臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　本研究以2006年至2012年台灣上市企業為樣本，透過分析總經理過去的學習經驗與工作經歷，瞭解其對於當前企業管理績效的影響。本研究以總經理是否取得商管研究所的文憑、總經理過去曾經任職的企業數、總經理過去曾經任職的產業數、以及過去是否擔任過其他企業的總經理等四個變數，作為總經理個人學經歷的代理變數，並以會計績效衡量企業的營運績效。
　　整體而言，總經理是否取得商管研究所的文憑對於企業績效並無顯著影響，此處呼應了華爾街日報的報導，指出總經理就讀商管研究所對於其人脈發展的助益可能大於專業知識的培養。總經理曾經任職過的企業數則顯著受到產業數的影響，顯示總經理應在不同的企業間多方學習不同企業文化下的管理技能，但是這些企業應在同一產業中加強同一產業專業技能的培養。最後，總經理過去曾經擔任過其他企業的總經理對於當前的企業績效有顯著的助益，顯示過去的管理技能與親身經歷確實有助於當前職務的推行。

　　The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine whether the resumes of Taiwan listed firms’ CEOs’ lifetime experience affect the firm’s performance from 2006 through 2012. With the conditions of whether the CEO got the MBA degree, number of firms where the CEO worked, number of industries where the CEO worked, and whether the CEO held a CEO position at another firm. My study shows that the MBA degree doesn’t matter for CEOs’ ability to manage the firm. The numbers of firms that the CEO worked positively affect the CEOs’ ability to manage but the numbers of industries CEOs worked negatively affect, which means that CEOs should transfer in different firms but in the same industries. And the experience that CEOs held the CEO position positively affect the firms’ performance.

前言.....................................1
文獻探討...............................3
樣本選擇與研究方法...............7
結論...................................19
參考文獻.............................21
 

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