臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討關係人交易與公司績效之關聯性。此外，由於家族企業在我國市場上扮演重要的角色，且家族企業透過相互持股或互為董監事等重要管理職務，形成國內最常見的家族控股集團型態。集團內關係人交易的進行非常頻繁，內部資源移轉可為集團帶來優勢，但也可能提高控制股東侵占小股東利益的動機或是增加控制股東圖利自我的管道。因此本研究同時也納入家族企業特性與公司治理特性，探討其對關係人交易與公司績效間之影響性。
本研究以2004至2013年期間台灣上市上櫃公司資料為研究對象，進行迴歸模型實證研究，實證結果有以下幾點發現：(1)關係人交易會傷害公司市場績效，兩者呈顯著負相關。(2)在台灣家族企業下，會產生負面固守作用，關係人交易仍會損害公司市場績效與價值。(3)台灣家族企業之公司治理，對關係人交易與公司績效間具有負向的調節效果。

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationships between related party transactions and firm performance. In addition, family ownership play the very important role in Taiwan market. They become family business groups, the most common organization structures in Taiwan, through cross shareholding or board and management position control. Related party transactions in business groups are very common and frequent. Internal resource sharing through related party transactions can create its own competitive advantages, but also may increases motivation of controlling shareholders expropriate minor shareholders wealth, or increases self-benefit pipelines of controlling shareholders. Therefore, this study also takes family ownership and corporate governance into consideration, in order to examine their effects on relationship of related party transactions and firm performance.
We use the panel data regression model to investigate a sample of listed firms in Taiwan from 2004 to 2013.The empirical results are summarized as follows: (1)related party transactions have significant negative impact on firm market performance(Tobin's q).(2) There is negative entrenchment effect in Taiwan family firms, related party transaction still have significant negative impact on market performance.(3) corporate governance in Taiwan family firms has a negative moderating effect between related party transactions and firm market performance.

第一章 緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 6
第三節 研究架構與流程 7
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展
第一節 以往案例 8
第二節 關係人交易
一、關係人之定義 10
二、關係人交易之揭露準則 11
三、關係人交易伴隨之風險 13
四、關係人交易與公司績效之關聯性 16
第三節 家族企業與公司治理
一、家族企業之優劣 19
二、家族企業與公司績效之關聯性 24
三、家族企業公司治理 27
第三章 研究設計
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 31
第二節 變數介紹與實證模型
一、應變數 32
二、自變數 33
三、控制變數 36
四、實證模型 39
第四章 實證結果與分析
第一節 敘述性統計分析 40
第二節 相關分析 41
第三節 多變量迴歸分析 42
第四節 增額測試
一、其他公司治理變數 44
二、異常關係人進貨 51
第五章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結論 54
第二節 研究限制與未來研究建議 56
參考文獻
中文文獻 57
英文文獻 61
