跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(3.238.135.174) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/08/05 07:44
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:黃玉如
研究生(外文):Huang, Yu Ru
論文名稱:權益薪酬會影響審計委員會監督關係人交易之效果嗎?
論文名稱(外文):Does Equity-based Compensation Affect Audit Committee Supervision on Related Party Transactions?
指導教授:周玲臺周玲臺引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chou, Ling Tai
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:會計研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
畢業學年度:103
語文別:中文
論文頁數:56
中文關鍵詞:關係人交易審計委員會權益薪酬企業價值
外文關鍵詞:Related party transactionsAudit committeeEquity-based compensationFirm value
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:89
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
本文主要探討權益薪酬對審計委員會監督關係人交易效果之影響。本研究從美國證券交易所公開資訊EDGAR資料庫以手動蒐集關係人交易資訊,以2010年至2013年間之中小企業為樣本進行實證分析。實證結果發現關係人交易與權益薪酬交乘項與企業價值呈現顯著負相關,意即發放權益薪酬使得審計委員會極大化個人利益而過度注重短期財務績效,選擇默許管理階層不當之關係人交易安排,進而造成企業價值不利之影響。額外分析亦指出審計委員會之權益薪酬對其監督關係人交易效果有負面影響,但未發現證據指出審計委員會之現金薪酬與其監督關係人交易效果有關聯性。
This study investigates whether equity-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with the effectiveness of their supervision on related party transactions. We hand collect the data of related party transactions for small and medium-size firms from EDGAR database for the period 2010-2013. We find that the interaction effect between related party transactions and stock compensation for audit committee members is negatively associated with firm value. It suggests that in order to maximize short-term benefits, audit committee members with stock compensation are inclined to be more tolerable to earnings management through related party transactions that are unfavorable to shareholders. Additionally, we do not find any evidence indicating that cash compensation is associated with the effectiveness of audit committee’s oversight on related party transactions.
第一章緒論 ......................1
第一節研究背景與動機 .............1
第二節研究問題 ...................3
第三節研究貢獻 ...................5
第四節論文章節 ...................6
第二章文獻探討 ...................7
第一節關係人交易之性質 ............7
第二節關係人交易之相關文獻 ........9
第三節審計委員會 ................11
第四節審計委員會之誘因及薪酬 .....12
第三章研究方法 ..................14
第一節研究假說 ..................14
第二節樣本選取與資料蒐集 .........17
第三節研究模型與變數衡量 .........20
第四章實證結果 ..................28
第一節敘述性統計分析 .............28
第二節相關係數分析 ..............30
第三節複迴歸結果分析 .............33
第四節其他測試 ..................37
第五章結論與建議 ................47
第一節研究結論 ..................47
第二節研究限制 ..................49
第三節研究建議 ..................50
參考文獻 .......................51
中文文獻

陳文河,2002,上市公司外部董事及監察人行使職權成效之研究,證交資料,第 456 期,頁 2。

羅贊興、陳逸珊、黃書芸及黃馨儀,美國企業改革法案對我國上市公司治理制度適用性之探討(上),2011,頁 8–34。

許智順、簡俱揚、黃媺婷與陳燕錫,2012,產業專家會計師事務所對關係
人交易之影響 ,商管科技季刊,第十三卷,第二期,頁 99–129。

劉倩妏,2014,關係人交易之利益衝突及規範面向,法令月刊,第 65 卷,第 12 期,頁 69–91。

劉若蘭、許永聲與劉力維,2014,在不同生命週期下董事會組成特性對公司經營績效之影響,會計評論,第五十八期,頁 133–165。

英文文獻

Adams, R. B., and D. Ferreira. 2008. Do directors perform for pay? Journal of Accounting and Economics 46: 154–171.

Abbott, L. J., and S. Parker. 2000. Audit selection and audit committee characteristics. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 19(2): 47–66.

Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G. F. Peter. 2004. Audit committee characteristics and restatement. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 23(1): 69–87.

Archambeault, D. S., F. T. DeZoort, and D. R. Hermanson. 2008. Audit committee incentive compensation and accounting restatements. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (4): 965–992.

Bedard, J., S. M. Chtourou, and L. Courteau. 2004. The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 23(2): 13–35.

Berkman, H., R. A. Cole, and J. L. Fu. 2009. Expropriation through loan guarantees to related parties: Evidence from China. Journal of Banking and Finance 33: 141–156.

Berle, A. A., and G. C. Means. 1932. The modern corporation and private property. Transaction Publishers.

Bierstaker, J. L., J. R. Cohen, F. T. DeZoort, and D. R. Hermanson. 2012. Audit committee compensation, fairness, and the resolution of accounting disagreements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 31 (2): 131–150.

Boumosleh, A. 2009. Director compensation and the reliability of accounting information. The Financial Review 44 (4): 525–539.

Brick, I. E., O. Palmon, and J. K. Wald. 2006. CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance 12 (3): 403–423.

Chen, K. C., and J. Li. 2008. Audit committee and firm value: Evidence on outside top executives as expert-independent directors. Corporate Governance: An International Review 16(1): 16–31.

Chen, V. Y. S., Y. K. Ho, and Z. Zhu. 2013. Non-executive compensation and corporate investment decision making: Evidence from R&;D investment. Working paper. National University of Singapore.

