ethics versus shareholder value," Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 73, 319–331.
Seyhun, H. N. (1992) "Why does aggregate insider trading predict future stock returns?" The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.107(4), 1303–1331.
Simpson, S. S. (1986) "The decomposition of antitrust: Testing a multi-level, longitudinal model of profit-squeeze," American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, 859–875.
Sims, R. R. (1992) "The challenge of ethical behavior in organizations," Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 11, 505–513.
Staw, B. M. and E. Szwajkowski (1975) "The scarcity-munificence component of organizational environments and the commission of illegal acts," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 20, 345–354.
Svensson, J. (2003) "Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118(1), 207–230.
Thaler, R. and E. Johnson (1990) "Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: The effects of prior outcomes on risky choice," Management Science, Vol. 36, 643-660.
Tillman, R. (2009) "Reputations and corporate malfeasance: Collusive networks in financial statement fraud," Crime Law Soc Change, Vol. 51, 365–382.
Tosi, H. L., W. Shen and R. J. Gentry (2003) "Why outsiders on boards can’t solve the corporate governance problem," Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 32, 180–192.
Williams, R. J. and J. D. Barrett (2000) "Corporate philanthropy, criminal activity, and firm reputation: Is there a link?" Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 26, 341–350.
Williams, R. J., P. A. Fadil and R. W. Armstrong (2005) "Top management team tenure and corporate illegal activity: The moderating influence of board size," Journal of Managerial Issues, Vol. 17, 479–493.
Wokutch, R. E. and B. A. Spencer (1987) "Corporate saints and sinners: The effects of philanthropic and illegal activity on organizational performance," California Management Review, Vol. 29, 62–77.
Wu, X. (2009) "Determinants of bribery in asian firms: Evidence from the world business environment survey," Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 87, 75–88.