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研究生:張雍光
研究生(外文):CHANG YUNG-KUANG
論文名稱:股權結構對實質盈餘管理影響之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Ownership Structcre on Real Earnings Management
指導教授:張椿柏張椿柏引用關係徐傳瑛徐傳瑛引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chuen-Bo ChangChuan-Ying Hsu
口試委員:劉文祺王育偉
口試委員(外文):Wen-Chi LiuYu-Wei Wang
口試日期:2014-09-20
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:大葉大學
系所名稱:管理學院碩士在職專班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:103
語文別:中文
論文頁數:38
中文關鍵詞:實質盈餘管理股權結構代理問題
外文關鍵詞:Real Earnings ManagementOwnership StructureAgency Problems
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:145
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
投資人常以公司治理的優劣做為投資評估的重要參考,以往的盈餘管理研究多以應計項目為探討主軸,本研究檢視當企業產生盈餘管理誘因時,是否採用實質盈餘管理;據此探索實質盈餘管理與股權結構之間的關係。實證結果顯示,核心代理問題變數為正相關,控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度會影響公司的價值性,顯示核心代理問題確定會使公司價值下降。機構投資人持股比率呈現顯著正相關。最後,與誘因理論的文獻一致,當企業不具有盈餘管理誘因時,以上的這些現象均消失。
Investors often take quality of corporate governance as an important reference for investment appraisal. Most of previous studies on real earnings management used accountant items to explore it. This study examines whether a company will adopt real earnings management when incentives of real earnings management generates in a purpose to investigate the relevance between real earnings management and ownership structure. Empirical results show that core agency problem is positively correlated to real earnings management. Deviation of control rights and cash flow rights will affect the value of the company, showing core agency problem indeed decreases the value of a company. Institutional ownership correlated significantly positive with real earnings management. Finally, it is in consistence with former literature on incentive theory that when a company does not have earnings management incentives, these phenomena surely will disappear.
第一章緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機
第二節 研究目的
第三節 研究架構與研究流程
第四節 研究流程圖
第二章文獻探討
第一節 實質盈餘管理
第二節 核心代理和實質盈餘
第三節 股權結構和實質盈餘管理
第三章 研究方法
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源
第二節 變數定義
第三節 研究模型設計

第四章 實證結果與分析
第一節 敘述性統計分析
第二節 變數相關性檢定
第三節 迴歸分析
第五章結論與分析
第一節 結論
第二節 建議與限制


中文文獻
王元章、張椿柏,2011,從核心代理問題的角度探討股權結構,董
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王元章、張椿柏,2012,核心代理問題對盈餘管理之影響,會計審
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李春安、吳欽杉、葉麗玉 ,2003,所有權結構與公司非法行為關係之研究-以台灣股票上市公司為例,證券市場發展季刊,第14卷第4期:75-138。
呂麒麟、洪嘉聲、范麗雪、陳淑貞,2005,金融機構所有權結構、公司特性與逾放比率之研究,會計與公司治理,第2卷,第1期:61-79。
金成隆、陳俞如,2006,公司治理與專利權:臺灣新興市場,管理學報,第23卷,第1期:99-124。
周行一、陳錦村、陳坤宏 ,1996,家族企業、聯屬持股與公司績效之研究,中國財務學刊,第4卷,第1期:115-139。
俞海琴、周本鄂 ,1994,台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q 關係之研究,管理評論,第13卷,第1期:79-98。
高蘭芬與邱正仁,2002,董監事股權質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相
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許崇源,2003,控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(下),貨幣觀測
與信用評等雙月刊,第43期:11-26。
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩、鄭桂蕙,2003,控制權與現金流量請求權偏離之衡量-上:貨幣觀測與信用評等,第42卷:15-31。
許永聲、 陳信吉、陳琬菁,2013, 董事會特性與盈餘管理之選擇行為, 會計評論,第57卷:39-72.
張文瀞,2003,本益比變動與盈餘管理,當代會計,第4卷,第1期:29-56。
張瑞當、方俊儒、曾玉琦 ,2007,核心代理問題與盈餘管理:董事會結構與外部監督制之探討,管理學報,第24卷,第1期:17-39。
黃祥睿,2012,董事會特性與股權結構對實質盈餘管理影響之研
究,台中科技大學會計資訊研究所碩士論文。
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1. 呂麒麟、洪嘉聲、范麗雪、陳淑貞,2005,金融機構所有權結構、公司特性與逾放比率之研究,會計與公司治理,第2卷,第1期:61-79。
2. 呂麒麟、洪嘉聲、范麗雪、陳淑貞,2005,金融機構所有權結構、公司特性與逾放比率之研究,會計與公司治理,第2卷,第1期:61-79。
3. 金成隆、陳俞如,2006,公司治理與專利權:臺灣新興市場,管理學報,第23卷,第1期:99-124。
4. 金成隆、陳俞如,2006,公司治理與專利權:臺灣新興市場,管理學報,第23卷,第1期:99-124。
5. 周行一、陳錦村、陳坤宏 ,1996,家族企業、聯屬持股與公司績效之研究,中國財務學刊,第4卷,第1期:115-139。
6. 周行一、陳錦村、陳坤宏 ,1996,家族企業、聯屬持股與公司績效之研究,中國財務學刊,第4卷,第1期:115-139。
7. 俞海琴、周本鄂 ,1994,台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q 關係之研究,管理評論,第13卷,第1期:79-98。
8. 俞海琴、周本鄂 ,1994,台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q 關係之研究,管理評論,第13卷,第1期:79-98。
9. 葉銀華、蘇裕惠、柯承恩、李德冠,2003,公司治理機制對於關係人交易的影響,證券市場發展季刊,第15卷,第4期:69-106。
10. 葉銀華、蘇裕惠、柯承恩、李德冠,2003,公司治理機制對於關係人交易的影響,證券市場發展季刊,第15卷,第4期:69-106。
11. 許永聲、 陳信吉、陳琬菁,2013, 董事會特性與盈餘管理之選擇行為, 會計評論,第57卷:39-72.
12. 許永聲、 陳信吉、陳琬菁,2013, 董事會特性與盈餘管理之選擇行為, 會計評論,第57卷:39-72.
13. 張文瀞,2003,本益比變動與盈餘管理,當代會計,第4卷,第1期:29-56。
14. 張文瀞,2003,本益比變動與盈餘管理,當代會計,第4卷,第1期:29-56。
15. 張瑞當、方俊儒、曾玉琦 ,2007,核心代理問題與盈餘管理:董事會結構與外部監督制之探討,管理學報,第24卷,第1期:17-39。