(3.237.97.64) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/03/04 12:10
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果

詳目顯示:::

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:賴志芳
研究生(外文):Chih-Fang Lai
論文名稱:勞動供給三維與政策分析
論文名稱(外文):Three Margins of Labor Supply and Policy Analysis
指導教授:陳明郎陳明郎引用關係
指導教授(外文):Been-Lon Chen
口試委員:張俊仁郭建廷賴景昌楊建成
口試委員(外文):Juin-Jen ChangJang-Ting GuoChing-Chong LaiC.C. Yang
口試日期:2014-06-24
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:經濟學研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:英文
論文頁數:133
中文關鍵詞:搜尋與配對工時失業勞動參與勞動稅和失業救濟金
外文關鍵詞:search and matchinghours workedunemploymentlabor force participationlabor taxes and unemployment benefits
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:183
  • 評分評分:系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
歐洲的勞動供給在過去的30年間─70年代初期到2000年代初期─相對於美國下降了30%,其中部分來自於每位工人勞動工時的下降,部分來自於就業人數的減少。目前已有許多文獻探討其成因,Prescott (2002, 2004)認為此差異全為歐洲的高勞動所得稅所造成,Ljungqvist and Sargent(2007, 2008)則認為歐洲優厚的失業救濟金導致居高不下的失業率。然而絕大多數文獻的討論都專注在政策對工時的影響或政策對就業的影響,卻鮮少有文獻探討政策對兩者的相對影響。又就業的變化同時受失業率和勞動參與率變動的影響,因此本博士論文試圖建構一套完整的理論模型涵蓋勞動供給的三個維度:每工人工時、失業率和勞動參與率,以供政策分析之用。
既有文獻中,目前已知涵蓋勞動供給的工時和就業兩個面向的只有Fang and Rogerson (2009)所提出的理論模型。Fang and Rogerson (2009)將工時植入標準的Pissarides配對模型中,得到勞動所得稅會同時降低每工人工時和就業的結果,但他們並未討論救濟金的影響,也未作定量分析。本論文第一篇延伸Fang and Rogerson (2009)的架構,將勞動搜尋的特性加入新古典成長模型的設定中,分析勞動稅和失業救濟金對勞動供給兩個面向的相對影響,並作定量分析。我們發現勞動稅提高的確會同時降低工時和就業;而較高的失業救濟金則會降低就業,但可能提高工時;兩者同時增加約能解釋75%歐美勞動供給的差異,解釋力則受勞動供給彈性和勞動尋職強度左右。
第一篇採用Fang and Rogerson (2009)的設定,每工人工時和工資皆由勞資雙方談判決定,然而文獻上工時有不同的決定機制,即使是在談判工時時,相對談判能力也會有所不同。第二篇延續Fang and Rogerson (2009)的架構,變動勞資雙方的相對工時談判能力。我們發現工人的工時談判能力越大,提高勞動稅對工時的負向影響越大,而對就業的負向影響越輕微。當工人的工時完全由家計單位決定,也就是談判能力為100%時,勞動稅對工時的影響達到最大,搭配效用函數中若是線性於工時,則對就業完全無影響。而工時若是由官方管制,勞資無法隨意更動時,勞動稅提高,想當然耳只會降低就業。
談完工時,第三篇分析就業。工人要就業必須先想工作而後找工作,前者決定於工人主觀的勞動參與意願,後者受限於勞動市場客觀的結構限制,主觀意願與客觀限制的不同連帶影響著政策的效力。因此第三篇在第一章的架構下內生化勞動參與,將就業分離為勞動參與率和失業率兩個維度,同樣以提高勞動稅和失業救濟金為例,分析在勞動參與內生與外生下,政策對每工人工時和就業的影響。本章發現勞動稅提高雖會升高保留工資而降低配對,但當勞動參與內生時,勞動參與的意願也降低了,勞動市場上尋職者減少,配對成功機率相對提高,就業反而較勞動參與外生時降得少。失業救濟金在勞動參與外生時為尋職者的考量,但當勞動參與內生時,工人在決定是否想工作時就已列入考慮,尋職時反而已不是保留工資的一部分。因為失業救濟金的提高鼓勵了勞動參與,就業也跟著增加,得到與傳統勞動搜尋模型截然相反的結果。而兩者同時提高的定量分析在勞動參與內生時對工時和就業的解釋度較佳。
綜合三篇的研究結果顯示,勞動供給可分為三個維度,各個維度的決定機制各有不同,連帶影響政策對各維度的運作效果,又各維度之間互有牽引,如若未將勞動供給的三個維度放在一個完整的架構裡討論,則政策分析的結果可能失真。

This dissertation decomposes labor supply into three margins step by step and studies the relative effects of two adverse labor market institutes on labor supply. Labor supply in Europe declined about 30% relative to the US over the past 3 decades. The decline in labor supply comes from both hours worked per worker and employment. Some studies attributed the declining hours worked to higher labor taxes, while other studies accredited high unemployment rates in Europe to generous non-employment benefits. Fang and Rogerson (2009) is the only exception which incorporates two margins of labor supply.
