臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

現金對於一家公司而言，是營運不可或缺的要素，但現金亦是最容易被管理階層操縱的資產，尤其在資訊不對稱的情形下，代理問題嚴重，公司現金持有邊際價值降低，而資訊揭露能有效降低資訊不對稱的影響，公司現金持有邊際價值提升。臺灣證券交易所為強化上市公司召開法人說明會之資訊揭露透明度，於民國102年6月1日開始適用法人說明會相關語音資訊之公告申報事項，顯示我國對於法人說明會日趨重視。綜觀上述兩點，本文欲探討法人說明會與公司現金持有是否存在正相關性，更進一步探討召開法人說明會，增加公司資訊揭露，對公司現金持有價值的影響。本文以臺灣公司2006年至2011年之4263個觀測值作為研究標的，並以法人說明會作為資訊揭露之代理變數，實證研究顯示，召開法人說明會確實有效提升了公司現金持有價值。

Cash plays an important role in firm’s operating activities but it is also the asset that would be misused by the managements. Especially, when firms with higher information asymmetries, the cost of agency problem become more serious then lead to the lower market value of a marginal dollar of cash. Therefore, it is important to increase corporate information disclosures then mitigate information asymmetries and lead to the higher market value of a marginal dollar of cash. To enhance the transparent of the publicly listed company, Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation releases a new regulation that firms need to make conference call’s contents broadly available on internet since June first 2013. Therefore, conference calls become more and more important in Taiwan capital market. This paper attempts to investigate the relationship between conference call and cash holdings. Using 4263 samples of publicly listed company in Taiwan from 2006 to 2011 and examining voluntary disclosures as measured by conference calls, the empirical results show that conference call do increase cash value of the firm.

目錄I
表目錄II
摘要IV
第壹章 緒論1
第一節、研究動機與目的1
第二節、研究架構4
第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展5
第一節、公司現金持有因素5
第二節、自願性揭露與法人說明會7
第三節、自願性揭露與公司現金持有9
第四節、法人說明會與公司現金持有價值10
第參章 研究方法與研究設計11
第一節、資料來源與樣本標準11
第二節、現金持有模型15
第三節、現金持有價值模型17
第肆章 實證結果與分析20
第一節、共線性分析20
第二節、迴歸實證結果分析23
第伍章 結論與建議27
參考文獻29

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