臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究運用賽局理論建構模型，探討在不同的競爭條件下，當產品品質為內生決定時，廠商的通路策略選擇。考慮市場上存在兩家互相競爭的廠商與一家零售商。賽局順序為：第一階段，兩家廠商同時決定其通路策略，包括只使用直接通路(D)、只使用間接通路(I)，或者兩種通路都使用(B)，共有九種通路策略組合；第二階段，兩家廠商同時決定其產品品質；第三階段，兩家廠商同時決定在間接通路中賣給零售商的批發價，以及在直接通路中銷售給消費者的產品價格；第四階段，零售商決定其在間接通路中的銷售價格；最後，在觀察所有價格後，消費者決定其購買決策。
本研究使用後向歸納法求解九種通路策略組合下之最適廠商利潤、價格、銷售量及批發價，並進行均衡分析，最後探討廠商之均衡策略組合。本研究獲得的主要分析結果為：(一) 當雙佔廠商一家選擇雙重通路，另一家選擇間接通路，在產品替代性以及通路替代性夠大時，選擇雙重通路之廠商在間接通路的定價會低於直接通路的定價。(二) 雙佔廠商的通路策略並不會影響其產品品質的制定，表示廠商在制定品質時，可能有除了通路之外的其他考量因素。(三) 當產品替代性以及通路替代性不大時，均衡策略組合為(B, B)；而當產品替代性以及通路替代性夠大時，廠商有誘因選擇不與對手重疊的通路策略，則均衡策略組合為(I, D)及(D, I)。(四) 在均衡為(I, D)、(D, I)或(B, B)的區域中，兩家廠商在(I, D)及(D, I)下的利潤會大於在(B, B)下的利潤。

In this paper, we construct a theoretical model to explore duopoly firms'' strategic channel choices when product quality is endogenous determined in different competitive conditions. Consider there are two competitive firms and a retailer in the market. The sequence of events are as follows: (1) Two firms decide its channel simultaneously; (2) Two firms decide its product quality simultaneously; (3) Two firms decide wholesale price in the indirect channel and product price in the direct channel simultaneously; (4) The retailer decides product price in the indirect channel; (5) After observing all prices, consumers determine their purchasing decisions.
We use backward induction to find optimal profit, price, quantity, wholesale price and firms'' equilibrium channel strategies in nine subgames. Our results show that: (a) If one firm choose dual channel, the other choose indirect channel, the firm which choose dual channel will set a lower price in its indirect channel than in its direct channel when product substitution and channel substitution are large. (b) Duopoly firms’ channel strategies will not affect its product quality. It means that when firms determine its quality, they may have other considerations except channel strategy. (c) When product substitution and channel substitution are not too large, the equilibrium strategy is (B, B); on the contrary, when product substitution and channel substitution are large, firms have an incentive to choose different channel strategies from competitor, the equilibrium strategies are (I, D) and (D, I). (d) If (I, D)、(D, I) and (B, B) can all be equilibria, two firms will have higher profit in (I, D) and (D, I) than in (B, B).

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究問題 3
第二章 文獻回顧 4
第一節 通路 4
第二節 產品品質 8
第三節 通路結構對廠商決策影響之相關文獻 9
第三章 模型設定 12
第一節 消費者 12
第二節 廠商 13
第三節 零售商 13
第四節 賽局順序 13
第四章 模型分析 15
第一節 子賽局均衡推導 15
第二節 各子賽局之均衡比較 21
第三節 跨子賽局之均衡比較 22
第四節 廠商之均衡策略組合 26
第五章 結論與建議 36
第一節 主要結果 36
第二節 實務意涵 36
第三節 研究建議 37
參考文獻 39

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