臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

公私部門合夥推動基礎建設專案(公私合夥模式)的關鍵優勢在於：有效整合資源、提升經營效率。然而，其潛在的交易成本及無效率，經常受到低估、甚至忽略，導致公私合夥模式被誤用於不適合的專案，最終可能造成專案的失敗。本研究從交易成本經濟學的角度，分析在什麼情況、什麼原因下，公私合夥模式會變成一種高成本的專案治理架構。此外，本研究並研究專案的需求風險問題，分析在履約階段的契約變更原則，探討在哪一種法律原則下，需求風險所帶來的交易成本能夠被降至最低。具體來說，本研究以交易成本經濟學為基礎，提出公私合夥模式之治理架構理論。此項理論主張，有三類潛藏於公私合夥模式中的重要投機問題，可能造成重大的交易成本，並使公私合夥模式成為高成本的專案治理架構。這三類重要的投機問題包括：控制股東與少數股東間之利益衝突(principal-principal problem)、廠商主導的箝制問題(firm hold-up problem)、及政府主導的箝制問題(government-led hold-up problem)。其次，本研究也指出造成上述投機問題的專案性特徵及制度性特徵。根據這些特徵，本研究提出投機性交易成本之分析架構，輔助實務上評估公私合夥模式之可行性分析。再就事後的角度分析，對於採行公私合夥模式的專案，需求風險是影響專案成敗的關鍵因素之一。倘若營運期間的實際需求與特許契約簽約時的預測不相符合，可能造成專案的營收不足，或者特許公司獲得超額利潤，導致增加民間投資人的風險貼水、政府的政治成本及專案整體的交易成本。就此相關問題，本研究分析其適用之特許權變更原則，檢驗各不同法律原則的效率性，並依據需求風險的高低，提出較有效率的法律原則。此外，本研究採取個案研究法，作為理論發展的一部分，並據以評估本研究所提出之理論，及闡釋該理論於實務上之運用方式。

While the higher efficiency due to better pooling of resources is greatly emphasized in public-private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure projects, the embedded transaction inefficiencies are often understated or even ignored. As a result, PPPs can be misused for unsuitable projects, and failure of the projects may thus be expected. Through the lens of transaction cost economics (TCE), this study aims to answer why and when PPPs may become a costly project governance structure. Furthermore, this research studies issues on the project demand risk. It analyzes various contract modification principles applied during the stage of contract performance, and identifies the legal rules under which the transaction costs arising out of demand risk may be efficiently minimized. Specifically, this study develops a TCE-based theory of PPPs as a governance structure. This theory suggests that three major opportunism problems embedded in infrastructure PPPs are possible to cause substantial transaction costs and render PPPs a costly governance structure. The three main opportunism problems are principal-principal problem, firm’s hold-up problem, and government-led hold-up problem. In addition, project and institutional characteristics that may lead to opportunism problems are identified. Based on these characteristics, an opportunism-focused transaction cost analysis (OTCA) of PPPs as a governance structure is proposed to supplement the current practice of PPP feasibility analysis. Furthermore, from the perspective of ex post management the demand risk can be one of the critical elements of PPP project success. If the actual demand during the project operation comes out to be less than the initial prediction, the resulting shortfalls in operating revenues may cause private promoters to request high risk premiums for future investment in PPP projects. On the other side, if the actual demand comes out to be higher than the initial prediction, excess profits that the concession company may earn from the project can impose political costs on the government. This study analyzes the applicable contract modification principles addressing the related problems of demand risk, and identifies the legal rules that may efficiently minimize the total transaction costs. In addition, as a part of theory development, this study uses case analysis to evaluate the proposed theory and to illustrate how the proposed OTCA can be applied in practice. Policies and administration strategies for infrastructure PPPs are derived based on the proposed theory.

Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Background and Motivations 1
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 2
1.3 Research Methodology 3
1.4 Contributions and Limitations 4
1.5 Framework of the Dissertation 5


Chapter 2 Literature Review 7
2.1 Public-Private Partnerships 7
2.2 Transaction Cost Analysis of Governance Structure 10
2.3 Law and Economics Analysis of Formal Institution 13


Chapter 3 Opportunism-Focused Transaction Cost Analysis (OTCA) of Using PPPs as Project Governance Structure 16
3.1 TCE View of PPPs as a Project Governance Structure for Delivering Infrastructure 16
3.2 PPPs'' Unbalanced Profit Pool Syndrome 19
3.2.1 Promoters’ Profit Pool in a PPP Project 20
3.2.2 Unbalanced Profit Pool Syndrome 22
3.3 Opportunism Problems, Contributing Characteristics, and the Transaction Costs in Infrastructure PPPs 22
3.3.1 Principal-Principal Problem in Infrastructure PPPs 23
3.3.2 Firm Hold-Up Problem in Infrastructure PPPs 31
3.3.3 Government-Led Hold-Up Problem in Infrastructure PPPs 38
3.4 Concluding Remarks 42


