(3.238.174.50) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/04/20 22:56
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果

詳目顯示:::

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:田逸凡
研究生(外文):Tian, Yi-Fan
論文名稱:公司經營績效與高階經理人薪酬之影響關係
論文名稱(外文):A Study of the Relationships between Corporate OperatingPerformance and Senior Management Remuneration
指導教授:吳翠治吳翠治引用關係劉朝陽劉朝陽引用關係
指導教授(外文):Wu, Tsui-ChihLiu, Jau -Yang
口試委員:吳翠治劉朝陽陳瑜芬李慕萱
口試委員(外文):Wu, Tsui-ChihLiu, Jau-YangChen, Yu-FenLee, Mu-Shang
口試日期:2014-06-23
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中國文化大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:高階經理人薪酬資訊不對稱公司經營績效
外文關鍵詞:compensationinformation asymmetryoperating performance
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:2
  • 點閱點閱:347
  • 評分評分:系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔
  • 下載下載:25
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:3
公司經營績效和高階經理人薪酬存在密切關係。近年來有許多企業不斷的發生危機,然而該企業的管理階層卻依然領著相當高額的薪資,或者企業本身獲利卻沒有給予相對的報酬。本研究從績效與薪酬之間增加資訊不對稱變數。本研究認為,在一般勞動市場中,公司願意支付較高的工資來雇用生產力高的員工,而員工的真實生產力在僱傭員工前並無從得知。故本研究以資訊不對稱觀點探討高階經理人的薪酬與公司經營績效之關係。
本研究係以台灣所有上市公司作為研究對象,樣本選取期間從2006年至2012年排除2008年金融海嘯;由於本研究是比較高階經理人薪酬的增減與公司經營績效變化的關係,所以主要變數以前後期之增減,並以公司治理觀點對於高階經理人薪酬進行實證分析。研究結果發現高階經理人薪酬會受到公司經營績效,董監事持股等影響。

Corporate performance and CEO compensation exists a close relationship. In recent years, many companies continue to have a crisis occurs, however, the management of the company is still led quite a high salary, or the business itself has not given the relatively profitable reward. This study adds to the information asymmetry between performance and compensation from variable .
This study suggests that, in the general labor market, companies are willing to pay higher wages to hire highly productive employees, and there is no real way of knowing the productivity of employees before hiring employees. In this study, information asymmetry perspective to investigate whether senior managers to pay to reflect operat-ing performance . In this study, all listed companies in Taiwan as research subjects, from 2006 to 2012 in 2008 to exclude samples selected during the financial crisis ; Because this study is to compare the change in CEO compensation and corporate performance , it is based on a two-year unit of observation before the latter, and in view of the human capital management performance for empirical analysis. The results showed that corpo-rate performance will be affected by senior managers salaries , bonuses, and human cap-ital.

中文摘要 ..................... iii
英文摘要 ..................... iv
誌謝辭  ..................... v
內容目錄 ..................... vi
表目錄  ..................... viii
圖目錄  ..................... ix
第一章  緒論................... 1
第一節  研究背景與動機............ 1
第二節  研究問題與目的............ 4
第三節 論文架構............... 5
第四節 研究流程............... 6
第二章  文獻探討................. 7
第一節  資訊不對稱.............. 7
第二節 代理理論............... 10
第三節 監控機制─股權與董事會........ 15
第四節 獎酬契約............... 18
第三章  研究設計與方法.............. 23
第一節  研究假說............... 23
第二節 變數的定義與衡量........... 28
第三節 研究模型............... 31
第四節 研究期間、樣本及資料來源....... 33
第五節 研究方法............... 34
第四章  實證結果與分析.............. 36
第一節  敘述性統計.............. 36
第二節 相關分析............... 37
第三節 迴歸分析.................. 40
第五章  結論.................... 40
第一節  研究結論.................. 40
第二節  研究建議與限制............. 41
第三節  未來研究建議............... 42
參考文獻....................... 43



