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研究生:許捷
研究生(外文):Chieh Hsu
論文名稱:忙碌董事與資本支出
論文名稱(外文):Busy Boards and Capital Expenditure
指導教授:鄭揚耀鄭揚耀引用關係顏子瑜顏子瑜引用關係
指導教授(外文):Lee-Young ChengTze-Yu Yen
口試委員:王明昌
口試日期:2014-05-21
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:財務金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:英文
論文頁數:38
中文關鍵詞:忙碌董事
外文關鍵詞:Busy Boards
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:3
  • 點閱點閱:354
  • 評分評分:系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔
  • 下載下載:103
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
這份文獻主要探討台灣2008年至2012年台灣上市公司忙錄董事、忙碌獨立董事對公司資本支出的影響。忙碌董事與忙碌獨立董事,他們具有經驗、人脈,但是由於身兼多職,並不能有效監控公司運作。先前的文獻都是分別對公司資本支出與忙碌董事、忙碌獨立董事分開做研究; 這篇文獻將兩種議題合併討論,結果發現忙碌董事相較於忙碌獨立董事會造成公司過度投資。因此我們建議當公司在一個營運穩定階段時,應加強公司治理,來減少過度投資的傾向。
Using data from all listed firms in Taiwan from 2008 to 2012, this paper analyzes the effects of busy directors and independent ones on investment. The rise in the concept of the busy director (multi-directorship) has become phenomenal. Busy directors are more experienced and better connected, but are more distracted with ineffective monitoring than independent ones. We depart from previous research by documenting examining the relationship of the new aspects of busy boards, busy independent boards, and investment inefficiency. Our findings indicate that firms with busy boards tend to overinvest. When firms are in a stable stage with stable growth profit, they should enhance corporate governance and reduce the number of busy directors in the board.
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1 Busy Boards
2.2 Capital Expenditure
3. Data and Research Design
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1 Sample
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
4.3 Correlation Analysis
4.4 Univariate Analysis
4.5 Busyness and Investment Inefficiency
5. Conclusion

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Bebchuk L. A. and Fried J. M., 2003. Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 71–92.
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Fu F.,2010. Overinvestment and the Operating Performance of SEO Firms. Financial Management ,Spring 2010 , 249 – 272.
Guariglia A., Yang J.,2012. A balancing act: managing financial constraints and agency costs to minimize investment inefficiency in the Chinese market. Working Paper. University of Birmingham.
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Micah S.,2007. Overinvestment, corporate governance, and dividend initiations. Working Paper. University of Southern California
Mæland J.,2002. Valuation of Irreversible Investments and Agency Problems. Working Paper, NorwegianSchool of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Financeand Management Science
Shivdasani A., Yermack D.,1999. CEO Involvement In The Selection Of New Board Members: An Empirical Anlysis. Journal of Finance 5, 1829-1853.
Richardson S.,2006. Over-investment of free cash flow. Journal of Economic Literature, G3 , M4.
Tarkovska V.,2012. Busy Boards, Corporate Liquidity and Financial Risk: Evidence from UK Panel Data. Journal of Economic Literature, G3, G32
Titman S., K. C., Wei J. and Xie F., 2004. Capital Investments and Stock Returns. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39, No. 4, 677-700

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