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研究生:江雅雯
研究生(外文):Chiang Ya Wen
論文名稱:分析師跟隨與成本僵固性
論文名稱(外文):Analyst Coverage and Cost Stickness
指導教授:周庭楷周庭楷引用關係
口試委員:林軒竹黃劭彥潘李賢
口試日期:2014-05-04
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:會計與資訊科技研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:24
中文關鍵詞:分析師跟隨成本僵固代理成本銷管費用
外文關鍵詞:SG&Acost asymmetryanalyst followingagency costs
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本研究旨在探討分析師跟隨與成本僵固之間的關聯性。以往文獻指出代理成本與成本僵固呈正向關係,而從另一脈文獻得知分析師的跟隨除了可提升公司的價值外並為公司帶來監督治理等效果,減少管理者和投資者間因利益不一致所產生的代理成本。因此本研究試圖檢測分析師的監督效果是否能減緩成本僵固的情形。本研究以1990年至2012年為樣本期間,實證結果發現,公司分析師跟隨個數越高時,該公司發生成本僵固性的程度就愈低。同時,為了檢驗加入其他控制變數是否會改變分析師和成本僵固性間的影響,本研究使用Anderson et al.(2003)的模型測試分析師對成本僵固行為的影響,實證結果亦發現,即使加入了其他控制變數,也沒有改變分析師跟隨會降低銷管費用不對稱的現象。本文是第一篇發現分析師跟隨個數會影響公司成本行為的研究。
Prior studies have documented the asymmetrical behavior of selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs, and argue that SG&A cost asymmetry is partially driven by managerial agency incentives. On the other hand, researchers argue that financial analysts facilitate more effective monitoring of firms’ activities and, thereby, reducing agency costs. This study integrates the two streams of research by examining the relationship between analyst following and the degree of cost asymmetry. Using data for the US firms over the period 1990-2012, we find that there is a negative association between analyst following and the degree of cost asymmetry. Our results suggest that financial analysts play an important governance role by preventing empire-building managers from over-spending on SG&A costs.
目 次
摘要...............................................................................................................................i
Abstract........................................................................................................................ⅱ
誌謝..............................................................................................................................iii
目次..............................................................................................................................ⅳ
表次..............................................................................................................................ⅴ
壹、緒論 1
貳、文獻探討與假說發展 3
一、成本僵固性 3
二、成本僵固性的原因 4
三、代理問題與成本僵固 4
四、分析師帶來治理效果 5
五、研究假說 6
參、研究方法 7
一、資料來源、研究期間及樣本選取 7
二、模型設定及變數定義 7
肆、實證結果分析 9
一、敘述性統計分析 9
二、實證迴歸分析 10
伍、結論 12
參考文獻 13


參考文獻
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林旻毅,2004,銷管費用僵固性之額外證據,天主教輔仁大學會計學系碩士論文。
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嚴友廷,2010,銷管費用僵固性與股價波動關聯性之研究-以台灣上市公司為例,國立台北大學會計研究所碩士論文

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