臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

自從美國發生安隆案及世界通訊等公司的會計醜聞後，導致許多投資人對於財務報表失去信心及審計制度的喪失信賴，美國國會為加強保護投資大眾權益而通過沙氏法案，也因此喚起了許多投資人對於公司盈餘品質與審計品質的重視程度。分析師為公司與投資人之間的重要信息傳遞者，分析師在進行分析時不但要參考公司的財務報表及未來價值，若公司擁有較高透明度及盈餘品質也會增加追隨意願。此外，分析師對於管理階層也具有相當程度的監督效果，因此，當分析師跟隨人數愈多，無形中對管理階層也會造成一種壓力，使得公司對於審計品質更加重視。由於公司聘用四大會計師事務所將有效提升審計品質，且若公司支付之非審計公費較低，會計師獨立性較高，故審計品質較好。因此本研究主旨在探討分析師跟隨人數與審計品質之關聯，實證結果顯示分析師跟隨人數與公司聘用四大會計師事務所呈現顯著正向相關，亦即分析師跟隨人數的確具有監督公司聘用四大會計師事務所進行查核，提升自我審計品質之效用。另一方面，分析師跟隨人數與公司支付的非審計公費呈現顯著負向相關，亦即分析師跟隨人數可以抑制管理階層支付非審計公費，提升會計師事務所的審計獨立性，也可以減少公司舞弊的可能。

After the Enron and Worldcom scandals, investors have been concerning about the credibility of the financial reports of many companies. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was promulgated by the U.S. government in 2002, requiring public firms to ensure that their financial reports are fairly presented with adequate disclosure. Analysts play an important role between investors and firms because analysts can provide useful information to investors. They are also concerned about companies’ corporate transparency and earnings quality, so the analysts’ coverage will increase if the levels of both transparency and earning quality are better. Moreover, prior literature indicated analysts’ coverage was negatively correlated to discretionary accruals quality. Therefore, this study investigates the relationship between analysts’ coverage and audit quality. Our empirical results show that analysts’ coverage is positively associated with Big4 and negatively associated with non-audit fee, which means that analysts serve as external monitors to managers.

目錄
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 4
第三章 研究方法 8
第一節 樣本及資料來源 8
第二節 研究模型 8
第四章 實證結果 12
第一節 敘述性統計及相關係數 12
第二節 研究結果 13
第五章 結論與建議 14
參考文獻 15

表目錄
【表一】樣本篩選過程 20
【表二】變數彙總表 21
【表三】敘述性統計表 22
【表四】Pearson相關係數表 23
【表五】分析師跟隨人數迴歸 24
【表六】四大會計師事務所與分析師跟隨人數迴歸 25
【表七】非審計公費與分析師跟隨人數迴歸 26

