臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

關係人交易普遍存在於臺灣的集團企業當中，它可以幫助創建企業內部的資本市場，從而減少對於外部融資的依賴性。然而，它也可能提高大股東侵占小股東利益的動機或是增加外部投資大眾和集團企業之間的資訊不對稱。因此，本研究將探討組臺灣企業投資現金流敏感性和集團企業之關係人的關係，並且探討其中之原因。這項研究結果發現集團企業比起非集團企業更加仰賴內部資金內部融資。此外，當企業具有較高的Q值、較高的控制權與盈餘權之偏離，或是更多的關係人交易時，集團企業比起非集團企業更加仰賴內部融資，表示集團企業比起非集團企業存在較多的代理問題或是資訊不對稱。

Related party transaction is very common for group firms in Taiwan as it can help create an internal capital market and therefore reduce the dependence on external financing. However, it may also encourage large shareholders’ expropriation of small shareholders and strengthen the information asymmetry between outside shareholders and managers. Therefore, this study explores the relationship between investment－cash flow sensitivity and related party transaction for group firms in Taiwan. The results will clarify which argument dominates. This study explorers that group firms do rely on more internal financing than non-group firms. Besides, group firms with higher Tobin’s Q, higher excess control right or more related party transactions will rely on more internal financing than non-group firms, indicating that group firms have more agency problems or information asymmetry than non-group firms.

Chinese Abstract………………………………………………………………i
English Abstract ……………………………………………………………ii
Acknowledgement …………………………………………………………iii
Contents ……………………………………………………………………iv
List of Tables …………………………………………………………………v
1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………1
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis…………………………………………2
2.1Corporate Governance and Agency Problems………………………2
2.2 Financial Constraints and Information Asymmetry …………………3
2.3 Group Firms …………………………………………………………4
2.4 Family Firms …………………………………………………………7
2.5 Related Party Transactions ……………………………………………9
2.6 Hypothesis …………………………………………………………10
3. Data and Methodology……………………………………………………14
3.1 Data …………………………………………………………………14
3.2 Methodology ………………………………………………………17
4. Empirical Results ……………………………………………… …………20
5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………24
Reference …………………………………………………………………26

吳幸蓉，2003，公司治理與企業短視行為關係之研究，逢甲大學會計與財稅研究所碩士論文。
李馨蘋、黃啟倫，2009，股權結構、關係人交易與公司績效，中華管理評論國際學報 12(2)
梁正學，2007，多角化、事業部組織、人力資源管理與組織績效之關聯，國立中
央大學人力資源管理研究所碩士論文
陳碧滋，2001，我國上市公司股價行為與董監因素關連性之探討，國立臺灣大學
會計系碩士論文
陳麗娟，2004，董事會組成、股權結構、關係人交易與企業績效關係之研究—以紡織業及電子業為實證，國立成功大學高階管理碩士在職專班學位論文
簡湘玲、陳苑吟、吳雅萍、趙宇君、楊凱婷、黃藝馨、楊雅婷，2007，企業關係人交易與公司治理、財務危機之研究－以電子業為實證，崑山科技大學會計資訊系學生專題
葉銀華、柯承恩和李德冠，2002，「公司監理機制對於關係人易的影響」，臺灣財務金融學會2002年財務學術研討會。
Allayannis George, and Abon Mozumdar, 2004, The impact of negative cash flow and influential observations on investment–cash flow sensitivity estimates, Journal of Banking & Finance 28(5), 901-930.
Amihud, Y and H Mendelson, 1988, Liquidity and asset prices: Financial management implications, Financial Management 17(1), 5-15.
Anderson, RC and DM Reeb, 2003, Founding‐family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500, Journal of Finance 58(3), 1301-1327.
Berger, Philip, G. and Eli Ofek, 1995, Diversification’s effect on firm value, Journal of Financial Economics 37(1), 39-65.
Boubakri, Narjess and Cosset Jean-Claude, and O mrane Guedhami, 2003, Postprivatization corporate governance: The role of ownership structure and investor protection, Journal of Financial Economics 76(2), 369-399.
Brennan, MJ and A Subrahmanyam, 1996, Market microstructure and asset pricing: On the compensation for illiquidity in stock returns, Journal of Financial Economics 41(3), 441-464.
Chkir, Imed, Eddine, and Jean-Claude Cosset, 2001, Diversification strategy and capital structure of multinational corporations, Journal of Multinational Financial Management 11(1), 17-37.
Clark, Jeffrey A, 1996, Economic Cost, Scale Efficiency, and Competitive Viability in Banking, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28(3), 342-364.
Cleary, Sean, Povel, Paul, and Michael Raith, 2007, The U－shaped investment curve: Theory and evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42(1), 1-39.
Cole, David C. and Yung Chul Park, 1983, Financial development in Korea: 1945-1978, Studies in the modernization of the Republic of Korea: 1945-1975, Harvard East Asia Monographs.
Easley, D and M O’Hara, 2004, Information and the cost of capital, Journal of Finance 59(4), 1553-1583.
Fazzari, Steven, Glenn, Hubbard, R., and Bruce C. Petersen, 1988, Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment, Bookings Papers on Economic Activity, 141-195.
Gayané, Hovakimian, 2009, Determinants of Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity, Financial Management, 38(1), 161-183.
George, Rejie, Kabir, Rezaul and Jing Qianc, 2011, Investment–cash flow sensitivity and financing constraints: New evidence from Indian business group firms, Journal of Multinational Financial Management 21(2), 69-88.
Hermes, N and R Lensink, 1998, Banking reform and the financing of firm investment: An empirical analysis of the Chilean experience, Journal of Development Studies 34(3), 1983-92.
Hoshi, Takeo, Kashyap, Anil and David Scharfstein., 1991, Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: Evidence from Japanese industrial groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(1), 33-60.
Jiraporn, Pornsit and Peter J. DaDalt, 2009, Does founding family control affect earnings management, Applied Economics Letters 16(2), 113-119.
Kaplan, Steven, N. and Luigi Zingales., 1997, Do Investment－Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints? Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(1), 169-215.
Khanna, T and K Palepu, 2000, Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups, Journal of Finance 55(2), 867-891.
Kuo, Yi-Ping and Jung-Hua Hung, 2012, Family control and investment－cash flow sensitivity: Moderating effects of excess control rights and board independence, Corporate Governance: An International Review 20(3), 253-266.
Lensink, Robert, Molen, Remco, van, der and Shubashis Gangopadhyay, 2003, Business groups, financing constraints and investment: The case of India, Journal of Development Studies 40(2), 93-119.
Liu, Yixin, 2011, Founding family ownership and cash holdings, Journal of Financial Research 34(2), 279-294.
Modigliani, F and MH Miller, 1958, The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment, American Economic Review 48(3), 261-297.
Morck, Randall, Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert, W. Vishny, 1988, Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20(1), 293-315.
Myers, SC and NS Majluf, 1984, Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics 13(2), 187-221.
Perotti, EC and S Gelfer, 2001, Red barons or robber barons? Governance and investment in Russian financial–industrial groups, European Economic Review 45(9), 1601-1617.
Pindado, Julio, Requejo, Ignacio and de la Torr Chabela e, 2011, Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone, Journal of Corporate Finance 17(5), 1389-1409.
Rajan, Raghuram, Servaes, Henri, and Luigi Zingales, 2000, The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment, The Journal of Finance 55(1), 35–80.
Shin, Hyun-Han and René M. Stulz, 1998, Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(2), 531-552.