Chapter 4 The Application of Opportunism-Focused Transaction Cost Analysis (OTCA) to Evaluating Opportunism Problems of PPPs 43
4.1 The Application of OTCA to Various Types of Transport Projects 43
4.1.1 Greenfield PPPs versus Brownfield PPPs 43
4.1.2 Transaction Costs of High Speed Rail PPPs 44
4.1.3 Transaction Costs of Toll Road PPPs 46
4.1.4 Transaction Costs of Mass Rapid Transit PPPs 47
4.1.5 Transaction Costs of Airport PPPs 47
4.2 The Application of OCTA to the Individual Transport Project 49
4.3 Policy Implications on Using PPPs for Infrastructure Projects 52
4.3.1 Policy Implication on PPPs Feasibility Analysis 52
4.3.2 Policy Implications on Project Tendering and Administration 53
4.4 Concluding Remarks 54


Chapter 5 Case Studies of Opportunism-Focused Transaction Cost Analysis (OTCA) of PPPs 57
5.1 Analysis of Channel Tunnel 58
5.1.1 Problems in Project Tendering 58
5.1.2 Financial Distresses and Restructuring 59
5.1.3 Analysis of Issues on Opportunism-Focused Transaction Costs 60
5.1.4 Case Conclusions 63
5.2 Analysis of Taiwan High Speed Rail 64
5.2.1 Problems in Project Tendering 65
5.2.2 Crises Encountered During the Construction 66
5.2.3 Financial Distresses 67
5.2.4 Analysis of Principal-Principal Problem 68
5.2.5 Analysis of Issues on Hold-up Problems 70
5.2.6 Case Conclusions 72
5.3 Cross-Cases Analysis: Overall Evaluation 72


Chapter 6 Analysis of Contract Modification Principles in PPPs: Theoretical Analysis and Case Studies 76
6.1 Theoretical Analysis 76
6.1.1 Demand Risk in PPP Projects 76
6.1.2 Contract Modification Principles for Projects with Low Demand Risk 79
6.1.3 Contract Modification Principles for Projects with High Demand Risk 83
6.1.4 Risk and Profit Sharing Mechanism: Shadow Toll Payment Model 86
6.2 Case Studies 87
6.3 Concluding Remarks 91


Chapter 7 Conclusions 93


REFERENCE 98

Ahmadjian, C. and J. Collura (2012). "Evaluating Public-Private Partnership Organizational Alternatives for Existing Toll Roads." Journal of Management in Engineering 28(2): 114-119.

Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz (1972). "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization." American Economic Review 62(5): 777-795.

Alexandersson, G. and S. Hultén (2007). "Prospects and Pitfalls of Public-Private Partnerships in the Transportation Sector – Theoretical Issues and Empirical Experience."

Anguera, R. (2006). "The Channel Tunnel—An Ex Post Economic Evaluation." Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 40(4): 291-315.

Attar, A. R. and V. S. Jadhav (2014). Study of Shadow Toll Mechanism with the Experience of International Countries. NBM & CW. New Delhi, Athena Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

Ayres, I. and R. Gertner (1989). "Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules." The Yale Law Journal 99(1): 87-130.

Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (2005). Contract Theory. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.

Brandao, L. E. T. and E. Saraiva (2008). "The Option Value of Government Guarantees in Infrastructure Projects." Construction Management & Economics 26(11): 1171-1180.

Cheung, E. and A. Chan (2010). "Evaluation Model for Assessing the Suitability of Public-Private Partnership Projects." Journal of Management in Engineering 27(2): 80-89.

Cheung, E., A. P. C. Chan and S. Kajewski (2010). "Suitability of Procuring Large Public Works by PPP in Hong Kong." Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 17(3): 292-308.

Coase, R. H. (1992). "The Institutional Structure of Production." American Economic Review 82(4): 713-719.

Das, T. K. and B.-S. Teng (2000). "A Resource-Based Theory of Strategic Alliances." Journal of Management 26(1): 31-61.

Demirag, I., I. Khadaroo, P. Stapleton and C. Stevenson (2010). Public Private Partnership Financiers'' Perceptions of Risks. Edinburgh, Scotland, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland.

Dixit, A. K. (1996). The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge, Mass, Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press.

Dnes, A. W. (1995). "The Law and Economics of Contract Modifications: the Case of Williams v. Roffey." International Review of Law and Economics 15(2): 225-240.

Dudkin, G. and T. Välilä (2006). "Transaction Costs in Public-Private Partnerships : A First Look at the Evidence." Competition and regulation in network industries : CRNI 1(2, (6)): 307-330.

Fetherston, D. (1997). The Chunnel : the Amazing Story of the Undersea Crossing of the English Channel. New York, Times Books.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). "Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research." Qualitative Inquiry 12(2): 219-245.

Flyvbjerg, B., H. Mette Skamris and S. Buhl (2002). "Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or lie?" American Planning Association. Journal of the American Planning Association 68(3): 279-295.