Balvers, R., B. McDonald and R. Miller. 1988. Underpricing of new issues and the choice of auditor as a signal of investment banker reputation. The Accounting Review 63: 605-621.
Barkess, L. and R. Simnett. 1994. The pricing of other services by auditors: Independence and pricing issues. Accounting and Business Research 24: 91-108.
Beaver, W. H. 2002. Perspectives on recent capital market research. The Accounting Review 77 (2): 453-474.
Beatty, R. 1989. Auditor reputation and the pricing of initial public offerings. The Accounting Review 64 (4): 693-709.
Becker, C., M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo and K. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of audit quality on earning management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15 (1): 1-24.
Beck, P. J., T. J. Frecka and I. Solomon. 1988. A model of the market for MAS and audit services: Knowledge spillovers and auditor-auditee bonding. Journal of Accounting Literature 7: 50-64.
Behn, B. K., J. H. Choi and T. Kang. 2008. Audit quality and properties of analyst earnings forecasts. The Accounting Review 83 (2): 327-349.
Bhushan, R. 1989. Firm characteristics and analysts following. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11: 255-274.
Bonner, S. E., Z. Palmrose and S. M. Young. 1998. Fraud type and auditor litigation: An analysis of SEC accounting and auditing enforcement releases. The Accounting Review 73 (4): 503-532.
Brown, P., G. Foster and E. Noreen.1985. Security analyst multi-year earnings forecasts and the capital market. American Accounting Association, Studies in Accounting Research 21.
Cahan, S., D. Emanuel, D. Hay and N. Wong. 2008. Non-audit fees, long-term auditor-client relationships and earnings management. Accounting and Finance. 48 (2): 181-207.
Caramanis, C. and C. Lennox. 2008. Audit effort and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45 (1): 116-138.
Chaney, P. D., D. C. Jeter and L. Shivakumar. 2004. Self-selection of auditors and audit pricing in private firms. The Accounting Review 79 (1): 51-72.
Craswell, A. T., J. R. Francis and S. L. Taylor.1995. Auditor brand name reputations and industry specializations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20 (3): 297-322.
DeAngelo, L. 1981. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3 (3): 297-322.
Dechow, P. M. and I. Dichev. 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77: 35-59.
DeFond, M. L. 1992. The association between changes in clients firm agency cost and auditor switching. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 11: 16-31
Dopuch, N. and D. Simunic. 1982. Competition in auditing: an assessment. Fourth Symposium on Auditing Research: 401-450.
Dopuch, N., R. W. Holthausen and R. W. Leftwich. 1987. Predicting audit qualifications with financial and market variables. The Accounting Review 62 (3): 431-454.
Dyck, A., A. Morse and L. Zingales. 2006. Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud? The Journal of Finance 65 (6): 2213-2253.
Dye, R. 1993.Auditing standards, legal liability and auditor wealth. Journal of Political Economy 101: 887-914.
Fan, P. H. and T. J. Wong. 2005. Do External auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (1): 35-72.
Ferguson, M. J., G. Seow and D. Young. 2004. Non-audit Services and Earnings Management: U.K. Evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research 21 (4): 813-841.
Francis, J. R. and D. J. Stokes. 1986. Audit prices, product differentiation, and scale economies: Further evidence from the Australian market. Journal of Accounting Research 24 (2): 383-393.
Francis, J. R. and D. T. Simon. 1987. A test of audit pricing in the small-client segment of the U.S. audit market. The Accounting Review 62 (1): 145-157.
Francis, J., E. Maydew and H. C. Sparks. 1999. The role of big 6 auditors in the credible reporting of accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 18: 17-34.
Francis, J. R. 1984. The effect of audit firm size on audit prices: A study of the Australian market. Journal of Accounting and Economics 6 (2): 133-151.
Francis, J. R. and M. D. Yu. 2009. The effect of Big 4 office size on audit quality. The Accounting Review 84: 1521-1552.
Frankel, R. M., M. F. Johnson and K. K. Nelson. 2002. The relation between auditors’ fee for non-audit services and earning management. The Accounting Review 77: 71-105.
Healy, P. M., A. P. Hutton and K. G. Palepu. 1999. Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research 16 (3): 485-520.
Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (1): 405-440.
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.
Kasznik, R. 1999. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research 30: 57-81.
Kasznik, R. and M. F. McNichols. 2002. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (3): 727-759.
Kellogg, R. 1984. Accounting activities, securities prices, and class action lawsuits. Journal of Accounting and Economics 6 (3): 185-204.
Kim J. B. and C. H. Yi. 2006. Ownership structure, business group affiliation, listing status, and earnings management: evidence from Korea. Contemporary Accounting Research 23 (2): 427-464.
Lang, M. H., K. V. Lins and D. P. Miller. 2004. Concentrated control, analyst following, and valuation: Do analysts matter most when investors are protected least? Journal of Accounting Research 42 (3): 589-623.
Lang, M. H. and R. J. Lundholm. 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. The Accounting Review 71 (4): 467-492.
Lennox, C. S. 1999. The accuracy and incremental information content of audit reports in predicting bankruptcy. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 26: 757-778.
Lys, T. and R. L. Watts. 1994. Lawsuits against auditors. Journal of Accounting Research 32: 65-93.
Magee, R. and M. Tseng. 1990. Audit pricing and independence. The Accounting Review 65: 315-336.
Mahoney, W. F. 1991. Investor Relations: The Professional’s Guide to Financial Marketing and Communications. New York, NY: New York Institute of Finance.
McKeown, J. C., J. F. Mutchler and W. Hopwood. 1991. Towards an explanation of auditor failure to modify the audit opinions of bankrupt companies. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 10: 1-13.
Menon, K. and D. Williams. 1991. Auditor credibility and initial public offerings. The Accounting Review 66: 313-332.
Moyer, R. C., R. E. Chatfieldand and P. M. Sisneros. 1989. Security analyst monitoring activity: Agency costs and information demands. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24 (4): 503-512.
Palmrose, Z. V. 1988. Audit fees and auditor size: Further evidence. Journal of Accounting Research 24: 97-110.
Reynolds, K. and J. Francis. 2001. Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30 (3): 375-400.
Simunic, D. A. 1984. Auditing, consulting and auditor independence. Journal of Accounting Research 22 (2): 679-702.
Simunic, D. and M. Stein. 1987. Production differentiation in auditing: A study of auditor choice in the market for new issue. Canadian Certified General Accountants’ Research Foundation.
Stice, J. 1991. Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement Factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. The Accounting Review 66 (3): 516-533.
Watts, R. and J. Zimmerman. 1983. Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: Some evidence. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (October): 613-633.
Waymire, G. 1986. Additional evidence on the accuracy of analyst forecasts before and after voluntary management earnings forecast. The Accounting Review 61 (1): 129-142.
Whisenant, S., S. Sankaraguruswamy and K. Raghunandan. 2003. Evidence on the joint determination of audit and non-audit fees. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (4): 581-744.
Wilson, T. and R. Grimlund. 1990. An examination of the importance of an auditor’s reputation. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 9: 43-59.
Yu, F. F. 2008. Analyst coverage and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2): 245-271.