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研究生:林珈妤
研究生(外文):Chia-Yu,Lin
論文名稱:應用賽局選擇權概念於飯店擴展最適時間點之決策分析
論文名稱(外文):Studies on an Optimal Timing of Hotel Expansion with Game Options Concept
指導教授:林達榮林達榮引用關係
指導教授(外文):Lin,Tyrone
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立東華大學
系所名稱:國際企業學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
論文頁數:72
中文關鍵詞:飯店擴張賽局選擇權先行者與跟隨者決策評估
外文關鍵詞:Hotel ExpansionGame OptionsLeader and FollowerDecision Evaluation
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本文旨在探討高、低兩價位屬性之飯店集團,針對一新興旅遊地區進行飯店投資之最適時間點決策評估分析。在雙方商情資訊透明化的狀態下允許兩飯店集團皆選擇同一新興旅遊市場來進行飯店擴展行動,其中本文有三種情境假設分別為高價位之飯店以先行者角色與低價位之飯店以跟隨者角色,低價位之飯店以先行者角色與高價位之飯店以跟隨者角色及高低兩價位飯店在同一時間點進入此一新興市場。透過賽局選擇權(Game Options)和先行者與跟隨者(Leader and Follower)建立三個賽局模型並藉由來客數服從幾何布朗運動(geometric Brownian motion)的變動下及等價條件(Value Matching condition)和平滑條件(Smooth Pasting condition)建立運算公式以求出在三種不同情境下兩飯店集團分別可執行進入此新興市場之最適時間點決策。而數理模型設算結果可給予當決策者與競爭者面臨這三種情況時且兩造雙方皆打算進入相同市場之最適飯店擴張時間點的決策判斷。
This thesis mainly explores the decision making of the optimal timing analysis for both high- and low-priced properties of two hotel groups which are assessing hotel investments in an emerging tourist area. In the case of business information transparency, both hotel groups know that the other has chosen the same target market to invest the hotel expansion. We discuss three different contexts in this thesis: in the first, a high-priced hotel plays the role of leader and a low-priced hotel plays the role of follower; in the second, a low-priced hotel plays the role of leader and a high-priced hotel plays the role of follower, and at last both the high- and low-priced hotels invest into the same emerging market at the same time. According to game options, the leader and follower create three game models in which the number of visitors obeys the geometric Brownian motion and create formulae by using value matching and smooth pasting conditions. Accordingly, we are able to identify the optimal timing for two hotel groups to expand into the emerging market in all of the three contexts. The results suggest that when competing hotel groups are entering the same market and facing the situations that discussed in this thesis, decision-makers should make the decision to expand at the optimal time.
Content Page
Acknowledgement i
Chinese Abstract ii
Abstract iii
Table of Contents iv
List of Tables vi
List of Figures vii
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Research Background and Motivation 1
1.2 Research Problems and Limitations 3
1.3 Research Structure and Outline 4
CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 7
2.1 Hotel Industry and Expansion 7
2.2 Game Theory and Game Options 9
2.3 Leader and Follower 11
CHAPTER III MODEL CONSTRUCTION 13
3.1 Model Introduction 13
3.2 The Model Construction 15
3.2.1 Model I: Searching for the Optimal Timing for Hotel H (as a leader ) and L (as a follower) 15
3.2.2 Model II: Searching for the Optimal Timing for Hotel L (as a leader) and H (as a follower) 18
3.2.3 Model III: Searching for the same Optimal Timing forHotel H and L 20

3.3 The Decision Threshold Value 23
3.3.1 The Decision Threshold Value of Model I 24
3.3.2 The Decision Threshold Value of Model II 26
3.3.3 The Decision Threshold Value of Model III 28
CHAPTER IV NUMERICAL AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 31
4.1 Numerical Analysis of Model I 31
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis of Model I 33
4.3 Numerical Analysis of Model II 43
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Model II 45
4.5 Numerical Analysis of Model III 55
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis of Model III 57
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION 65
5.1 Conclusion 65
5.2 Recommendations 67
REFERENCE 69

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