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研究生:李珮歆
研究生(外文):Li, Pei-Hsin
論文名稱:影響金融機構總經理薪酬之關鍵因素-績效評估與公司 治理機制的實證研究
論文名稱(外文):Key Elements of Financial Institutional CEO Compensation:The Empirical Study of Performance Evaluation, CorporateGovernance Mechanisms
指導教授:歐陽豪歐陽豪引用關係李政隆李政隆引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ou-Yang, HouLi, Cheng-Lung
口試委員:李明興
口試委員(外文):Lee,Ming-Shing
口試日期:2014-06-04
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:崑山科技大學
系所名稱:企業管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:總經理薪酬績效公司治理機制金融控股公司
外文關鍵詞:CEO CompensationPerformanceCorporate Governance MechanismFinancial Holding Company
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:335
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  • 下載下載:2
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
本研究旨在探討『金融控股公司組織』對『公司績效與總經理薪酬』與『公司治理機制與總經理薪酬』間關係有何影響?研究期間與樣本為2003年至2012年台灣上市櫃之金融產業公司,其中,金融控股公司合計有144個觀察值,非金融控股公司合計有356個觀察值,兩者合計共500個觀察值公司。
本研究的主要動機與目的之ㄧ在驗證金融機構(包括金融控股公司與非金融控股公司),會計與市場績效指標與總經理薪酬間是否具有正向敏感性?兩者中何者的正向敏感性較高? 本研究動機與目的之二乃是要探討在目前台灣上市金融機構中,關於董事會結構組成變數-『總經理的持股率、總經理為家族集團成員、董事長是否兼任總經理』是否與總經理的薪酬呈現正相關?董事會規模愈大是否會顯著影響總經理薪酬?
本研究的主要動機與目的之三在驗證外部治理機制組成變數-金融機構之董事會的獨立董事或獨立監察人的監督功能,外部大股東存在與機構法人的監督,是否能降低總經理持股率、總經理為家族集團成員的身份、董事長兼任總經理或董事會規模過大對總經理圖利本身,進而提高與績效無關薪酬的不利影響,並探討外部治理機制是否能有效抑制總經理的薪酬。本研究的主要動機與目的之四在探討不同組織型態下-金融控股公司與非金融控股公司對上述10項變數對金融機構總經理薪酬是否有不同的影響?
實證結果發現:非金融控股公司較會採取以前期會計績效決定總經理薪酬,內部治理機制中,金融控股公司,總經理持股率與董事會規模對總經理薪酬均為顯著負向影響,非金融控股公司,總經理為控制家族成員對總經理薪酬為顯著負向影響,董事長兼任總經理對總經理薪酬為顯著正向影響;外部治理機制中,金融控股公司,獨立監察人比率對總經理薪酬為顯著正向影響,非金融控股公司,法人機構持股率對總經理薪酬為顯著正向影響,僅獨立董事比率與法人機構持股率分別在非金融控股公司與金融控股公司樣本中略有發揮監督的功能,獨立監察人比率與外部大股東的存在均未發揮其監督功能,此點值得主關機關注意公司治理機制在金融產業中是否真的有發揮正面影響,尤其對金融控股公司組織應加強監督。
This study examines the effects of firm performance, corporate governance mechanisms on CEO Compensation, which is an important issue recently. Further, this study argues that the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and CEO Compensation is moderated by financial holding company (FHC) samples. We collect 500 Taiwan financial listed and OTC firms to be our samples during 2003 to 2012, including 144 Financial Holding Firms and 356 non-Financial Holding Firms.
The first part of our study motivations and objectives is to examine the positive sensitive of accounting and market performance index on CEO Compensation in financial organizations (including FHC and Non-FHC). Which one of them is more positive sensitive?
The second part of our study motivations and objectives is to examine the positive relationship between CEO and the variables of board structure (the ratio of Top Managers Compensation shareholdings, CEO Compensation is the member of family controlled group, board chairman is also firms’ CEO Compensation). Will it be a significant influence on CEO Compensation if the size of board increases?
The third part of our study motivations and objectives is to examine external governance mechanism variables: whether the independent director (supervisor) ratio, outside block holders and institutional shareholdings have significantly monitoring function? And they will decrease CEO Compensation shareholdings, CEO Compensation belongs to controlled family member, board chairman is also CEO, or the size of board of directors gets larger, and results in do something benefit themselves, furthermore, promote the disregard impact on CEO Compensation. The final purpose of this study is to discuss whether outside governance will have the decrease function CEO Compensation.
The fourth part of our study motivations and objectives is to examine the impacts of three dimensions which contain 10 variables under full financial industry and non-FHC samples.
In the empirical analysis, we find that there exists significantly positive effect between firm accounting performance and CEO compensation by samples of non-FHC. In internal corporate governance mechanism variables, both the CEO shareholdings and board size have significantly negative effect on CEO compensation in FHC samples. CEO is the member of family controlled company has significantly negative influence on CEO compensation in non-FHC samples. However, board chairman is also CEO has significantly positive effect on CEO compensation in non-FHC samples. In external corporate governance mechanism variables, independent supervisor ratio has significantly positive effect on CEO compensation in FHC samples, institutional shareholdings has significantly positive effect on CEO compensation in non-FHC samples. As to the samples of all financial industry and non-financial holding companies, only independent director ratio and institutional shareholdings in external governance mechanisms, develop the monitored function. Independent supervisor ratio and external blockholders do not develop the monitored function. It worth the authority notice that whether corporate governance mechanisms execute positive influence in financial industry, especially in FHC.
中文摘要 ........................................................................................................ i
英文摘要 ...................................................................................................... iii
誌謝 ............................................................................................................... v
目錄 .............................................................................................................. vi
表目錄 ......................................................................................................... vii
圖目錄 ........................................................................................................ viii
第壹章、緒論 ............................................................................................... 1
1.1研究背景 ........................................................................................................ 1
1.2 研究動機與目的 ......................................................................................... 4
1.3研究流程 ........................................................................................................ 6
第貳章、文獻回顧與假說發展 ................................................................... 7
2.1績效與總經理薪酬 ...................................................................................... 7
2.2公司治理機制與總經理薪酬間的關聯 ................................................ 8
2.3『金融控股公司』對『公司治理機制與總經理薪酬』間關係的影響.............................................................................................................. 13
2.4控制變數 ...................................................................................................... 13
第參章、研究變數、實證模型與資料來源 ............................................. 15
3.1研究變數定義 ............................................................................................. 15
3.2實證模式:公司績效、公司治理機制變數、控制變數對總經理薪酬之影響................................................................................................ 17
3.3資料來源、變數定義、樣本選取準則 .............................................. 18
第肆章、實證結果與分析 ......................................................................... 19
4.1敘述性統計與分析 .................................................................................... 19
4.2『金融控股公司』與『非金融控股公司』之研究變數平均數差異檢定 ......................................................................................................... 22
第伍章、結論與建議 ................................................................................. 48
參考文獻 ..................................................................................................... 50
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