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研究生:黃榆芳
論文名稱:高階經理人超額薪酬與專利權之關聯性-以高科技產業為例
論文名稱(外文):The Relationship between CEO Excess Compensation and Patents: Evidence from High-Technology Industries
指導教授:梁嘉紋梁嘉紋引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:會計研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:78
中文關鍵詞:超額薪酬專利權高階經理人
外文關鍵詞:Excess compensationPatentCEO
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:435
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
根據過去文獻公司經常以管理階層之薪酬契約來解決代理問題,激勵經理人做出股東財富極大化之決策。而過去企業衡量經理人績效時,大多使用財務性指標,然而知識時代來臨,傳統財務性指標已不足衡量獎酬制度,尤其當公司策略重視創新及品質導向時,若獎酬只與傳統財務績效指標做連結,可能會導致經理人做出不當的決策,故亦應加入非財務性指標來決定獎酬。本文主要探討專利權對高階經理人超額薪酬之影響,由於專利權對於獲利存在遞延效果,本文推論董事會可能依據外部人無法觀察到的當期非財務性績效指標,給予相對應之超額薪酬。
由於專利權對於高科技業更為重要,因此本研究以高科技產業公司為樣本,進行實證研究,結果顯示公司專利權申請數、核准數及被引證次數愈多,高階經理人超額薪酬愈高。

Traditionally, firms use financial performance measures to reward managers and thus align managerial incentives with the interest of shareholders. However, recent evidence shows that firms are increasing using non-financial performance measures to evaluate CEO performance, especially when firms emphasize on innovation and quality. The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between patents information and CEO excess compensation for high-tech firms. The empirical results show that CEO excess compensation is positively associated with patent counts and patent citations after controlling for financial performance measures. Overall, the evidence suggests that non-financial performance measures provide incremental information about CEO efforts over financial measures and thus compensation committees adjust CEO compensation for non-financial performance.
壹、 緒論 1
一、研究動機與目的 1
二、研究問題 4
三、研究架構 4
貳、 文獻探討 7
一、代理理論 7
二、高階經理人薪酬相關文獻 8
三、專利權相關文獻 15
參、研究方法 21
一、研究假說 21
二、變數衡量 25
三、實證模型 30
四、分析方法 32
五、研究期間與樣本選取 32
肆、實證結果 38
一、衡量高階經理人應領薪酬 38
二、研究假說檢定 44
三、額外測試 53
伍、研究結論、限制與建議 64
一、研究結論 64
二、研究限制 65
三、研究建議 66
四、研究貢獻 66
參考文獻 67


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