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研究生:楊茹安
研究生(外文):YANG RU-AN
論文名稱:設置薪酬委員會對家族企業與公司績效關聯性之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Compensation Committee on the Relationship between Family Firm and Firm Performance
指導教授:洪玉舜洪玉舜引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yu-Shun Hung
口試委員:戚務君劉正田
口試日期:2014-06-23
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:輔仁大學
系所名稱:會計學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:50
中文關鍵詞:家族企業薪酬委員會公司績效
外文關鍵詞:family firmCompensation Committeeperformance
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
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為強化公司治理規範,我國於2010年修訂證券交易法,強制上市櫃公司於2011年底前須設置薪酬委員會。本研究採2009年至2012年間台灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本,探討設置薪酬委員後對家族企業及公司經營績效的影響。
依據假說一之實證結果,設置薪酬委員會後相較設置前,家族企業相較於非家族企業,於市場績效上無顯著差異性。此外,在設置薪酬委員會後,非家族企業相較家族企業擁有較佳的市場績效。依據假說二之實證結果,設置薪酬委員會後相較設置前,且家族企業相較於非家族企業,高階經理人的現金薪酬與會計績效,二者之連結性不具顯著差異性。我們並發現,在設置薪酬委員會後,家族企業相較於非家族企業,高階經理人的現金薪酬與市場績效具顯著的正向連結性。

In order to ensure compliance with corporate governance norms, the R.O.C. Securities and Exchange Act was amended in 2010 to force listed companies to establish a Compensation Committee by the end of 2011. This study uses sample companies in Taiwan to investigate the influence of establishing a Compensation Committee on family firms and firm performance in the period 2009 to 2012.
As a result, according to Hypothesis 1, on comparing Compensation Committees established (i.e.2011-2012) or not (i.e.2009-2010), there appears to be no significant correlation with market performance between family firms and non-family firms. Moreover, after Compensation Committees were established, the non-family firms are showing significantly better market performance than family firms. According to Hypothesis 2, on comparing Compensation Committees established in family firms versus non-family firms, there is no significant correlation seen between CEO’s compensation and accounting performance. We also find that after Compensation Committees were established, the CEO’s compensation is positively correlated with market performance in family firms, as compared to non-family firms.

表 次
第一章 緒論 0
第一節 研究背景與動機 0
第二章 文獻探討 0
第一節 薪酬委員會(Compensation committee) 0
第二節 家族企業 0
第三章 研究方法 0
第一節 研究假說 0
第二節 樣本選取與資料收集 0
第三節 實證模型 0
第四節 變數衡量 0
第四章 實證結果 0
第一節 敘述性統計 0
第二節 相關係數分析 0
第三節 實證結果 0
第五章 結論與建議 0
參考文獻 0



表 次
表 1樣本產業別 0
表 2變數定義及說明 0
表 3敘述性統計表 0
表 4設置薪酬委員會公司年度分配表 0
表 5相關係數表 0
表 6設置薪酬委員會後,對家族企業公司會計績效(ROA)之影響 0
表 7設置薪酬委員會後,對家族企業公司市場績效(Tobin's Q)之影響 0
表 8設置薪酬委員會後,家族企業相較於非家族企業對公司薪酬績效 0
表 9設置薪酬委員會後,家族企業相較於非家族企業對公司薪酬績效 0


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