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研究生:張維祖
研究生(外文):JHANG,WEI-ZU
論文名稱:以代理理論分析報酬方案對台商總經理所產生的效果:所有人-代理人觀點之研究
論文名稱(外文):Using Agency Theory to Analyze the Effect of CEO Incentive Programs on a Taiwanese-Manufacturer in China: A Principal-Agent Perspective.
指導教授:葉鳴朗葉鳴朗引用關係
指導教授(外文):YE,MING-LANG
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中華大學
系所名稱:企業管理學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
語文別:中文
論文頁數:51
中文關鍵詞:公司治理代理理論代理問題報酬方案
外文關鍵詞:corporate governanceagency theoryagency problemreward program
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
台灣製造業自2000年以來,隨著產品終端市場轉移與追求較低生產成本為緣由,各個企業廠商不斷將生產基地移往中國大陸以及東協國家。在面對此客觀環境的轉變情況下,公司治理除需面對股東與經理人間之權益代理問題,也因所有人與代理人身處不同國家而產生權益代理之管理問題-所有人對代理人的遠距離管理模式。
由於所有人與代理人之目標與利益不一致,雙方之契約與信息呈現不完全與不對稱之情形,代理問題必將油然而生。一般而言,所有人與代理人雙方利益完全一致之情況甚少出現,乃因代理人也不斷追求自身利益的最大化,特別是在臨近退休的年紀時,其追求個人利益大於所有人利益之驅動性將更加強烈。
本研究以台灣某一被動元件製造商為研究對象,探討個案公司之所有人為降低代理成本,如何建立完善的激勵與約束機制,以期代理人達成與所有人目標一致之願景,使之成為企業高效運轉和取得績效的積極力量。

Since 2000 many Taiwanese businesses moved their factories from Taiwan to mainland china and ASEAN in search of lower costs and new markets. The corporate governance still faced the old problems of trying to make sure their agents’interests are the same as theirs. We name it as equity agency problem. By moving their factories to new areas, they face a new problem. The principals are so far from their agents that it is difficult to control them.
Agency costs are to be expected. The principals’targets and interests are not the same as the agents. The principals and agents agree upon a contract together. The contract, however, does not completely define the entire extent of the relationship. For example, the agents’ interests are not defined in the contract and are always changing. Either principals or agents know all the information of the firm. They each can hide information from each other. Yong agents who are thinking about their career are more likely to protect principals’ interests. Agents near retirement, however, think less about their career are more about their own interests. Once we have accepted the reality of principals and agents relationship, we can look at incentives and constrains that can improve the relationship. This case study of passive components company of Taiwanese in china will suggest effective ways to do so.

摘 要                  i
ABSTRACT                 ii
誌謝辭                  iii
目 錄                   iv
表目錄                    vi
圖目錄                    vii
第一章 緒論                1
  第一節 研究背景               1
  第二節 研究動機與研究目的       3
  第三節 研究方法及研究流程         3
第二章 文獻探討        5
  第一節 代理理論           5
  第二節 代理問題         5
  第三節 代理成本         6
  第四節 報酬方案對公司影響        7
第三章 個案公司介紹            9
  第一節 個案公司簡介            9
  第二節 個案公司發展歷程         11
  第三節 個案公司組織結構         13
第四章 個案探討         15
  第一節 代理問題形成背景       16
  第二節 代理問題形成原因      17
  第三節 新報酬方案      23
  第四節 前任與現任代理人作為差異及影響 29
第五章 研究結論與建議      36
  第一節 研究結論    36
  第二節 研究建議      40
參考文獻           43
附錄A.                 46
附錄B.           48
附錄C.           49
附錄D           51
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