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研究生:吳靜宜
研究生(外文):Ching-Yi Wu
論文名稱:產業創新條例帶來租稅公平?
論文名稱(外文):Does Act for Industrial Innovation bring Tax Equity?
指導教授:林宜勉林宜勉引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yi-Mien Lin
口試委員:傅鍾仁劉志諒
口試委員(外文):Chung-Jen FuChih-Liang Liu
口試日期:2014-05-03
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中興大學
系所名稱:高階經理人碩士在職專班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:52
中文關鍵詞:產業創新條例董事會結構研究發展支出資本密集度經營績效
外文關鍵詞:Act for Industrial innovationBoard structureR&D expenseCapital intensityManagerial performance
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  • 被引用被引用:5
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台灣從 1960 年以來政府即不斷的以租稅優惠及經費補助等政策來鼓勵企業 投入研發創新活動,1991 年實施之「促進產業升級條例」也於 2009 年施行屆滿; 2010 年之產業創新條例接續上路。產創條例適用於中小企業、傳統產業與高科技 產業,並使所有企業均可享受大幅調降的營利事業所得稅稅率之減稅利益。本研 究將探討此種制度的變革對企業租稅負擔之影響,除了探究在此制度變革下之企 業的有效稅率外,並進一步分析在此制度下企業之董事會結構對有效稅率之影 響,以及新稅制的實施與企業後續經營績效的關聯性。 具體而言,本研究的主要目的首先在探討在企業之研究發展支出的投資抵減 稅率降低後,資本密集度及研究發展支出較高的企業之租稅負擔將有何影響。其 次,在考量企業之董事會結構下,驗證前述研究議題下之企業之租稅負擔的影響。 實證結果指出,在企業之研究發展支出的投資抵減稅率降低後,企業之有效 稅率較創新條例施行之前為高。其次,在公司研究發展支出的投資抵減稅率降低 後,資本密集度較高的企業之有效稅率亦較改革之前高。再者,若控制董事會結 構,則資本密集度較高之企業於研究發展支出之投資抵減降低後,企業之稅負與 公司之有效稅率同樣成正相關有效稅率提高。最後,若控制了投資抵減稅率降低 對董事會結構之影響後,資本密集度較高的公司於研究發展支出的投資抵減稅率 降低後,公司的有效稅率仍然較產業創新條例實施之稅率改革之前為高。 前述之研究係探討在企業之投資抵減稅率降低後是否更達到租稅公平,則就 過去享有租稅優惠之高資本密集度之企業而言,因長期減免稅負,在實質的稅負 上相較中小企業實有租稅不公之虞。因此,本條例實施後,高資本密集度之企業 有效稅率較之前為高,使實質稅負增加則可帶來租稅負擔的公平性更佳。 對於經營績效方面,產業創新條例實施後,資本密集度較高的公司於研究發 展支出的投資抵減稅率降低後,公司的經營績效乃較產業創新條例實施之稅率改 革之前更佳。

The government has encouraged the businesses to invent the research and innovation in tax preference and the subsidies policy from 1960s in Taiwan. The Statute for Upgrading Industries is practiced from 1991 to 2009, and the Act for Industrial Innovation has practiced in 2010. The Act for Industrial Innovation is suitable for SME, conventional industry and high-technology industry. All of the enterprises have the benefit of the tax preference in the rate of Profit-seeking Enterprise Income Tax. We will discuss the effect of the policy for the tax burden on enterprise. We will not only discuss the effective rate under this policy for the enterprise but analysis on the effect of the board of director structure on the effective tax rate. We also discuss the connection between the new tax and the business effectSpecifically, the main purpose in this study is the Tax credit of investment of the R&D expense. How does it affect the tax for the enterprise with the high expense from the capital intensity and the R&D after reducing the tax rate? Regarding to the corporate board structure, we will verify the effect of the tax for the enterprise under the issue we mentioned before. It shows that after reducing the rate of Tax credit of investment of the R&D expense, the effective tax rate of the enterprise is much higher than the Act for Industrial innovation practiced. After reducing the rate of Tax credit of investment of the R&D expense, the enterprise with high capital intensity is much higher than the policy practiced. Next, we control the board of director structure, after reducing the rate of Tax credit of investment of the R&D expense, the enterprise with high capital intensity, the tax bearing and effective tax rate are in positive correlation. At last, if we control the board of director structure, after reducing the rate of Tax credit of investment of the R&D expense, the effective tax rate of the enterprise is still much higher than the Act for Industrial innovation practiced. This study is to discuss if it reach the fair taxation when reducing the tax credit of investment. Because the high capital intensity enterprise with fair taxation in the past enjoy reducing the tax bearing for a long term, it is much better than those SME. The fair taxation is not fair. Therefore, after practicing this policy, the enterprise with high capital intensity is much higher than the policy practiced. The increasing tax bearing would make the tax much fair. For the management performance, after practicing the Act for Industrial innovation and reducing the rate of Tax credit of investment of the R&D expense for the enterprise with high capital intensity, it is much better than before.

誌謝----------i
摘要-----------ii
英文摘要-----------iii
目錄-----------v
表目次-----------vi
圖目次-----------vii
第一章 緒論-----------1
第一節 研究背景-----------1
第二節 研究動機與研究目的-----------2
第三節 研究貢獻-----------3
第四節 研究架構及流程圖-----------4
第二章 文獻探討-----------6
第一節 促產條例之說明-----------6
第二節 產業創新條例之說明-----------7
第三節 稅負之相關文獻-----------8
第四節 董事會結構之相關文獻-----------11
第三章 研究設計-----------15
第一節 假說發展-----------15
第二節 研究期間、選樣準則及資料來源-----------17
第三節 研究方法-----------19
第四節 變數定義-----------21
第四章 實證結果與分析-----------22
第一節 敘述性統計與相關係數分析-----------22
第二節 樣本差異性分析-----------25
第三節 相關迴歸分析-----------30
第四節 考慮董事會結構之分析-----------33
第五節 敏感度分析-----------37
第六節 經營績效分析-----------41
第五章 結論與建議-----------44
第一節 研究結論-----------44
第二節 研究限制-----------45
第三節 未來研究方向-----------46
參考文獻-----------47


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