Garvin, M. J. (2010). "Enabling Development of the Transportation Public-Private Partnership Market in the United States." Journal of Construction Engineering & Management 136(4): 402-411.

Geddes, R. R. (2011). Road to Renewal : Private Investment in the U.S. Transportation Infrastructure. Washington, DC, USA, AEI Press.

Genus, A. (1997). "Unstructuring Incompetence: Problems of Contracting, Trust and the Development of the Channel Tunnel." Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 9(4): 419-436.

Geyskens, I., J.-B. E. M. Steenkamp and N. Kumar (2006). "Make, Buy, or Ally: A Transaction Cost Theory Meta-Analysis." Academy of Management Journal 49(3): 519-543.

Grant, M. (1997). "Financing Eurotunnel." Japan Railway & Transport Review 11: 7.

World Bank Group (2014). Public-Private Partnerships Reference Guide Version 2.0. Washington, DC, USA.

Guasch, J. L., J.-J. Laffont and S. Strauḅ (2007). "Concessions of Infrastructure in Latin America: Government-Led Renegotiation." Journal of Applied Econometrics 22(7): 1267-1294.

Guasch, J. L. and S. Straub (2006). "Renegotiation of Infrastructure Concessions: An Overview." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 77(4): 479-493.

Hart, O., A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny (1997). "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 1127-1161.

Hart, O. D. (1995). Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. New York, Oxford University Press.

Ho, S. P. (2006). "Model for Financial Renegotiation in Public-Private Partnership Projects and Its Policy Implications: Game Theoretic View." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 132(7): 678-688.

Ho, S. P. (2009). Government Policy on PPP Financial Issues: Bid Compensation and Financial Renegotiation. Policy, Finance & Management for Public-Private Partnerships, Wiley-Blackwell: 267-300.

Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom (1991). "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 7: 24-52.

Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom (1994). "The Firm as an Incentive System." The American Economic Review 84(4): 972-991.

Hovenkamp, H. (2011). "Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics." Indiana Law Journal 86(2): 499-542.

Iossa, E. and D. Martimort (2012). "Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships." The RAND Journal of Economics 43(3): 442-474.

Kornai, J. (1979). "Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems." Econometrica 47(4): 801-819.

Kornai, J., E. Maskin and G. Roland (2003). "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint." Journal of Economic Literature 41(4): 1095-1136.

Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston and J. R. Green (1995). Microeconomic theory. New York, Oxford University Press.

Ng, S. T., Y. M. W. Wong and J. M. W. Wong (2010). "A Structural Equation Model of Feasibility Evaluation and Project Success for Public-Private Partnerships in Hong Kong." Engineering Management, IEEE Transactions on 57(2): 310-322.

Osei-Kyei, R. and A. P. C. Chan (2015). "Review of Studies on the Critical Success Factors for Public–Private Partnership (PPP) Projects from 1990 to 2013." International Journal of Project Management 33(6): 1335-1346.

Papajohn, D., Q. Cui and M. Bayraktar (2010). "Public-Private Partnerships in U.S. Transportation: Research Overview and a Path Forward." Journal of Management in Engineering 27(3): 126-135.

Parker, D. and K. Hartley (2003). "Transaction Costs, Relational Contracting and Public Private Partnerships: A Case Study of UK Defence." Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 9(3): 97-108.

Posner, E. A. (2003). "Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?" The Yale Law Journal 112(4): 829-880.

Posner, R. A. (2002). Economic Analysis of Law New York, Aspen Publishers.

Qian, Y. and G. Roland (1998). "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint." The American Economic Review 88(5): 1143-1162.

Ramamurti, R. (2003). "Can Governments Make Credible Promises? Insights from Infrastructure Projects in Emerging Economies." Journal of International Management 9(3): 253-269.

Rindfleisch, A. and J. B. Heide (1997). "Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future Applications." Journal of Marketing 61(4): 30-54.

Schaffer, M. E. (1989). "The Credible-Commitment Problem in the Center-Enterprise Relationship." Journal of Comparative Economics 13(3): 359-382.

Shaoul, J., A. Stafford, P. Stapleton and P. M (2008). Financial Black Holes: Accounting for Privately Financed Roads in the UK, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland.

Su, Y., D. Xu and P. H. Phan (2008). "Principal–Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation." Management and Organization Review 4(1): 17-38.

Tang, L., Q. Shen and E. W. L. Cheng (2010). "A Review of Studies on Public–Private Partnership Projects in the Construction Industry." International Journal of Project Management 28(7): 683-694.

Vernon, R. (1971). "The Multinational Enterprise: Power versus Sovereignty." Foreign Affairs 49(4): 736-751.

Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York, Free Press.

Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. London, Collier Macmillan.

Williamson, O. E. (1993). "Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 149(1): 99-118.

Williamson, O. E. (1999). "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 15(1): 306-342.

Yin, R. K. (2014). Case Study Research: Design and Methods.

Young, M. N., M. W. Peng, D. Ahlstrom, G. D. Bruton and Y. Jiang (2008). "Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective." Journal of Management Studies 45(1): 196-220.