一、中文部分
于學宇(2003),高階經理人報酬、公司治理與經營績效之研究,中山大學企業管理研究所未出版之碩士論文。
王文程(2010),訊息不對稱、最適稅率與經濟成長,台北大學經濟學系研究所未出版之碩士論文。
王建仁(2005),探討高階經理人薪酬水準之決定因素,成功大學會計學研究所未出版之碩士論文。
林峰成(1996),台灣上市公司高階主管酬勞、公司績效與控制權型態之關連性實証研究,中正大學會計學研究所未出版之碩士論文。
洪玉舜,王泰昌(2008),績效衡量指標在總經理股票誘因薪酬之相對重要性分析,會計評論,46,1-29。
周淑儀(2003),人力資本、薪資與組織績效-以電子業為例,中央大學人力資源管理研究所碩士在職專班未出版之碩士論文。
施念恕(1996),會計盈餘、股價與高階主管薪酬之相關性研究,中興大學會計學研究所未出版之碩士論文。
徐千惠(2012),高階經理人薪酬是來自於好運嗎?以外部公司治理探討,中原大學會計研究所未出版之碩士論文。
陳俊元(2003),台灣上市公司獎酬制度、多角化與經營績效之關聯,雲林科技大學企業管理研究所未出版之碩士論文。
陳奕瑾(2010),高階經理人薪酬與公司績效及盈餘管理關係之研究-穩健原則觀點,成功大學會計學研究所未出版之碩士論文。
陳雯惠(2010),董事會資本、董監酬勞與一領薪酬現象關係之探討-以金融保險業為例,成功大學會計學研究所未出版之碩士論文。
黃美華(1995),勞動市場教育與薪資差異之分析,中央大學產業經濟研究所未出版之碩士論文。
董威(2012),高階經理人薪酬與公司績效關聯性之研究,大同大學事業經營學研究所未出版之碩士論文。
二、英文部分
Agarwal, N. (1981). Determinants of executive compensation. In-dustrial Relations, 20(1), 36-46.
Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics, 84(3), 488-500.
Amir, E., & Lev, B. (1996). Value-relevance of non-financial in-formation: The wireless communications industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22(1), 3-30.
Beck, T. R., Levine, R., & Loayza, N. (2000). Finance and the source of growth. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 261-300.
Berle, A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The modern corporate and pri-vate property. New York: Macmillan.
Brounen, D., & Schweitzer, M. (2001). Information transparency pays: Evidence from european property shares. Real Estate Finance, 18(2), 11-39.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1), 81-112.
Conyon, M. J. (2006). Executive compensation and incentives. Acadamy of Management Perspectives, 20(1), 25-44.
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985). The structure of corporate own-ership: Causes and consequence. Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155-1177
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Two agency-cost explanations of divi-dends. American Economic Review, 74(4), 650-659.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and re-view. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57-74.
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 327-349.
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1989). Chief executive com-pensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political process. Strategic Management Journal, 10(2), 121-134.
Fu, J. (1996). The effects of asymmetric information on economic growth. Southern Economic Journal, 63(2), 312-26.
Gerhart, B., & Milkovich, G. T. (1990). Organizational differences in managerial compensation and financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 33(4), 663-691.
Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Jour-nal of Economics, 10(1), 74-91.
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Fi-nance, 48(3), 831-879.
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225-264.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1979). Theory of the film: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Finance Economics, 1, 163-231.
Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983). The market for corporate control: Empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1), 24-29.
Jenkins, E., & Seiler, R. E. S. (1990). The impact of executive compensation schemes upon the level of discretionary expenditures and growth in stockholder wealth. Jour-nal of Business Finance and Accounting, 17(4), 585-592.
Jensen, M. C., & Warner, J. B. (1988). The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1), 3-24.
Kaplan, S. N. (1994). Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of Japan and the United States. Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), 510-545.
Kaplan, R. S., & Norton, D. P. (1996). The balanced scorecard: Translating strategy into action. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Knight, D. J. (1999). Performance measures for increasing intel-lectual capital. Strategy & Leadership, 27(2), 22-27.
Lambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1985). Executive compensation, corporate decision-making and shareholder wealth: A review of the evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 7(1), 179-203.
Lambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1987). An analysis of the use of Accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contrasts. Journal of Ac-counting Research, 25, 85-125.
Lambert, R. A. (2001). Contracting theory and accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32(1), 3-87.
Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. (1977). Informational asymmetries, fi-nancial structure, and financial intermediation. Jour-nal of Finance, 32(2), 371-387.
Lewellen, W., Lorderer, C., & Martin, K. (1987). Executive com-pensation contracts and executive incentive problems: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Accountign and Economics, 9(3), 287-310.
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer, 48(1), 59-77.
Morck, R., Shileifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315.
Moyer, R. C., Chatfield, R. E., & Sisneros, P. M. (1989). Security analysis monitoring activity: agency costs and infor-mation demands. Journal of Financial and Quantita-tive Analysis, 24(4), 503-512.
Murphy, K. J. (1985). Corporate performance and managerial re-muneration: An empirical analysis. Journal of Ac-counting and Economics, 7(1), 11-42.
Murphy, K. J. (2001). Performance standards in incentive contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3), 245-278.
O'Connell, V. (2006). The impact of accounting conservatism on the compensation relevance of UK earnings. European Accounting Review Volume , 15( 4), 627-649.
Oviatt, B. M. (1988). Agency and transaction cost perspectives on the manager-shareholder relationship: Incentive for congruent interests. Academy of Management Review, 13(2), 214-225.
Patton, A., and Baker. J. C. (1987). Why won’t directors rock the boat. Harvard Business Review, 65(6), 10-18.
Ross, S. A., (1977). The determination of financial structure: The incentive -signaling approach. Journal of Economics, 8, 209-243.
Rozeff, M. S. (1982). Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determi-nants of Dividend Payout Ratios. Journal of Financial Research, 5(3), 249-259.
Salancik, G. R., & Pfeffer, J. (1980). Effects of ownership and performance on executive tenure in U.S. corporate. Academy of Management Journal, 23(4), 653-664.
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in human capital, Presidential address before the American Economic Association. American Economic Review, 51(1), 1-17.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). The Survey of Corporate Gov-ernance, Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783.
Singh, H., & Harianto, F. (1989). Management-board relationships, takeover risk, and the adoption of golden parachutes. Academy of Management Jourmal, 32(1), 7-24.
Smith, C. W., & Warner. J. B. (1979). On financial contract-ing-analysis of bond covenant. Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 117-161.
Spence, A. M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355-374.
Sun, J. & Cahan, S. (2009). The effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compen-sation and accounting performance. Corporate Gov-ernance: An international review, 17(2), 193-207.
Tsiddon, D. (1992). Moral hazard trap to growth, International Economic Review, 33(2), 299-321.
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). Positive accounting the-ory. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of directors and cor-porate financial performance: A review and integrative model, Journal of Management, 15(2), 291-334.

QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
無相關期刊
 
系統版面圖檔 系統版面圖檔