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研究生:簡鈺宏
研究生(外文):Yu-houng Jain
論文名稱:公司治理與政治獻金關聯性之研究
論文名稱(外文):A Study on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Political Contributions
指導教授:陳宜伶陳宜伶引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄大學
系所名稱:亞太工商管理學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:59
中文關鍵詞:公司治理董事會特性股權結構政治獻金
外文關鍵詞:Corporate governanceBoard of directorsOwnership structurePolitical contributions
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
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本研究探討公司治理對政治獻金的影響。本文對政治獻金定義為公司捐獻的政治獻金,以2008年和2012年總統大選資料為研究樣本,探討台灣上市櫃公司之董事會特性與股權結構對政治獻金的影響。我們發現,董事會規模和機構投資人持股比率與政治獻金具正向關聯性,獨立董事比例和經理人持股比例與政治獻金具負向關聯性,表示董事會特性與股權結構會影響公司能否發揮監督的有效性與公司的決策,進而影響公司捐獻的政治獻金與捐獻意願。
This study investigates the effects of corporate governance on political connections. This research defines political connection as political contribution donated by corporations and uses the political donation data of the presidential election in 2008 and 2012 to explore the impact of the characteristics of board of directors and ownership structure of Taiwan listed companies on political contributions. We find that the size of board of directors and institutional ownership are positively associated with political donations; the percentage of independent directors and manager ownership are negatively associated with political donations, meaning that the characteristics of board of directors and ownership structure would influence whether enterprises have monitoring effectiveness and enterprises’ decision-making, and further affect the political contributions of enterprises and their donation willingness.
目錄
致謝 I
摘要 II
Abstract III
目錄 IV
表目錄 VI
圖目錄 VII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節、研究背景與動機 1
第二節、研究目的 2
第二章 文獻探討 4
第一節、政治關聯 4
第二節、公司治理之背景 6
一、董事會 7
二、股權結構 10
第三節、公司治理與政治關聯 11
第三章 研究方法 14
第一節、研究假說 14
第二節、資料來源與樣本 16
第三節、變數衡量定義 16
一、應變數衡量變數定義 16
二、自變數衡量變數定義 17
三、控制變數衡量變數定義 19
第四節、統計分析方法 19
一、敘述性統計分析 19
二、迴歸分析 20
第四章 實證結果與分析 22
第一節 敘述性統計量 22
第二節 相關性分析 26
第三節 實證OLS迴歸分析 30
第四節 實證Logistic迴歸分析 36
第五章 結論與建議 42
第一節 結論 42
第二節 研究限制 43
第三節 研究貢獻與建議 44
參考文獻 45
中文文獻 45
英文文獻 46
參考文獻
中文文獻
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7. 劉彤,2002,所有權結構研究綜述(上),經濟研究資料,第7 期。
8. 陳家祥、陳嘉惠、郭國家,2006,資訊透明化與盈餘操縱關係之研究,《育達學院學報》,11:23-48。
9. 周明徹,2004 ,政商關係對企業價值的影響,國立清華大學經濟學系研究所碩士論文。
10. 易明秋,2007,公司治理法制論,五南圖書出版股份有限公司。
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應用科技大學商務經營研究所碩士論文。
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