Chen, Y., C. Chen, and W. Chen. 2009. The impact of related party transactions on the operational performance of listed companies in China. Journal of Economic Policy Reform 12(4): 285–297.

Cheung, Y., Y. Qi, P. R. Rau, and A. Stouraitis. 2009. Buy high, sell low : how listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions. Journal of banking and finance 33: 914–924.

Chowdhury, S.D. (2009, January/February). Director compensation: The growing popularity if deferred stock units. Ivey Business Journal Online 1.

Cordeiro, J. J., R. Veliyath, and D. O. Neubaum. 2005. Incentives for monitors: director stock-based compensation and firm performance. The Journal of Applied Business Research 21 (2): 81–90.

Cullinan, C. P., H. Du, and G. B. Wright. 2008. Is there an association between director option compensation and the likelihood of misstatement? Advances in Accounting, Incorporating Advances in International Accounting 24 (1): 16–23.

Daily, C. M., and D. R. Dalton. 2002. The problem with equity compensation.Journal of Business Strategy 23 (4): 28–30.

Daines, R. 2001. Does Delaware law improve firm value? Journal of Financial Economics 62: 525–558.

Demsetz, H. 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 375–390.

Diamond, S. F. (2006, October 10). Healthy reminder of risks of stock options. Finacial Times: 10.

DuCharme, L. L., P. H. Malatesta, and S. E. Sefcik. 2001. Earnings management: IPO valuation and subsequent performance. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 16(4): 369–396.

Engel, E., R. M. Hayes, and X. Wang. 2010. Audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49: 136–154.

Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics 43: 153–193.

Fama, E., and M. Jensen. 1983. Seperation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301–325.

Fich, E. M., and A. Shivdasani. 2005. The impact of stock‐option compensation for outside directors on firm value. The Journal of Business 78 (6): 2229–2254.

Frankel, R., M. Johnson, and K. Nelson. 2002. The relation between auditors’ fees for nonaudit services and earnings management. The Accounting Review 77: 71–105.

Gordon, E., E. Henry, and D. Palia. 2004. Related party transactions and corporate governance. Advances in Financial Economics 9: 1–27.

Henry, E., E. Gordon, B. Reed, and T. Louwers. 2012. The role of related party transactions in fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Forensic &; Investigative Accounting 4 (1): 186–213.

Hermalin, B. E., and M. S. Weisbach. 1987. The effect of board composition on corporate performance. Working paper.

Jensen, M. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48: 831–880.

Jian, M. and T. J. Wong. 2004. Earnings management and tunneling through related party transactions: Evidence from Chinese corporate groups. Working paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Jian, M. and T. Wong. 2010. Propping through related party transactions. Review of Accounting Studies 15(1): 70-105.

Johnson, S., R. L. Porta., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2000. Tunneling. The American Economic Review 90: 22–27.

Karamanou, I., and N. Vafeas. 2005. The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 43(3): 453–486.

Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 375–400.

Kohlbeck, M. J., and B. W. Mayhew. 2004. Agency costs, contracting, and related party transactions. Working paper, University of Florida Atlantic.

Kohlbeck, M. J., and B. W. Mayhew. 2014. Are related party transactions red flags? Working paper, University of Florida Atlantic.

Krishnan, J. 2005. Audit committee quality and internal control: An empirical analysis. The Accounting Review 80(2): 649–675.

Levitt, A. 1998. The numbers game. Speech delivered at New York University, Center for Law and Business, September 28. Available at: http://www.sec.gov /news /speech /speecharchive/1998 /spch220.txt.

Magilke, J. M., B. W. Mayhew and J. E. Pike. 2009 Are independent audit committee members objective? Experimental evidence. The Accounting Review 84 (6): 1959–1981.

McMullen, D. A. 1995. Audit committee performance: An investigation of the consequences associated with audit committees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 15(1): 87–103.

Morck, R., A. Shleifer., and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293–315.

Myers, J., L. Myers, Z.V. Palmrose, and S. Scholz. 2005. The length of auditor-client relationships and financial statement restatements. Working paper, Texas A&;M University.

Myers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5: 147–175.

Persons, O. 2012. Stock option and cash compensation of independent directors and likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Journal of Business and Economic studies 18(1): 54–73.

Ryngaert, M., and S. Thomas. 2012. Not all related party transactions(RPTs) are the same: Ex ante versus ex post RPTs. Journal of Accounting Research 50(3): 845–882.

Sanders, W. G., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50(5): 1055−1078.

Securities and Exchange Commission. 2006. Executive compensation and related person disclosure, SEC Release No.33-8732a.

Sengupta, P., and S. Zhang. 2014. Equity-based compensation of outside directors and corporate disclosure quality. Working paper, George Mason University.

Stout, L. 2003. On the proper motives of corporate directors. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 28:1–25.

Teoh, S. H., I. Welch, and T. J. Wong. 2002. Earnings management and the long-run market performance of initial public offerings. The Journal of Finance 53(6): 1935–1974.

Vafeas, N. 2005. Audit committees, boards, and the quality of reported earnings. Contemporary Accounting Research 22(4): 1093–1122.

Yermack, D. 2004. Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside directors. Journal of Finance 59: 2281–2308.


















連結至畢業學校之論文網頁點我開啟連結
註: 此連結為研究生畢業學校所提供,不一定有電子全文可供下載,若連結有誤,請點選上方之〝勘誤回報〞功能,我們會盡快修正,謝謝!
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top