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研究生:宋宜庭
研究生(外文):Yi Ting Sung
論文名稱:董事長與高階經理人專業教育背景及盈餘管理之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of the Professional Education Background of Company Chairperson and Executive Managers on Earings Management
指導教授:江向才江向才引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsiang Tsai Chiang
口試委員:李元恕施念恕
口試委員(外文):Yuan Shu LiNien Shu Shih
口試日期:2014-06-11
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:逢甲大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:100
中文關鍵詞:盈餘管理實質盈餘管理董事長與高階經理人專業背景
外文關鍵詞:earnings managementthe real earnings managementthe chairman and senior managers of the professional background
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過去研究發現,當董事擁有財會相關背景時,因較了解財會方面之專業知識而更能提升審計委員會之監督功能(Mark et al., 2004;Lai et al., 2007)。由此可知,當董事具備專業教育背景時,較能提升其監督效果(Beasley, 1996)。然而,董事長在董事會中擁有決策權的優勢 (Kakabadse et al., 2006;Balta et al., 2010),若此時再加上當董事長兼任總經理此一情況時,董事長便擁有過大的決策權及控制權(Arena, 2013),故不論董事會成員是否具備專業教育背景,皆會降低其監督效能,進而影響財務報導品質(Khairul Anuar Kamarudin et al., 2012)。因此本研究欲探討,當董事長兼任總經理時,具備專業教育背景的董事長,對盈餘管理的影響為何。另外,根據Hambrick and Mason (1984)研究發現,和其他教育背景相比,當高階經理人擁有正規的管理教育背景時,為了追求短期績效目標,可能會利用蓋廠房等,藉以建立長期資產。過去其他學者也指出,當高階經理人擁有不同的專業教育背景,則有不同的管理特質(Bertrand and Schoar, 2003),且高階經理人因擁有不同的專業能力,故在達其決策目標中所用的方法以及對企業的影響也不同(Frank and Goyal, 2009)。然而,當董事長兼任總經理時,決策權掌握於董事長手中,因此本研究欲研究探討高階經理人擁有自主決策權且受於董事會監督時,亦即董事長未兼任總經理情況下,具備專業教育背景的高階經理人對盈餘管理的影響為何。因過去學者將專業教育背景區分檢視後發現,其所作出之決策並不相同,故本研究將專業教育背景區分為商學教育背景與會計教育背景。實證結果顯示,當董事長兼任總經理時,具備商學教育背景的董事長,會憑藉其專業知識而調整盈餘;而具備會計教育背景的董事長,亦會憑藉其專業知識而管理公司盈餘。另外,當董事長未兼任總經理時,具備商學教育背景的高階經理人因稅務之問題,會憑藉其專業知識向下調整公司盈餘;而具備會計教育背景的高階經理人,相較於具備商學教育背景的高階經理人,擁有財務專精之優勢,故不僅能增加公司盈餘,亦能替其達到節稅之效果。綜合上述實證結果可知,不論事董事長抑或是高階經理人,在擁有自主決策權情況下,皆會憑藉所擁有之專業知識,運用不同方法調整公司盈餘以達其預期之目的。
Due to a better understanding of accounting expertise and more to enhance aspects of the supervisory functions of the audit committee, some of studies have found that when directors have accounting background (Mark et al, 2004;. Lai et al, 2007.). It can be seen that when the directors have the professional educational background are more able to improve its oversight effect (Beasley, 1996). However, the chairman of the board of directors has the advantage in the decision-making authority (Kakabadse et al, 2006;. Balta et al, 2010.). When CEO duality, the chairman would have too large decision-making power and control (Arena, 2013). It will reduce the effectiveness of their supervision, thereby affecting the quality of financial reporting whether the board members have the professional educational background(Khairul Anuar Kamarudin et al., 2012). This study would confer whether earnings management have any effect when CEO duality with his professional educational background. According to the study of Hambrick and Mason (1984) , he compared with other educational background found that the the senior managers who have formal management education may use the cover plants, etc., to establish long-term assets. And the purpose is to pursue short-term performance goals. The other scholars have pointed out that when senior managers have different professional educational background thier management characteristics would also be different (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). The expertise of evry senior managers is different, the reach of its decision-making objectives used the method and the impact on business is also different (Frank and Goyal, 2009). However, when CEO duality, the power of decision-making rests is at the chairman. Result of past scholars distinguish between professional education background view after discovery, made their decisions are not the same. This study would be divided into professional and educational background in business education background and accounting education background. We found that the chairman and the senior managers who has the power of decision-making would use their professional knowledge to achieve the purpose of its expectations.
摘  要 I
Abstract II
目  錄 III
圖目錄 V
表目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機及背景 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第四節 研究限制 6
第二章 文獻探討 7
第一節 代理問題 7
第二節 盈餘管理 10
第三節 董事與高階經理人特性 16
第三章 研究設計與實施 23
第一節 研究流程 23
第二節 研究架構 24
第三節 研究方法 25
第四節 研究假說 26
第五節 實證模型 30
第六節 變數之操作性定義與衡量 34
第四章 實證結果與分析 42
第一節 敘述性統計 42
第二節 相關分析 47
第三節 實證結果分析 51
第五章 結論與建議 84
參考文獻 87
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