附表 69

表目錄
表1 樣本篩選過程 69
表2 各項變數之敘述性統計結果 70
表3 Pearson相關係數 71
表4 關係人交易對公司績效之迴歸結果 72
表5 納入家族企業特性下，關係人交易對公司績效之迴歸結果 73
表6 納入家族企業與股權結構特性下，關係人交易對公司績效之迴歸結果 74
表7 納入家族企業與其他公司治理特性下，關係人交易對公司績效之迴歸結果 76
表8 關係人進貨交易對公司績效之迴歸結果 78

圖目錄
圖1 研究流程圖 7

中文文獻
1.江淑玲、林麗容，我國中小企業盈餘管理行為之探索性研究－德爾菲法之應用，東吳經濟商學學報 ，第 57 期，79-109頁。
2.何里仁，2003，公司治理之資訊透明度與績效評校關聯性之研究，逢甲大學會計與財稅研究所碩士論文。
3.吳姿璉，2000，論股份有限公司經營者與公司間利益衝交易－以關係人交易為核心，國立政治大學法律研究所碩士論文。
4.吳雅雲，2005，探討公司治理機制以及兩岸關係人交易對兩岸三地財務績效之影響，國立成功大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
5.李馨蘋、黃啟倫，2009，股權結構、關係人交易與公司績效，中華管理評論國際學報，第12卷，第2期，1-31頁。
6.沈中華、陳錦村、吳孟紋，2001，更早期預警模型：台灣銀行道德指標的建立及影響，討論稿。
7.沈昱均，2008，家族企業與非家族企業經營績效之比較，雲林科技大學會計系碩士論文。
8.侍台誠，1994，董事會特性中家族因素與經營績效之實證研究 - 兼論法人董事的影響，台灣大學商學研究所碩士論文。
9.周百隆、林佳君、謝百婷，2009，從樣本期間觀點探討台灣上市公司風險預警模型之研究，中華管理評論國際學報，第12卷，第1期，1-17頁。
10.周行一、陳錦村、陳坤宏，1996 ，家族企業、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究，中國財務學刊，第4卷，第1期，115 -139頁。
11.林由雪，1997，台灣高科技產業的研究發展、持股類型與經營績效之研究，國立中央大學財務管理學系碩士論文。
12.林建山，1991，台灣企業管理：觀念、經驗與現實，環球經濟社。
13.林昱成、吳壽山、蕭子誼、林金賢，2007，異常關係人銷貨偵測模型之建構，管理學報，第24卷，第5期，585-601頁。
14.林凱薰、張瑀珊、王貞靜，2010，盈餘管理誘因、實質盈餘管理與應計項目盈餘管理之關聯性：中國大陸的證據，2010會計理論與實務研討會論文集，1267-1294頁。
15.邱安琪，1993，我國上市公司關係人交易性質之探討，東吳大學會計研究所碩士論文。
16.邱垂昌、黃秀姿，2006，自願設立獨立董事、關係人交易與公司價值關聯性之研究：代理理論與訊號發射理論之比較，管理及人文科學，第1卷，第3期，379-403頁。
17.邱瓊玲，2011，關係人交易對財務危機預測模式影響之探討，育達科大學報，第26期，31-48頁。
18.俞海琴、周本鄂，1994，台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司Tobin’s Q關係之研究，管理評論，第13卷，第1期，79－98頁。
19.施敏雄，2002，安隆公司破產案的原因及其對證券業的影響，國際經濟情勢週報，第1429 期，行政院經建會。
20.范揚松，1987，掌握權力與影響力。現代管理月刊，第127卷，14-43頁。
21.翁淑育，2000，台灣上市公司股權結構、核心代理問題與公司價值之研究，私立輔仁大學金融所碩士論文。
22.高振楠，2007，家族企業與公司績效：台灣電子產業為例，彰化師範大學商業教育學系碩士論文。
23.高蘭芬、 陳安琳，董監事股權質押、盈餘管理與公司績效相關性之研究，中華會計學刊 ，第6 卷，第 2 期，153 - 172頁。
24.粘雅維，2008，家族企業營運績效之實證研究：以台灣上市公司為例，朝陽科技大學財務金融系碩士論文。
25.許士軍、陳光中，1989，台灣家族企業發展與家族結構關係，行政院國家科學會專題研究。
26.許永聲、劉政淮，2005年，盈餘的資訊品質對盈餘管理行為的影響，管理與系統，第十二卷第一期，1-22頁。
27.許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩，2003，控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(上)，貨幣觀測與信用評等，42 期，15-31頁。
28.許智順、簡俱揚、黃媺婷、陳燕錫，2012，產業專家會計師事務所對關係人交易之影響， 商管科技季刊，第13卷，第2期，99-129頁。
29.陳克和，1989，關係人交易及其揭露問題之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
30.陳宏姿，2001，董監事結構與企業經營績效關聯之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
31.陳惠珠，1996，公司申請上市前盈餘操縱之探討，東吳大學會計學系碩士論文。
32.陸怡伸，2003，公司財務危機預測－考慮公司治理及關係人交易影響之實證研究，中原大學會計學系碩士論文，未出版。
33.黃光國，1984，談家族企業的組織型態，中國論壇，第13 卷，第7期，21-22頁。
34.黃旭輝、陳隆麒、謝劍平，2001，公司成長機會對經理人持股與董事會組成影響之研究，中山管理評論，第9卷，第2期，37-59頁。
