臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文利用Grossman and Helpman (1994) 的政治獻金模型，來探討遊說對污染稅制定的影響。本文設定廠商和環保團體均可以進行遊說，以獲取自身利益極大化。最終結果顯示，當稅率對廠商利潤的影響呈現負相關時，若僅由廠商 (僅利益團體) 進行遊說，遊說後的污染稅稅率會低(高)於不存在遊說下的最適污染稅。而兩利益團體為了避免政府制定過高或過低的稅率，均會進行遊說來影響政府政策制定。

1緒論 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．1
1.1 前言 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 1
1.2 研究動機與目的 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 6
1.3 研究方法 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 7
1.4 研究架構 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 7
2 文獻回顧 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．9
3基本模型 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．13
3.1 假設 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．13
3.2 利潤函數及生產數量 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．15
3.3 最適污染減量技術 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．20
4最適政策 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．23
　4.1 利益團體進行遊說 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．23
　　　4.1.1 兩利益團體皆遊說 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．24
　　　4.1.2 僅生產者遊說 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．25
　　　4.1.3 僅環保團體遊說 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．26
5 結論 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．29

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