根據高層理論(upper echelon theory)探討當公司發生負面事件時，高階經理人的聲譽與股價的關係。負面事件的發生對企業而言是影響投資人信心以及對未來表現的關鍵，但是因為公司存在資訊不對稱的現象，因此外部投資人無法只依靠企業的財務報表來衡量負面事件對公司的未來影響。因此，外部投資人會依靠其他準則來做為判斷。高層理論表示公司的績效會受高階經理人特質影響。並且如果公司的高階經理人有相對良好的名聲時，可以降低內外的資訊不對稱的程度，釋出公司真正價值給外部投資者。本研究以1992∼2008 年美國S＆P100公司作為目標，經過CRSP、Compustat 資料庫之比對，共收集157筆負面事件樣本，並根據Milbourn (2003)的研究以CEO 任期長短 、CEO為外部任用與CEO任期內的績效，作為衡量聲譽的三個變數，藉此探討高階經理人的聲譽對公司發生負面事件時的關聯。

研究結果指出，三個指標中只有CEO績效表現與異常報酬有正向的顯著關係之外，CEO任期以及CEO為外部任用並沒有明顯的正向影響。

This study examines the relation between CEO reputation and the abnormal return when a firm facing a negative event. We search the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) to collect the research sample. We collect 329 samples of negative events of 33 firms out of S＆P100. Furthermore, we search the ExecuComp database to get the information about CEO’s reputation. Finally, 157samples are collected after matching with the CRSP and Compustate database.We use the CEO’s reputation as the independent variable. The proxies follow the study of Milbourn (2003) about the CEO, which are CEO’s tenure, CEO is appointed from outside of the firm, and firm performance during the CEO’s tenure. We analyze whether CEO’s reputation can decrease the information asymmetry, then when a firm face a negative event, a firm will have less harm because investors will use the CEO’s reputation as an indicator to do reaction.According to the result of our analysis, CEO’s reputation does influence the abnormal returns when a firm under the situation of negative event. However, among three proxies, only the CEO’s performance is positively related to the abnormal returns, no matter tested by the original or adjusted performance.

Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research background 1
1.2 Research Motivation 1
1.3 Research Objectives 2

Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 3
2.1 Research and development activity 3
2.2 Top manager’s reputation 4
2.3 Hypothesis development 7

Chapter 3 Data and Methodology 8
3.1 Data and sample selection 8
3.2. Methodology 8
3.3 Definition and measure of the variables 13

Chapter 4 Empirical Results 17
4.1 Sample description 17
4.2 Multiple regression analysis 20

Chapter 5 Conclusion 22
5.1 Conclusion 22
5.2 Contributions and Research Limitations 23
5.3 Suggestions for Future Research 24

Reference 25

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