Fang and Rogerson (2009) embedded working hours into Pissarides matching model and found that higher labor taxes decrease both hours per worker and employment. The first essay of this dissertation starts from Fang and Rogerson (2009) to compares the relative effects of increases in labor taxes and non-employment benefits on hours per worker and employment and quantifies them. We find that increases in labor taxes decrease hours per worker and employment, with an overstated adverse effect on hours per worker if extensive margins are not taken into account. Moreover, increases in non-employment benefits decrease employment and increase hours per worker, with an understated adverse effect on employment if intensive margins are not considered. In the baseline parameterization, we find that increases in labor taxes and non-employment benefits together explain about 75% of declining labor supply in Europe, with the fraction accounted for being increasing in the labor supply elasticity and decreasing in the labor’s contribution in matching.
The second essay adopts the same setup of Fang and Rogerson (2009) but varies the relative bargaining power of workers on working hours. We find that the mechanisms shaping the supply of hours per worker play an important role. In the mechanism when the working hour is bargained by matched job-worker pairs, a higher labor income tax reduces both employment and hours per worker. When the laborer’s hour bargaining power is larger, the negative effect on employment is smaller while the negative effect on hours is larger. In the mechanism when labor hours are decided exclusively by the household, i.e., the laborer’s hour bargaining power is 100%, the negative effects on hours per worker approach to the maximum. In extremis, when the utility of leisure is linear in hours, there is no any effect on employment. In the mechanism when the working hour is effectively regulated by an authority, a higher labor tax only reduces employment without any effect on hours.
The third essay further splits employment into unemployment rates and labor force participation which is endogenous, and compares with the model with exogenous LFP. Because of discouraging LFP, labor taxes decrease employment in our model less than the model with exogenous LFP, have ambiguous effects on hours, and decrease less labor supply in our model. Due to boosting LFP, unemployment compensation increases employment in our model and decreases in the model with exogenous LFP, but with opposite effects on hours, labor supply is ambiguous in both models. With endogenous LFP, the quantitative result explains the difference in labor supply better than the model with exogenous LFP.

Acknowledgements ii
摘要 iv
Abstract vi
1 Introduction 1
2 Relative Effects of Labor Taxes and Non-employment Benefits on Hours Worked per Worker and Employment 4
2.1 Introduction 4
2.2 Relative Data 8
2.3 The Model 9
2.4 Equilibrium 16
2.5 Policy Analysis 22
2.6 Concluding Remarks 30
Mathematical Appendix 32
Table Appendix 36
Figure Appendix 38
3 Relative Effects of Labor Taxes on Working Hours and Employment: Role of Mechanisms Shaping Working Hours 39
3.1 Introduction 39
3.2 A Simple Labor Search Model 43
3.3 Effects of Labor Taxes on Employment and Working Hours 52
3.4 Quantitative Analysis 61
3.5 Concluding Remarks 64
3.6 Mathematical Appendix 65
Table Appendix 76
Figure Appendix 78
4 Effects of Labor Taxes and Unemployment Benefits on Labor Supply in a Search Model with Endogenous Labor Force Participation 81
4.1 Introduction 81
4.2 The Model 85
4.3 Two Models 93
4.4 Policy Analysis 100
4.5 Concluding Remarks 110
Table Appendix 112
Figure Appendix 115
Mathematical Appendix 117
5 Conclusion 125
References 128


Alesina, A., E. Glaeser and B. Sacerdote, 2006, Work and leisure in the U.S. and Europe: why so different? in M. Gertler and K. Rogoff eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005.
Andolfatto, D. 1996, Business cycles and labor-market search,” American Economic Review 86, 112-132.
Azariadis, C., B.-L. Chen, C. Lu, and Y. Wang (2013) “A two-sector model of endogenous growth with leisure externalities,” Journal of Economic Theory 148, 843–857.
Andolfatto, D. and P. Gomme, 1996, Unemployment insurance and labor market activity in Canada, Carnegie Rochester Series on Public Policy 44, 47-82.
Arseneau, D. M. and S. K. Chugh, 2012, Tax smoothing in frictional labor markets, Journal of Political Economy 120, 926–985.
Azariadis, C., B.-L. Chen, C.-H. Lu, and Y.-C. Wang, 2013, A two-sector model of endogenous growth with leisure externalities, Journal of Economic Theory 48, 843–857.