35.黃英修，1999，我國銀行業股權結構與經營績效相關性之探討，國立成功大學企業管理研究所碩士論文
36.黃湘綺，1995，家族企業與盈餘操縱現象的關聯性研究，國立中正大學會計研究所碩士論文。
37.楊國樞，1998，家族化歷程、泛家族主義及組織管理，載於鄭伯壎、黃國隆、郭建志主編，海峽兩岸之組織管理，遠流出版公司。
38.楊凱吉，2007，安隆案中新型金融工具運用衍生法律問題之初探：已公開揭露為中心，證卷暨期貨月刊，第25卷，第5期，19-34頁。
39.楊蕉霙，1990，所有權結構與公司價值間關係之研究，國立中山大學企業管理學研究所碩士論文。
40.葉銀華、邱顯比、何憲章，1997，利益輸送代理問題與股權結構之理論與實證研究，中國財務學刊，第4卷，第4期，47-73頁。
41.葉銀華、蘇裕惠、柯承恩、李德冠，2003，公司治理機制對於關係人交易的影響，證券市場發展季刊，第15卷，第4期，69-106頁。
42.廖秀梅、李建然、吳祥華，2006，董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究一兼論台灣家族金業因素的影響，東吳經濟商學學報，第五十四期，117-160頁
43.褚先忠譯，荒和雄著，1995，家族企業的優勢與劣勢，建宏出版社出版。
44.劉紜夙，2005，關係人交易對盈餘管理與利益輸送之影響，國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
45.鄭伯壎、姜定孙，2003，組織忠誠、組織承諾及組織公民行為，載於姜定孙、鄭伯壎、鄭宏岳主編，組織行為研究在台灣：三十年回顧與展望，桂冠圖書公司。
46.謝金賢，2001，台灣上市公司董事會結構與關係人交易關聯性之研究，致理學報，第十四期，241-269頁。

英文文獻
1.Aboody, D., and Baruch Lev. (2000). Information Asymmetry, R&;D, and Insider Gains. Journal of Finance, 55, 2747-2766.
2.Agrawal, A., and Knoeber, C. R. (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 3, 377-397.
3.Alchian, A., and S. Woodward. (1987). Reflections on the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 143, 110-136
4.Allen, L. and C. Pantzalis. (1996). Valuation of the Operating Flexibility of Multinational Corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(4),633-653
5.Anderson, R.C., and D.M Reeb. (2004). Board composition: Balancing Family influence in S&;P 500 firms. Adminisrative Science Quarterly, 49(2),209-237
6.Anderson, R.C., and D.M. Reeb. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&;P 500. The Journal of Finance, 58(3),1301-1328
7.Barnhart, S. W., Marr, M. W., and Rosenstein, S. (1994). Firm performance and board composition: Some new evidence. Managerial and Decision Economics, 15, 329-340
8.Bertrand, M., P. Mehta, and S. Mullainathan. (2002). Ferreting out tunneling: An application to indian business groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 121-148.
9.Bertrand, Marianne, Simon Johnson, Krislert Samphan-tharak and Antoinette Schoar. (2008). Mixing Family with Busi-ness:A Study of Thai Business Groups and the Families behind Them. Journal of Financial Economics,88,466~498.
10.Bogert, J. D. (1996). Explaining variance in the performance of long-term corporate blockholders. Strategic Management Journal, 17(3),243-249.
11.Booth, J., M. Cornett, and H, Tehranian. (2002). Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation. Journal of Banking and Finance, 26,1973-1996.
