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研究生:張雅婷
研究生(外文):Chang, Ya-Ting
論文名稱:公司揭露與資訊不對稱關聯性之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Corporate Disclosures on Information Asymmetry
指導教授:汪進揚汪進揚引用關係
指導教授(外文):Uang, Jinn-Yang
口試委員:李慕萱張石柱汪進揚
口試委員(外文):Li, Mu-ShangJang, Shr-JuUang, Jinn-Yang
口試日期:2014-06-20
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中國文化大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:55
中文關鍵詞:資訊不對稱資訊揭露買賣價差股票週轉率市場風險
外文關鍵詞:information asymmetryinformation disclosurebid-ask spreadshare turnovermarket risk
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資訊不對稱可能引導公司利害關係人作出錯誤決策,甚至進而影響經濟秩序。為了瞭解企業資訊揭露對投資人資訊不對稱之影響,本研究以買賣價差、股票週轉率、市場風險以及對稱性綜合指標衡量資訊不對稱程度,以證基會所公布之資訊透明度評鑑結果作為企業資訊揭露程度之衡量。經採用2011至2012年台灣上市公司為樣本進行實證研究,實證結果發現,在控制潛在影響因素下,資訊揭露程度與買賣價差呈負向關係,並與股票週轉率及對稱性綜合指標呈正向關係,顯示公司資訊揭露可降低資本市場資訊不對稱情形。
Information asymmetry would lead stakeholders to make suboptimal decisions and even make a bad impact on economic order. To address the issue of whether corporate disclosures affect information asymmetry among investors, this study uses bid-ask spread, share turnover, market risk and a composite indicator to measure level of information asymmetry, and employs information disclosure and transparency rankings released by SFI as a proxy for extent of disclosure. Using companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2012, we find that, after controlling for potential confounding factors, the extent of disclosures is positively associated with share turnover and the composite indicator, and negatively related to the spread var-iable, indicating that more corporate disclosures can mitigate information asymmetry among investors.
中文摘要 ...................iii
英文摘要 ...................iv
誌謝辭  ...................v
內容目錄 ...................vi
表目錄  ...................vii
圖目錄  ...................viii
第一章  緒論.................1
第一節  研究背景與動機............1
第二節  研究目的...............3
第三節  研究流程與論文章節架構........3
第二章  文獻探討與研究假說發展........6
第一節  資訊不對稱..............6
第二節  資訊揭露...............8
第三節  公司揭露與資訊不對稱.........19
第三章  研究設計...............21
第一節  樣本與資料來源............21
第二節  實證模式與變數操作性定義.......23
第四章  實證結果與分析............31
第一節  敘述性統計..............31
第二節  相關分析...............33
第三節  資訊揭露與資訊對稱性.........35
第四節  敏感度分析..............39
第五章  結論與建議..............49
參考文獻 ...................51

一、中文部分
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林德明(2008),資訊揭露、董監結構與盈餘之資訊內涵,東吳大學會計研究所未出版之碩士論文。
柯美珠(2006),台灣證券市場買賣價差日內成份之研究,華人經濟研究,4(2),1-20。
張敏蕾(2006),財務報表資訊揭露程度與資訊不對稱-中國大陸深圳上市公司剖析,遠景基金會季刊,4,179-215。
張眾卓(2008),公司治理與市場微結構,中正大學財務金融研究所未出版之博士論文。
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黃薇涵(2009),由S&P 500公司觀察指定公平價值之金融商品對資訊不對稱之影響,台灣大學會計研究所未出版之碩士論文。
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二、英文部分
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Cheng, M., Dhaliwal, D., & Neamtiu, M. (2011). Asset securitiza-tion, securitization recourse, and information uncertainty. The Accounting Review, 86(2), 541-586.
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Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance, 46(4), 1325-1359.
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Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Finance Economic, 3(4), 305-360.
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Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1992). The impact of institutional trading on stock prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 31, 13-43.
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Merton, R. (1987). A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance, 42(3), 483-510.
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Palepu, K. G., & Healy, P. M. (1993). The effect of firms’ financial disclosure strategies on stock prices. Accounting Horizons, 7, 1-11.
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Spence, A. M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355-374.
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Xie, B., Davidson, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings man-agement and corporate governance: The role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, 295-316.

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