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研究生:叢憶
研究生(外文):Tsorng Yi
論文名稱:董事連結對公司融資決策之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Board Connectedness on Firm's Financial Structure Decisions
指導教授:許培基許培基引用關係
指導教授(外文):Dr. Shu, Pei-Gi
口試委員:邱啟倫孫梅瑞
口試日期:2014-06-20
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:輔仁大學
系所名稱:企業管理學系管理學碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:41
中文關鍵詞:董事外部連結融資順位
外文關鍵詞:Board External ConnectednessPecking Order
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當公司有資金需求時,可以透過內部籌資、銀行借款、對外舉債、以及發行股票等來解決資金需求。融資決策一直是學術上爭議的焦點,本研究擬探討董事外部連結對於公司資本結構調整之影響,實證模型參考Shyam-Sunder 與 Myers (1999)融資順位調整模型,而融資順位理論之自變數為資金缺口。
Myers 與 Majluf (1984)研究指出,當市場存在嚴重資訊不對稱效果時,管理者在沒有代理問題的疑慮下,很可能放棄有利的投資機會,因為籌措該筆資金可能面臨公司權益價值被嚴重低估的可能,當低估的程度大於專案淨現值的價值,公司則寧可放棄有利的投資機會。根據選擇權理論,由於負債被低估的程度小於權益,因此公司如有外部資金需求會偏好負債籌措。如果董事因為外部連結關係,進而降低資訊不對稱之影響,則加入董事連結的效果,預期將弱化負債籌資與資金缺口的連結性。
本研究以2007-2011共6,228筆上市櫃公司資料分析上述議題,研究結果發現,董事連結對負債融資有正面效果,亦即董事對外連結可以提升公司負債資金之籌措,但是董事連結與資金缺口之交乘項顯著為負,這說明董事外部的連結性可以降低公司與外部投資者資訊不對稱的效果,僅而弱化資金缺口與負債融資的連結性。本研究進一步探究資訊不對稱程度是否真的影響融資順位理論,以公司規模、該公司是否被分析師預測、是否被MSCI指
數涵蓋,做為資訊不對稱的代理變數。結果顯示,這些變數的確會弱化資金缺口與負債融資的連結性。以此強化本研究之推論:董事對外連結有利於資訊不對稱程度之消除,進而弱化融資順位理論對於負債融資偏好之預期。

Internal fund, bank loans, public debt and equity issuance are possible sources when firms are in need of funds. Financial decision remains a controversial issue in literature. In this study we explore how board connectedness is related to firm’s financial preference with the empirical setting referring to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) in testing pecking order theory.
Myers and Majluf (1984) indicate that even in the condition of no agency costs firms might forsake positive NPV projects when there is severe information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. The rationale is that the costs of seeking external funds due to information asymmetry might outweigh the benefits from taking positive NPV projects. Moreover, based on option theory, the undervaluation of debt is lower than equity. Inasmuch, firms would prefer debt to equity when seeking external financial sources. We postulate that board external connectedness might ameliorate the negative impact of information asymmetry and therefore attenuates the linkage between debt financing and cash flow deficit.
Using 6,228 firm-year observations of the listed firms in Taiwan in the sampling period of 2007-2011 we find that board external connectedness is positively associated with debt financing implying that board members’ external connection facilitates the incumbent firms’ debt financing sources. Moreover, the interaction between board external connectedness and cash flow deficit is significantly negative, implying that board external connectedness helps the amelioration of information asymmetry and therefore weakens the debt-deficit linkage. We further explore whether the attenuation in debt-deficit linkage is due to the reduction in information asymmetry. Using firm size, whether the underlying firm is covered by analysts, whether the firm is covered by MSCI as the proxies of information asymmetry, we verify that firms with a high degree of board external connectedness is associated with large size, and covered by analysts and MSCI than firms with a lower degree of board external connectedness.

目錄
頁次
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程 4
第貳章 文獻探討與假說建立 5
第一節 文獻探討 5
第二節 假說探討與建立 13
第參章 研究設計 14
第一節 研究架構 14
第二節 資料來源與樣本選取 15
第三節 變數定義及衡量 15
第四節 模型設計 20
第肆章 實證結果與分析 21
第一節 敘述性統計分析 21
第二節 多元線性迴歸分析結果 27
第伍章 結論與建議 38

表目錄
頁次
表 4-1-1各變數之基本統計量 21
表 4-1-2研究產業分布表 23
表 4-1-3 Pearson相關係數矩陣表 24
表 4-1-4本研究變數之(平均數)差異性檢定 25
表 4-1-5本研究變數之(平均數)差異性檢定 25
表 4-2-1負債比率變動-董監事連結(全樣本) 27
表 4-2-2負債變動比率-董監事連結(全樣本) 29
表 4-2-3負債比率變動-董監事連結(限制樣本後) 31
表 4-2-4負債變動比率-董監事連結(限制樣本後) 33
表 4-2-5 BEC1-資訊不對稱指標差異分析 34
表 4-2-6 BEC2-資訊不對稱指標差異分析 35
表 4-2-7 BEC3-資訊不對稱指標差異分析 35
表 4-2-8資訊不對稱之迴歸分析 37


圖目錄
頁次
圖 1-3-1研究流程圖 4
圖 3-1-1研究架構圖 14

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