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研究生:陳昭文
研究生(外文):Chao-Wen Chen
論文名稱:論搜尋引擎雙邊市場之競爭法適用問題-以Google搜尋偏愛為例-
論文名稱(外文):The Applicability of Competition Law in the Two-Sided Market of Search Engines-Using Google Search Bias as an Example-
指導教授:陳志民陳志民引用關係
指導教授(外文):Andy C.M. Chen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中原大學
系所名稱:財經法律研究所
學門:法律學門
學類:專業法律學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:120
中文關鍵詞:市場界定競爭法雙邊市場搜尋引擎搜尋偏愛
外文關鍵詞:search biasmarket definitionsearch enginetwo-sided marketcompetition law
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:4
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  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
於現今之網路時代下,搜尋引擎可謂係極具代表性之產業。於眾多搜尋引擎事業中,Google搜尋引擎乃係產業之領導事業,並大幅領先其他之搜尋引擎。惟隨著Google 之壯大,其所採取之事業行為亦被放大檢視,而受到反競爭之質疑。近年來,Google頻繁受到濫用市場力量之指控,而集中於其傾向將自身產品之網站連結置於搜尋結果之頂端或前端之行為(以下簡稱 ”搜尋偏愛” ),進而不公平地壓縮競爭者爭取消費者注意之機會,產生排除競爭者之效果。
上述指控掀起學界、實務之熱烈討論,而圍繞於搜尋引擎之市場架構所可能引發之競爭法適用問題。由於,學界普遍認為搜尋引擎屬雙邊市場,而不同以往認知之單邊市場。此時,市場架構之不同將可能影響經濟理論之適用,而連帶導致競爭執法之衝突。換句話說,一事業行為於不同市場架構下,將可能於競爭法下得到不同之評價。
本研究的主要目的即係結合法律與經濟理論分析問題之本質,而以搜尋引擎作為論述之主軸。首先,整理搜尋引擎之基本運作,並對照雙邊市場理論,判斷搜尋引擎之市場架構。在確定搜尋引擎之雙邊市場架構後,探討雙邊市場所可能帶給競爭法之適用問題,並嘗試提出可能之解決方向。最終,提出競爭主管機關於界定相關市場、評估市場力量時所應考慮之面向。
其後,分析搜尋偏愛之行為面爭議。於假設搜尋引擎具有市場力量之前提下,以經濟理論分析搜尋偏愛對於市場競爭所可能產生之正反面效果,並為正反效益之權衡,判斷是否有競爭法介入之必要。在評估相關論據後,本文認為搜尋偏愛並未能被證明將產生明確之排除競爭效果。反而,將明顯有助於搜尋效率之提升、搜尋品質之確保,而無禁止之必要。
最後,於得出上述市場結構面、行為面之分析結論後,判斷搜尋偏愛於我國公平交易法下可能之管制規範。而後,檢視我國就雙邊市場事業之執法經驗,參以學理之分析,而針對我國公平法提出執法之建議。



Search engines constitute a highly representative industry in the current Internet age. Among numerous search engine providers, the Google search engine is an industrial leader, holding a substantial advantage over other search engine companies. With the rise of Google, the business behavior of this company has attracted extensive attention and raised awareness regarding anti-competition. In recent years, Google has been frequently accused of abusing market power. Specifically, the company has been found to exhibit a tendency of placing, at the top of the search results, links to the websites of its own products (this phenomenon is hereafter referred to as “search bias”). Consequently, the opportunities that competitors should have to appeal to consumers are unfairly reduced, resulting in competitors being marginalized.
Such accusations have sparked heated debate among academia and in legal practice. This debate surrounds applications of competition law resulting from the changing structure of the search engine market. Academics generally regard the search engine as a two-sided market, which differs from its previous characterization as a one-sided market. However, this difference in market structure may influence the applicability of economic theories, leading to conflicts in the enforcement of competition law. In other words, under different market structures, a business behavior can be evaluated differently in relation to competition law.
The primary goal of this research was to combine legal and economic theory to analyze the essence of the problem, with search engines serving as the research topic. First, the researchers summarized the basic operations of search engines and evaluated the structure of the search engine market according to the theory of two-sided markets. After verifying the two-sided market structure of the search engine, the potential problems of applying competition law to a two-sided market were investigated and possible solutions were proposed. Finally, dimensions that competition authorities must consider when defining relevant markets and evaluating market power were proposed.
Next, the controversies faced by search bias behaviors were analyzed. Under the assumption that search engines possess market power, economic theory was adopted to analyze the possible positive and negative effects that search bias exerts on market competition. The weights of the negative and positive effects were used to assess the need for competition law intervention. By evaluating relevant theories, the researchers found that search bias does not generate apparent competition exclusion effects. However, search bias clearly increases search efficiency and ensures search quality; thus, the banning of search bias is not required.
Finally, after investigating the market structure and behavior, potential search bias regulations for Fair Trade Laws in Taiwan were devised. After examining the law enforcement experience of a two-sided market in Taiwan and referencing the results of theoretical analysis, the researchers provided suggestions for enforcing Fair Trade Laws in Taiwan.



