家族企業是台灣裡一種普遍的組織型態，在台灣經濟裡佔據重要的地位。學者認為家族企業之所以與非家族企業有所不同，是因為家族、家族成員與企業三者的互動會產生一種特殊的資源，能為其帶來競爭優勢。這種源自於家族涉入而產生的特殊資源，被認為是家族企業競爭優勢的來源，但有學者認為資源只是必要而非充分的條件，另外還必須透過各種不同的「管道」來對資源進行有效的管理與配置才能達到競爭優勢。然而在家族企業所擁有的各種能力中，家族企業成員佔董事會的人數比例與董事連結對於家族企業變更CEO是相當重要的要素，上述這兩種要素對於家族繼任CEO均有干擾著公司績效的因素。
本研究探討與彙整國內外家族繼任CEO及企業績效之相關文獻做出假設，進而以實證方式進行分析，最後提出結論。資料收集期間從2002年至2012年。資料來源取自於台灣經濟新報（Taiwan Economc Journal）相關資料庫、公開資訊觀測站。實證顯示當家族企業更換家族CEO時，對公司績效有顯著之負向影響；董事連結對於家族繼任CEO及公司績效有顯著的負向影響；家族企業成員佔董事會的人數比例對於家族繼任CEO及公司績效有顯著的正向影響。最後本研究亦對後續研究建議與實務提出不同之見解。

The family firm is a typical organizational institution in Taiwan that dominates the economic landscape. Scholars have proposed that the reason why family firms may be distinguished from non-family firms is that family firms possess a distinctive set of resources that stem from interactions between the immediate family, the extended family and the firm. Some believe that this set of resources gives family firms a competitive advantage, yet others argue that these resources, while necessary, are singularly insufficient in providing any clear benefit, as the resources must also be managed and deployed effectively. Still, the presence of family members on the Board of Directors and the unique relationships and networks of the family firm are among the most important as set savailable to family CEO successors.
In this study we not only explore the relationship between Family CEO Successors and Firm Performance, but also, we wish to address the following questions: (1) Do family CEO successors have a negative effect on firm performance? (2) Do interlocking directorates have a moderating effect on the relationship between family CEO successors and firm performance? (3) Does the presence of family members on the Board of Directors have a moderating effect on the relationship between family CEO successors and firm performance?

中文摘要……………….………………………………………………...…i
英文摘要..………………………………………………………………….ii
致謝 …………………………………………………………………….iii
目錄 …………………………………………………………………….iv
表目錄 ………………………………………………………………..…...vi
圖目錄 …………………………………………………………………....vii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節研究背景與動機 1
第二節研究目的 2
第三節研究貢獻 3
第四節研究流程 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節CEO繼承與績效 5
第二節社會資本理論之相關文獻 10
第三節董事連結之相關文獻 14
第四節家族企業之相關文獻 16
第五節資源依賴理論之相關文獻 21
第六節研究假說 23
第三章研究設計與方法 35
第一節研究架構 35
第二節樣本及資料來源 35
第三節變數定義及衡量 36
第四節實證模型 40
第四章實證分析 42
第一節樣本敘述 42
第二節敘述統計與相關分析 42
第三節模型驗證與分析 45
第五章研究結論與建議 47
第一節研究結論 47
第二節研究限制與未來研究建議 49
參考文獻 50
一、中文部分: 50
一、英文部分: 52

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