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研究生:陳敬雅
研究生(外文):CHEN-CHING YA
論文名稱:競賽誘因與公司風險關聯性之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Tournament Incentives on Firm Risk
指導教授:吳明政 教授
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立彰化師範大學
系所名稱:財務金融技術學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2013
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:競賽誘因公司風險公司決策
外文關鍵詞:tournament incentivesfirm riskcorporate policies
相關次數:
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本研究以2005至2011年在台灣證券交易所掛牌上市上櫃之公司為研究樣本,並依據競賽理論之觀點,探討在不同薪酬結構特性下,如:現金薪酬、股票分紅及員工認股權,高階經理人之薪酬差距與公司風險承擔及公司決策之關聯。
本研究主要結論彙整如下:
一、 根據薪酬結構的不同,高階經理人之競賽誘因與公司風險皆呈顯著正相關,亦即,不論以何種薪酬結構作為競賽誘因,當高階經理人之競賽誘因的效果愈大,則導致經理人藉由提高風險承擔來獲取升遷的機會。
二、 根據薪酬結構的不同,當高階經理人彼此間的競賽誘因越大時,則誘使高階經理人藉由公司決策(多投入R&;D、提高財務槓桿、降低公司多角化程度及減少資本支出)來增加經理人之間的薪酬差距。

Using samples of the Listed and Gre Tai Securities Markets in Taiwan over the period of 2005-2011, this paper first employs gaps between executive and non-executive compensations as measures of tournament incentives. Furthermore, this paper investigates the relationship among tournament incentives, firm’s risk-taking, and corporate policies.
The empirical results show that higher tournament incentives have positive impacts on firm’s risk-taking. To increase the chance of promotion, employees put more effort on their work to meet higher level of compensations, meanwhile increases the firm’s risk.
Finally, this paper finds that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&;D intensity and leverage, but lower firm focus and capital expenditures intensity. Also, promotion tournaments provide incentives for employees to increase firm’s risk.

目錄
第壹章 緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機……………………………1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………….5
第三節 研究架構與流程……………………………6
第貳章 文獻探討
第一節 競賽理論…………………………………….9
第二節 高階經理人薪酬結構…………………….11
第三節 薪酬結構與風險及決策之關聯………...13
第參章 研究方法
第一節 樣本資料……………………………………17
第二節 實證模型……………………………………18
第三節 變數定義……………………………………19
第肆章 實證結果與分析
第一節 敘述統計與相關分析…………………….26
第二節 迴歸分析……………………………………32
第伍章 結論與建議
第一節 結論………………………………………….44
第二節 研究限制與建議…………………………..47
參考文獻………………………………………………………..49


圖目錄
圖1 研究架構圖…………………………………………………7
圖2 研究流程圖…………………………………………………8

表目錄
表3-1 實證模型………………………………………………..18
表3-2 複迴歸變數定義表…………………………………...25
表4-1 樣本敘述性統計……………………………………….27
表4-2 Pearson 相關係數矩陣……………………………….29
表4-3 多元共線性診斷……………………………………….31
表4-4 競賽誘因對營運風險(Operating)之影響………….35
表4-5 競賽誘因對財務風險(Stock return)之影響………….36
表4-6 競賽誘因對研發支出率(R&;D)之影響………..…..39
表4-7 競賽誘因對資本支出率(CAPEX)之影響………….40
表4-8 競賽誘因對槓桿比率(Leverage)之影響…………..41
表4-9 競賽誘因對公司多角化(Focus)之影響…..……….42
表4-10 迴歸分析結果彙整…… ………….…………………43
參考文獻
一、 中文部分
李佳玲,2005,「不確定性、高階經理人報償差距與公司績效之關聯性:競賽理論之驗證」,會計評論,第四十二期,23-53頁。
陳明園、石雅慧,2004,「高階經理人薪酬-代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究」,臺大管理論叢,第15卷,第一期,131-166頁。
許文彥、劉淑芬,2006,「我國企業經理人薪酬與經營風險之關係」,風險管理學報,第8卷第1期,35-47頁。
二、 英文部分
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Brick, I. E. 2006. CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 403–423.
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