詳目

摘要 I
Abstract II
誌謝 IV
簡目 V
詳目 IX
圖目錄 XV
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的與問題意識 2
第三節 研究方法 3
第四節 論文架構 3
第二章 搜尋引擎之介紹 6
第一節 搜尋引擎之工作原理 6
第二節 搜尋引擎之營利途徑 9
第三節 搜尋引擎之成本結構 11
第四節 搜尋引擎之競爭概況及反競爭指控 12
第三章 搜尋引擎雙邊市場架構所可能引發之競爭法適用問題 14
第一節 市場界定及濫用市場力量之競爭法相關規定 14
第一款 相關市場之界定 14
1.相關產品市場 15
1.1.使用上之合理可替代性(reasonable interchangeability of use) 15
1.2供給替代性 16
1.3.現行相關產品市場之界定方法-SSNIP測試 17
2.相關地理市場 18
3.SSNIP測試之侷限 19
第二款 市場力量之判斷 20
1.市場力量存在之直接證據 20
2.市場力量存在之間接證據 21
第三款 濫用市場力量之相關規定 22
1.濫用市場力量之相關規定 22
1.1.休曼法第2條 23
1.2.聯邦交易委員會法第5條 23
2. 濫用市場力量之審理原則 24
2.1.當然違法 24
2.2.合理原則 25
2.3.小結 25
第二節 雙邊市場理論之介紹 25
第一款 雙邊市場之定義及基本要素 25
1.兩個消費族群 26
2.消費族群間存在交叉網路效應(cross-side network effects) 27
3.非中立價格結構(non-neutrality of the price structure) 28
第二款 雙邊市場之定價策略 29
第三款 雙邊市場之類型 30
1.雙邊市場產業之區分 30
1.1.依據市場功能區分 31
1.2.依據市場複雜程度區分 31
1.3.依據平台競爭程度區分 31
1.4.依據平台功能區分 32
1.5.依據平台所有權歸屬區分 32
1.6.依據交叉網路效應屬性區分 32
2.雙邊市場基本要素之體現 32
2.1.廣告支持之傳媒產業(advertising-supported media) 32
2.2.中介產業(exchanges) 33
2.3.支付系統產業(payment systems) 34
2.4.軟體平台產業(software platforms) 34
第三節 搜尋引擎之雙邊市場架構 35
第四節 雙邊市場可能引發之競爭法適用問題 36
第一款 相關市場之界定 36
第二款 市場力量之測量 39
第三款 參進障礙之評估 40
第四款 非中立價格結構之檢視 41
第五節 相關案例 44
第一款 Kinderstart.com LLC. v. Google Tech, Inc案 44
第二款 Google與DoubleClick結合案 45
第三款 First Data與Concord EFS結合案 47
第六節 學理分析 48
第一款 相關市場之個數 48
第二款 SSNIP測試基準價格之選擇 50
第三款 交叉網路效應之考量 52
第七節 搜尋引擎相關市場及市場力量之思考 53
第一款 相關市場之界定 53
1.相關產品市場 54
1.1. 搜尋邊之市場 54
1.2. 廣告邊之市場 55
2相關地理市場 58
第二款 搜尋引擎之市場力量 58
1.市場佔有率之計算 58
2.市場力量之評估 59
第四章 搜尋偏愛之可非難性及經濟分析 63
第一節 搜尋偏愛之定性 63
第一款 搜尋偏愛之必然性與辨別困難 63
第二款 搜尋偏愛之可非難性及其審理方向 64
1.搭售 64
2.拒絕交易 65
3關鍵設施理論 67
第二節 搜尋偏愛之經濟分析 69
第一款 搜尋排名對於點擊率之影響 69
第二款 搜尋偏愛之經濟分析 70
1.搜尋偏愛之損害競爭效果 70
1.1獨占力之延伸 70
1.2增加競爭者成本 72
1.3誤導消費者 72
1.4.降低搜尋效率 72
1.5.減少創新 72
2.搜尋偏愛之促進競爭效果 72
2.1.搜尋效率之提昇 73
2.2.維護搜尋品質 74
第三款 搜尋偏愛之正反競爭效益權衡 74
第三節 搜尋偏愛可能之抗辯理由 75
第一款 競爭法就免費產品之管轄 76
第二款 搜尋偏愛與言論自由 77
1.搜尋結果是否受到言論自由之保護 77
2.搜尋結果是否豁免競爭法之適用 78
第五章 搜尋引擎議題於我國公平法下之檢視 81
第一節 相關市場與市場力量界定之競爭法規定 81
第一款 相關市場之界定 81
第二款 市場力量之評估 82
第二節 搜尋引擎之相關市場與市場力量 82
第一款 搜尋引擎之相關市場 82
第二款 搜尋引擎之市場力量 82
第三節 搜尋偏愛之公平法適用 83
第一款 事業單方行為之規定 83
第二款 搜尋偏愛之公平法相應規範 84
第四節 雙邊市場之處理經驗 85
第一款 雅虎國際資訊股份有限公司與無名小站結合案 85
第二款 聯合信用卡處理中心(NCCC)與會員銀行申請聯合行為許可案 86
第三款 點鑽公司案 87
第四款 Google與Motorola域外結合案 88
第五節 學理分析 88
第一款 相關市場界定之考慮未周 88
第二款 公平會對雙邊市場相關議題見解之不明確 89
第六章 結論 90
第一節 研究發現 90
第一款 雙邊市場對於競爭法之影響 90
第二款 雙邊市場與競爭法之關係 92
第三款 Google搜尋偏愛議題可能之處理架構 92
第二節 雙邊市場對於競爭法與政策之建議 93
第一款 建立雙邊市場視角 93
第二款 觀察雙邊市場基本要素之表現 93
第三款 制定雙邊市場之一致判斷標準與流程 94
參考文獻 96

圖目錄

圖一:搜尋廣告與有機搜尋 10
圖二:雙邊市場與單邊市場交易型態之比較 26
圖三:簡單雙邊市場與複雜雙邊市場 31
圖四:雙邊市場事業可能之競爭來源 38
圖五:雙邊無交易市場與雙邊交易市場之比較 49
圖六:搜索排名對於點擊率之影響 70
圖七:雙邊市場判斷標準與流程 95
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