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研究生:楊雅婷
研究生(外文):Ya-ting Yang
論文名稱:獎酬契約與衍生性金融商品使用程度之關係
論文名稱(外文):The Effect of Compensation Contracts on Derivatives Usage Decision
指導教授:陳慶隆陳慶隆引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ching-Lung Chen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱:會計系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2013
畢業學年度:101
語文別:中文
論文頁數:50
中文關鍵詞:交易目的衍生性金融商品獎酬紅利計畫避險目的
外文關鍵詞:Managerial Bonus PlansSpeculationHedgingDerivatives Usage
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本研究係測試在風險管理的動機下,管理獎酬紅利計畫與公司使用衍生性金融商品之關係。本研究以紅利支付函數的凸性(Convexity)及凹性(Concavity)所產生的不同動機來區分樣本,實證結果顯示未達績效門檻(凸性的紅利支付函數)之公司經理人對交易目的衍生性金商品之使用程度呈現顯著的正相關;而已達績效上限(凹性的紅利支付函數)之公司經理人對交易目的衍生性金融商品的使用程度呈現顯著的負相關。此實證結果支持內在動機將影響經理人增加或減少交易目的衍生性金融商品的使用,藉此極大化經理人之紅利報酬。然而,管理獎酬紅利計畫對避險目的之衍生性金融商品使用決策之影響並不具統計顯著性,代表紅利支付函數的內在激勵動機對避險目的之衍生性金融商品之使用可能較不具強烈的激勵作用。
The present study examines the effect of managerial bonus plans on firms’ derivatives usage from risk management perspective. Partitioning the entire sample into firms whose mangers are more likely to face convexity or concavity in the bonus payoff function, this study documents a positive association between bonus plans and non-hedging derivatives usage for firms in the convex region, yet, a negative relation for firms in the concave region. These empirical findings provide evidence that the incentives inherent in managerial bonus plans trigger mangers to increase non-hedging derivatives usage in order to maximize their expected bonus payments. However, the study does not find a statistically significant relationship between managerial bonus plans and hedging derivatives usage. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the incentive inherent in managerial bonus does not play an important role in determining firm’ hedging derivatives usage.
目錄

中文摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
誌謝 III
目錄 IV
表目錄 VI
圖目錄 VII
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構 5
第四節 研究流程 6
第貳章 文獻探討及假說發展 7
第一節 薪酬契約與衍生性金融商品之相關文獻 7
一、代理問題與薪酬契約 7
二、獎酬制度與經營績效衡量 8
三、盈餘管理與衍生性金融商品之使用 11
第二節 研究假說之發展 13
第参章 研究方法 14
第一節 研究變數之定義 14
一、應變數-衍生性金融商品使用程度(DER) 14
二、自變數 14
第二節 實證模型 16
一、模型建立 16
二、模型符號說明 17
三、實證結果之預期係數 18
第三節 資料選取與樣本篩選過程 19
一、資料來源 19
二、樣本選取 19
第肆章 實證結果及分析 21
第一節 敘述性統計及相關性分析 21
一、敘述性統計 21
二、相關係數分析 21
第二節 實證結果分析 24
第伍章 敏感性測試 29
第一節 改變獎酬變數定義之額外測試 29
第二節 改變樣本期間之額外測試 33
第陸章 研究結論及研究限制 37
第一節 研究結論 37
第二節 研究限制 38
參考文獻 39
參考文獻
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