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研究生:吳佳穎
研究生(外文):Wu Chia Ying
論文名稱:高階經理人異動因素
論文名稱(外文):A Study of Factors of Senior Managers Turnover
指導教授:張椿柏張椿柏引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chun-Po Chang
口試委員:劉文祺王育偉
口試委員(外文):Liou Wen ChiWang Yu Wei
口試日期:2013-11-01
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:大葉大學
系所名稱:管理學院碩士在職專班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2013
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:49
中文關鍵詞:高階經理人異動董事會結構股權結構公司績效
外文關鍵詞:Top Executive TurnoverBoard StructureOwnership StructureFirm Performance
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本文利用 Logistic 迴歸模型探討董事會結構、股權結構以及公司經營績效對於高階經理人異動的影響。實證結果顯示,董事長身兼總經理的經營形態,高階經理人比較不容易被撤換;而當董事會外部董事比率較高時,高階經理人被撤換的可能性較高;其次,公司董事會規模較大,董事們較可在中立的立場下決定經理人是否要被撤換。而當公司內部的人持有越多股份,股權越集中時,其監督功能將會充分發揮,那麼高階經理人因為績效不佳而遭到撤換的可能性較大。其次,公司的經營績效越差,經理人也越容易被撤換
The article will discuss the impacts of how the board of directors, the structure of stocks and the achievements of the company's manipulation affect the alteration of the top executive turnover by the model of Logistic. According to the proved results, the top executive turnover will not be easily replaced under the circumstance of a board chairman, taking charge of a chief manager at the same time. However, the top executive turnover will be removed more easily when the proportion of outer directors is bigger in the board. Secondly, directors can make more indifferent decisions of whether the top executive turnover will be recalled when the board is lager. Furthermore, when the stocks are owned by more people of the company and more concentrated, the function of supervision will work better, and the top executive turnover will be replaced more easily due to their poor efficiency on jobs. And the worse the company runs, the more easily the top executive turnover are replaced.
目錄
摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
目錄 IV
圖目錄 VI
表目錄 VII
第一章 序論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究流程與架構 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 高階經理人的定義 5
第二節 高階經理人異動 6
第三節 公司治理與高階經理人異動的關係 8
第四節 公司績效造成高階經理人異動 14
第三章 研究方法 16
第一節 觀念性架構 16
第二節 研究假說 17
第三節 研究樣本選取及資料來源 19
第四節 研究變數之操作性定義 19
第五節 研究方法 23
第四章 實證結果分析 25
第一節 敘述統計 25
第二節 相關統計 29
第三節 迴歸分析 32
第五章 結論與建議 37
第一節 研究結論 37
第二節 研究建議 40
參考文獻 42
國內文獻 42
國外文獻 44


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