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研究生:蘇義程
研究生(外文):Yi-Cheng Su
論文名稱:超額薪酬是否存在於家族企業之高階經理人?
論文名稱(外文):Is There Extra Pay for Top Management Teamin Family Firms?
指導教授:黃政仁黃政仁引用關係
指導教授(外文):Cheng-Jen Huang
口試委員:劉俊儒陳瑞斌
口試委員(外文):Chun-Ju LiuJui-Pin Chen
口試日期:2014-06-23
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東海大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:71
中文關鍵詞:家族企業機構投資人持股高階經理人權力高階經理人超額薪酬主動型機構投資人
外文關鍵詞:Family FirmInstitutional OwnershipTop Management PowerExcessive Executive CompensationActive Institutional Investors
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本研究目的為探討家族企業之高階經理人是否有領取超額薪酬之現象,並區分高階經理人之權力(總經理持股比例、總經理兼任董事長以及高階經理人由家族成員出任之比例)及扮演監督角色之機構投資人,兩者對於高階經理人超額薪酬的影響。本研究以2008年至2012年台灣上市(櫃)公司為觀察對象,共6232筆觀察值,並進行OLS實證分析。本研究實證結果發現以下幾點現象:(1)家族企業與高階經理人超額薪酬有顯著正相關;(2)總經理同時兼任董事長時,與高階經理人超額薪酬顯著正相關;(3)高階經理人由家族成員擔任的比例與超額薪酬顯著正相關。結果闡述經理人之權力越大,越可能領有超額薪酬,但本研究也發現機構投資人之股權介入,能夠消弭超額薪酬,尤其以主動型機構投資人更能降低高階經理人之超額薪酬。
This study aims to explore whether there is excessive executive compensation in family firms. Also, this study distinguishes between top management power (CEO shareholdings, CEO duality and the proportions of top management served by family members) and institutional investors who play monitoring roles. I examine the effects of top management power and institutional ownerships on excessive executive compensation. Based on 6,232 observations, this research targets on the Taiwan listed companies from 2008 to 2012 and uses OLS methods to analyze the relationships mentioned above. The empirical results show that (1) family firms has a significant positive relationship with excessive executive compensation; (2) in family firms, CEO duality are significantly positive related to excessive executive compensation; (3) the proportions of top management served by family members significantly increase excessive executive compensation. In conclusion, manager power is positively associated with excessive executive compensation. However, the empirical results also show that institutional ownerships, especially active institutional ownerships, can significantly reduce excessive compensation of senior mangers.
致謝詞 I
摘要 II
英文摘要 III
目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
表目錄 V
第壹章 前言 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構與流程 5
第貳章 文獻回顧 7
第一節 股權結構與超額薪酬相關文獻 7
第二節 家族企業及內部力量與薪酬相關文獻 12
第三節 機構投資人與薪酬相關文獻 30
第參章 研究設計 38
第一節 觀念性架構 38
第二節 研究假說 39
第三節 變數衡量 43
第四節 研究模型 49
第五節 研究樣本 51
第肆章 研究結果 52
第一節 敘述性統計與相關係數分析 52
第二節 迴歸分析結果 55
第三節 額外測試 59
第伍章 結論與建議 62
第一節 結論 62
第二節 管理意涵及建議 63
第三節 研究限制與未來研究方向 64
參考文獻 65

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