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研究生:李建和
研究生(外文):Chien-He Lee
論文名稱:公司經理人的風險偏好及過度自信程度對公司會計穩健性之影響
指導教授:池祥萱教授
指導教授(外文):Professor Hsiang-Hsuan Chih
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立東華大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
論文頁數:47
中文關鍵詞:會計保守主義經理人風險偏好風險趨避風險愛好過度自信
外文關鍵詞:Accounting conservatismManagers risk appetiteRisk aversionRisk neutralOverconfident
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本文主要從經理人理性及非理性層面探討,當面對理性環境的風險偏好及非理性的過度自信程度會影響公司對於會計盈餘和虧損的認列判斷。本文研究結果顯示在理性層面下公司經理人面臨理性風險趨避偏好誘因增加的環境下,為了預防財務報表盈餘的樂觀預測和實際的收益產生誤差,對於會計盈餘虧損的認列方式會傾向較為寬鬆的會計保守主義。而在理性環境中公司經理人在面臨風險趨避誘因增加的條件下,為了避免公司績效的變異過大,影響自身名聲或工作權等因素,在會計盈餘虧損的認列方式會更趨向會計保守主義。而從非理性的角度下分析過度及非過度自信經理人對於會計保守主義的偏好。本文研究結果顯示在非理性環境下,過度自信的公司經理人為了預防或是彌補因自身過度自信對於未來公司營運績效的過度樂觀所產生的公司盈餘預測誤差,並且樂觀預期當期公司損失必定於下期轉虧為盈,所以損失及獲利的認列方式會偏好較為寬鬆的會計保守主義,顯示理性經理人在面臨風險及非理性的公司經理人過度自信高低對公司保守主義的偏好上是相同的,差別只是決策動機和營運的績效而已。



The main purpose of this paper is which level of accounting conservatism overconfident managers prefer in rational and unrational environment. We predict company managers prefer less accounting conservatism in risk aversion environment. Company managers prefer less accounting conservatism to prevent misestimate accounting reports income and then coming lawsuit risk. On the other hand non-confident company managers prefer accounting conservatism because they dont need to operate accounting reports numbers for misestimating prediction company income. In unrational environment overconfident company managers still prefer less accounting conservatism. Overconfident company managers will operate accounting reports income numbers for overoptimistic company operation performance and expect reversing company loss in next acconting year. We predict company managers will make the same choices in order to aviod misvalue company operation perfermance or keep reputation in rational and unrational situations.




第一章 緒論.......................................................1
第一節 研究動機及目的.............................................. 1
第二節 研究流程....................................................5
第二章 文獻探討及假說建立...........................................7
第一節 公司經理人的理性風險偏好......................................7
第二節 公司經理人非理性過度自信的影響................................8
第三節 公司會計穩健保守主義.........................................9
第四節 公司經理人特質對於公司營運績效的影響..........................10
第五節 研究假說...................................................12
第三章 研究方法...................................................15
第一節 資料來源...................................................15
第二節 變數定義...................................................16
第三節 實證模型...................................................18
第四章 實證結果與分析..............................................23
第一節 敘述統計...................................................23
第二節 相關係數分析...............................................24
第三節 風險趨避程度對會計穩健性的影響...............................25
第四節 過度自信程度對會計穩健性的影響...............................27
第五節 公司經理人的特質對公司營運績效的影響..........................29
第五章 結論......................................................33
圖1 研究流程......................................................5
表1 變數定義.....................................................41
表2 敘述統計.....................................................42
表3 相關係數表....................................................43
表4 理性的經理人風險態度對會計保守主義的影響.........................44
表5 非理性的經理人過度自信程度對會計保守主義的影響....................45
表6 理性的經理人風險態度及保守主義對公司績效的影響....................46
表7 非理性的經理人風險態度及保守主義對公司績效的影響..................47

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