臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

如何設計契約使經理人努力誘因最大化一直是經濟學上一個很重要的議題，目前也已有許多文獻在探討如何設計所謂的「最適契約」。然而，在現實生活中，最適的契約往往會隨時間所變動，而契約中的參數對經理人所代表的意義也可能隨外在環境不同而有所變化。如此一來，給定一個既有的契約架構，當契約參數有所變動時，經理人的努力誘因會如何受到影響就是一個值得探討的議題，而在
這方面的文獻卻較少。本論文旨在探討當努力影響產出的高階風險時，經理人誘因將如何受契約參數的變化所影響。

Managerial motivation has long been an important issue in economy. There are many papers discussing the “optimal contract design” that would optimize the effort spent by managers. However, the “optimal” contract may be affected by several factors and therefore can change over time. The problem “how the managerial motivation would be affected under certain type of contracts” has long been ignored. This article aim to figure out how managerial effort would be affected by the change of the parameters of the contract provided the effort improves higher order risk of production.

誌謝 p.1
英文摘要 p.2
中文摘要 p.3
Introduction p.5
The Model p.7
The Discussion p.7
Conclusion p.14
參考文獻 p.16

Putting Risk in Its Proper Place (Eeckhoudt &; Schlesinger, 2006, AER)
Managerial Motivation Dynamics and Incentives (Kocabiyikoglu &; Popescu, 2007, MS)
On relative and partial risk attitudes: theory and implications (Chiu, Eeckhoudt, &; Rey, 2012, Econ Theory)
Apportioning of Risks via Stochastic Dominance (Eeckhoudt, Schlesinger, &; Tsetlin 2009, JET)