12.Boyd, B. (2006). Corporate Linkages and Organizational Environment: A Test of The Resource Dependence Model. Strategic Management Journal, 11,419-430.
13.Chang, S. J., and Hong, J. (2000). Economic Performance of Group-Affiliated Companies in Korea Intragroup Resource Sharing and Internal Business Transactions. The Academy of Management Journal, 43(3), 429-448.
14.Chang, S., W. Wu and Y. Wong. (2009). Family control and stock market reactions to innovation announcements. British Journal of Managemen,t 10, 1-18.
15.Chung, K. and S.Pruitt. (1994). A simple approximation of Tobin’s q. Financial Management, 23,70-74.
16.Claessens S., S. Djankov, L.H.P. Lang. (2000).The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2),81-112.
17.Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Financial, 6,2741-2771.
18.Conaughy, Walker, Henderson and Chandra(1998
19.Covin, T. J. (1994). Perceptions of family-owned firms: The impact of gender and educational level. Journal of Small Business Management, 32(3),29-39。
20.Demsetz, H., and Lehn, K. (1985). The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177.
21.Denis, D. J. and J. M. Serrano. (1996). Active investors and management turnover following unsuccessful control contests. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2),239-266
22.Faccio, M. and L. Lang. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 365-395.
23.Fama, E. R., and Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journalof Law and Economics, 26, 301-325.
24.Fan, J. P. H., and T. J. Wong. (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3),401-425.
25.Fisher, F. M. and J. J. McGowan. (1983). On the Miuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits. American Economic Review, 73(1),82-97.
26.Frankel, R. M., M. F. Johnson, and K. K. Nelson. (2002). The relation between auditors'fees for nonaudit services and earnings management. The Accounting Review, 77,71-105
27.Friedman, E., S. Johnson, and T. Mitton. (2003). Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), 732-750.
28.Gomez-Mejia, L., M. Nunez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez. (2001). The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44,81-95.
29.Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach. (1991). The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management, 20, 101-112.
30.Hinton, R.(1989). Relating Party Transactions: The UK Way, Accountancy, 26-27
31.Howard, C. R. and Taylor, B. G. (1990). Common errors in financial statements. Journal of Accountancy, 111-113.
32.James, H. S. Jr. (1999). Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family Firm. International Journal of Economics of Business, 6, 41-55.
33.Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel, Lalitha Naveen (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all. Journal of Financial Economics, 87,329-356.
34.Jensen, M. C. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control System. Journal of Finance, 48,831-880.
35.Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H.(1976).Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3,305-360.
36.Jensen, M. C., and Ruback, R. (1983). The market of corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50.
37.Jensen, M., and J. Warner. (1988). The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 20,3-24.
38.Jensen, M., and R. Ruback. (1983). The Market for Corporate Control – The Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11, pp.5-50.
39.Johnson, S., P. Boone, A. Breach, and E. Friedman. (2000). Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1),141-186.
40.Karra, N., P. Tracey, and N. Phillips. (2006). Altruism and agency in the family firm:exploring the role of family, kinship, and ethnicity. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30, 861-877.
41.Klein, P., D. Shapiro, and J. Young. (2005). Corporate Governance, Family Ownership and Firm Value: the Canadian evidence. AnInternational Review, 13,769-784.
42.Kotabe, M., S. S. Srinivasan, and P. S. Aulakh (2002).Multinationality and Firm Performance:The Moderating Role of R&;D and Marketing Capabilities. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(1),79-97.
43.La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (1999).Corporate Ownership around the World. Journal of Finance, 54,471-517.
44.Lemmon, M. L., and Lins, K. V. (2003). Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Finance, 58(4), 1445-1468.
45.Lindenberg R. H., and and Stephen A.Ross. (1981). Tobin’s Q ratio and Industrial Organization. Journal of Business, 54(1),1-32.