Bils, M., Y. Chang and S.-B. Kim, 2011, Worker heterogeneity and endogenous separations in a matching model of unemployment fluctuations, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3, 128–154.
Blanchard, O., 2004, The economic future of Europe, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 3-26.
Blanchard, O. and F. Giavazzi, 2003, Macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 879-907.
Blanchard, O. and J. Wolfers, 2000, The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European unemployment: the aggregate evidence,” Economic Journal 110, 1–33.
Burdett, K., N. Kiefer, D. Mortensen, and G. Neumann, 1984, “Earnings, unemployment and the allocation of time over time,” Review of Economic Studies 51, 559-578.
Calmfors, L., 1985, Work sharing, employment and wages, European Economic Review 27, 293-309.
Causa, O., 2008, Explaining differences in hours worked among OECD countries: an empirical analysis,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 596, OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/244230044118.
Chen, B.-L., H.-J. Chen and P. Wang, 2011, Labor-market frictions, human capital accumulation, and long-run growth: positive analysis and policy evaluation,” International Economic Review 52, 131-160.
Cheron, A. and F. Langot (2004) “Labor market search and real business cycles: reconciling Nash bargaining with the real wage dynamics,” Review of Economic Dynamics 7, 476-493.
Daveri, F. and G. Tabellini, 2000, Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial countries, Economic Policy 15, 47-104.
Diamond, P.A., 1982, Wage determination and efficiency in search equilibrium, Review of Economic Studies 49, 217-227.
Fang, L. and R. Rogerson, 2009, Policy analysis in a matching model with intensive and extensive margins,” International Economic Review 50, 1153-1168.
Fonseca, R., P. Lopez-Garcia and C.A. Pissarides, 2001, Entrepreneurship, start-up costs and unemployment,” European Economic Review 45, 692-705.
Garibaldi, P. and E. Wasmer, 2005, Equilibrium search unemployment, endogenous participation, and labor market flows,” Journal of the European Economic Association 3, 851-882.
Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz and G. W. Huffman, 1988, Investment, capacity utilization, and the real business cycle,” American Economic Review 78, 402-417.
Hall, R.E., 2005, Employment fluctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness, American Economic Review 95, 50-65.
Hall, R.E. and P.R. Milgrom, 2008, The limited influence of unemployment on the wage bargain, American Economic Review 98, 1653-1674.
Hansen, G., 1985, Indivisible labor and the business cycle, Journal of Monetary Economics 16, 309-327.
Heckman, J. and T. Macurdy, 1980, A life-cycle model of female labor supply,” Review of Economic Studies 47, 47-74. [A Corrigendum, 1982, 49, 659-60.]
Hoel, M. and B. Vale (1986) “Effects on unemployment of reduced working time in an economy where firms set wages,” European Economic Review 30, 1097-1104.
Hosios, A.J., 1990, On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment, Review of Economic Studies 57, 279-298.
Jacobs, B., 2009, Is Prescott right? Welfare state policies and the incentives to work, learn, and retire, International Tax Public Finance 16, 253-280.
Kim, S.-B., 2003, Unemployment insurance policy with endogenous labor force, Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics 19, 1-36.
King, R.G. and S.T. Rebelo (1999) “Restructuring real business cycles,” in J.B. Taylor and M. Woodford eds. Handbook of Macroeconomics 1, 927-1007, Elsevier Science B.V. G. KING
Krusell, P., T. Mukoyama, R. Rogerson, and A. Sahin (2010) “Aggregate labor market outcomes: the role of choice and chance,” Quantitative Economics 1, 97-127.
Krusell, P., T. Mukoyama, R. Rogerson, and A. Sahin, 2011, A three state model of worker flows in general equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory 146, 1107-1133.
Kydland, F.E. and E.C. Prescott, 1982, Time to build and aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 50, 1345-1370.
Kydland, F.E. and E.C. Prescott, 1991, Hours and employment variation in business cycle theory, Economic Theory 1, 63-81.
Layard, R., S. Nickell and R. Jackman (1991) Unemployment: Macroeconomics Performance on the Labor Market, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ljungqvist, L. and T.J. Sargent, 1998, The European unemployment dilemma, Journal of Political Economy 106, 514–550.
Ljungqvist, L. and T.J. Sargent, 2006, Do taxes explain European employment? Indivisible labor, human capital, lotteries and savings, In: Acemoglu,D., Rogoff, K., Woodford, M. Eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 181-224.
Ljungqvist, L. and T.J. Sargent (2007a) “Do taxes explain European employment? indivisible labor, human capital, lotteries, and savings.” In D. Acemoglu, K. Rogoff and M. Woodford, M. (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 181–224.