46.Mallette, P. and K. Fowler, (1992). Effects of board composition and stock ownership on the adoption of poison pills. Academy of Management Review, 35,1010-1035.
47.Mark Kohlbeck, Brian W. Mayhew. (2010). Valuation of firms that disclose related party transactions. J. Account. Public Policy, 29(2),115-137
48.Maury, B.(2006). Family ownership and firm performance: empirical evidence from Western European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance,12, 321-341.
49.McConaughy, D., M. Walker, G. Henderson, and M. Chandra. (1998). Founding family controlled firms: efficiency and value. Review of Financial Economics, 7, 1-19.
50.Miller, D., I. Breton-Miller, R. Lester, and A. Cammella Jr. (2007). Are family firms really superior performers?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13, 829-858.
51.Miller, D., I. Breton-Miller, R. Lester, and A. Cammella Jr. (2007). Are family firms really superior performers?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13,829-858.
52.Ming Jian T.J.Wong. (2010). Propping through related party transaction. Review of Accounting Studies,15(1),70-105
53.Morck, R., D. Strangeland, and B. Yeung. (2000). Inherited wealth, corporate control, and economic growth: The Canadian disease. University of Chicago Press,
54.Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315.
55.Ng, W. and J. Roberts. (2007). Helping the family: the mediating role of outside directors in ethnic Chinese family firms. Human Relations, 60, 285-314.
56.Patton, A., and J. Baker (1987). Why won’t directors rock the boat? Harvard Business Review, 65(6),10-12.
57.Prevost, A. K., Rao, R. P., and Hossain, M. (2002). Determinants of board composition in New Zealand: A simultaneous equations approach.Journal of Empirical Finance,9,373-397.
58.Rechner, P. and D. Dalton. (1991). CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 155-160.
59.Ryngaert, Michael ; Thomas, Shawn. (2012). Not All Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Are the Same: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post RPTs. Journal of Accounting Research, 50(3),845-882
60.Saito, T. (2008). Family firms and firm performance: Evidence form Japan. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22, 620-646.
61.Schulze, W., M. Lubatkin, and R. Dino. (2003). Dispersion of ownership and agency in family firms. Academy of Management Journal, 46, 179-194.
62.Schulze, W., M. Lubatkin, R. Dino, and A. Buchholtz. (2001). Agency relationships in family firms: theory and evidence. Organization Science, 12, 99-116.
63.Shiue, F. J., K. C. Chung, and Y. Y. Yen. (2005).An Empirical Study on the Association between China Investment Location and Financial and Operating Performance of Taiwanese Listing Electronics Corporations. Journal of American Academy of Business, 7(2),105-116
64.Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52(2),737-783
65.Sirmon, D. G., and Hitt, M. A. (2003). Managing resources: Linking unique resources, management, and wealth creation in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(4), 339-358.
66.Sraer, D. and D. Thesmar. (2007). Performance and behavior of family firms: evidence from the French stock market. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5, 709-751.
67.Stein, J. (1988). Takeover threats and managerial myopia. Journal of Political Economy, 96, 61-80.
68.Villalonga, B. and R. Amit. (2006). How do family ownership, management and control affect firm value?. Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 385-417.
69.Wang, D. (2006). Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(3),619-656.
70.Wenyi Chu. (2011). Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Influence of Family Management, Family Control and Firm Size. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28,833-851.
71.Williamson, O. E. (1983). Organization Form Residual Claimants and Corporate Control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 351-366.
72.Yeh, Y. H., T. S. Lee and Y. H., Su. (2008). Family shareholding and corporate value in concentrated ownership structure environments. Taiwan Banking and Finance Quarterly 9:1-30.
73.Yeh, Y.H., T. S. Lee, and T. Woidtke. (2001). Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review of Finance, 2(1-2),21-48.
74.Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211.
75.Zahra, S. A. and J. A. Pearce II. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrated model. Journal of Management, 15(2),291-334.
76.Zahra, S. A., and Pearce, J. A. II. (1992). Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 29(4),53-55.