Ljungqvist, L. and T.J. Sargent, 2007a, Understanding European unemployment with matching and search-island Models, Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 2139-2179.
Ljungqvist, L. and T.J. Sargent, 2007b, Understanding European unemployment with a representative family model, Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 2180-2204.
Ljungqvist, L. and T.J. Sargent, 2008a, Two questions about European unemployment, Econometrica 76, 1-29.
Ljungqvist, L. and T.J. Sargent (2008b) “Taxes, benefits, and careers: complete versus incomplete markets,” Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 98-125.
Lucas, R. and E. Prescott, 1974, Equilibrium search and unemployment, Journal of Economic Theory 7, 188–209.
MaCurdy, T., 1981, An empirical model of labor supply in a life-cycle asetting, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 1059-1085.
Marimon, R. and F. Zilibotti (2000) “Employment and distributional effects of restricting working time,” European Economic Review 44, 1291-1326.
McDaniel, C., 2007, Average tax rates on consumption, investment, labor and capital in the OECD 1950-2003, Manuscript, Arizona State Univ.
Merz, M., 1995, Search in the labor market and the real business cycle, Journal of Monetary Economics 36, 269–300.
Mortensen, D.T. (1977) “Unemployment insurance and job search decisions,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 30, 505-517.
Mortensen, D.T. and C.A. Pissarides, 1999, Unemployment responses to skill-biased technology shocks, Economic Journal 109, 242–265.
Nickell, S., 1997, Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe versus North America, Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 55-74.
Nickell, S., 1998, Unemployment: questions and some Answers, Economic Journal 108, 802-816.
Ngai, L.R., and C.A. Pissarides, 2008, Trends in hours and economic growth, Review of Economic Dynamics 11, 239-256.
OECD, 1999, Benefit Systems and Work Incentives, Paris, France: OECD.
OECD, 2010a, Labour productivity growth, OECD Productivity Statistics (database).
OECD, 2010b, Labour force statistics: summary tables, OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database). doi: 10.1787/data-00286-en.
OECD, 2010c, "Trade unions: trade union density," OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database).
Ohanian, L., A. Raffo and R. Rogerson, 2008, Long-term changes in labor supply and tax: evidence from OECD countries, 1956-2004, Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 1353–1362
Olovsson, C., 2009, Why do Europeans work so little? International Economic Review 50, 39-61.
Petrongolo, B. and C.A. Pissarides (2001) “Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function,” Journal of Economic Literature 39, 390-431.
Pissarides, C.A., 2000, Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pissarides, C.A. (2007) “Unemployment and hours of work: the north Atlantic divide revisited,” International Economic Review 48, 1-36.
Prescott, E.C., 2002, Prosperity and depression, American Economic Review 92, 1-15.
Prescott, E.C., 2004, Why do Americans work so much more than Europeans? Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 28, 2-13.
Prescott, E.C., 2006a, Comment, in D. Acemoglu, K. Rogoff and M. Woodford eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 233-242, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Prescott, E.C., 2006b, Nobel lecture: the transformation of macroeconomic policy and research, Journal of Political Economy 114, 203-235.
Pries, M., and R. Rogerson, 2009, Search frictions and labor market participation, European Economic Review 53, 568-587.
Rocheteau, G. (2002) “Working time regulation in a search economy with worker moral hazard,” Journal of Public Economics 84, 387-425.
Rogerson, R., 2006, Understanding differences in hours worked, Review of Economic Dynamics 9, 365-409.
Rogerson, R., 2008, Structural transformation and the deterioration of European labor market outcomes, Journal of Political Economy 116, 235-259.
Rogerson, R. and R. Shimer, 2011, Search in macroeconomic models of the labor market, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Eds., Handbook of Labor Economics 4, 619-700.
Rogerson, R. and J. Wallenius, 2009, Micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 2277–2292.
Samuelson, P.A., 1948, Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Sattinger, M., 1995, General equilibrium effects of unemployment compensation with labor force participation, Journal of Labor Economics 12, 623-652.
Shimer, R., 2005, The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies, American Economic Review 95, 25-49.
Shimer, R. (2008) “Comment on: new Keynesian perspectives on labor market dynamics by Tommy Sveen and Lutz Weinke,” Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 931-935.
Shimer, R., 2011, Job search, labor force participation, and wage rigidity, mimeo.
Tripier, F., 2004, Can the labor market search model explain the fluctuations of allocations of time? Economic Modelling 21, 131–146.
van Vliet, L. and K. Caminada, 2012, Unemployment replacement rates dataset among 34 welfare states 1971-2009: An update, extension and modification of Scruggs’ Welfare State Entitlements Data Set, NEUJOBS Special Report No. 2, Leiden University.


QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
系統版面圖檔 系統版面圖檔