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研究生:陳之浩
研究生(外文):Chih-Hao Chen
論文名稱:產能清算、財務契約與異業合併
論文名稱(外文):Capacity Liquidation, Financial Contracts, and Conglomerate Mergers
指導教授:陳其美陳其美引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chyi-Mei Chen
口試委員:王泰昌池祥麟
口試日期:2015-05-29
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:財務金融學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
語文別:英文
論文頁數:62
中文關鍵詞:產能資產清算財務契約代理問題有限保證異業合併
外文關鍵詞:CapacityAsset LiquidationFinancial ContractsAgency ProblemsLimited PledgeabilityConglomerate Mergers
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本論文探討廠商的外部融資與其產品市場競爭行為,如何透過財務契約中的產能清算要求相互影響。產能清算對於廠商在產品市場競爭有兩種效果:一、減少廠商未來最大可能的生產量,二、降低產能價格。這兩者都會使對手廠商更有意願大量生產,增加競爭者的獲利,也因此讓潛在的進入者更容易進入產業。故產能清算雖能提高廠商的短期收益,但對長期在產品市場的獲利有負面影響。不僅如此,產能清算可能因為造成更多競爭者進入產業,使得廠商在產品市場的獲利波動性增加,產生財務契約的代理問題。當廠商獲利在財務契約中無法被驗證,不穩定的未來獲利可能讓投資人無法損益兩平,因而不願意出錢投資。為了使投資人願意投資,廠商必須透過調整產能清算的規模,增加能夠保證給投資人的未來收益,本文證明過度清算以及清算不足都可能達到此目的。廠商最適財務契約的清算規模將取決於市場環境,如產能價格、產品需求、產業進入成本等;而廠商簽訂的財務契約,也會透過契約中的產能清算要求影響未來的產品市場競爭。當廠商為了得到外部融資,改變其清算規模所造成的不效率,其實可以視為廠商的融資成本。由於文獻中指出企業合併後的內部資本市場,有助於緩解廠商的財務限制,因而本文推論異業合併對整體的清算效率性有正面影響。最後,根據異業合併、財務契約、產能清算的理論,本文對於美國一九八零年代併購潮的實證現象提出一個理論的解釋。

This thesis studies the interaction between the external financing and the product market competition of an incumbent firm through the capacity liquidation. The liquidation of the production capacity diminishes not only the firm’s maximum production level, but also the capacity price. Both effects encourage the rivals to behave more aggressively and promote entry. Therefore, capacity liquidation increases the short term liquidation income but declines the long term profits from the product market competition. Moreover, the capacity liquidation may intensify the agency problems in financial contracts because the profits become more volatile after new entry occurs. When the states of profits are unverifiable in financial contracts, the uncertain future income may make the investors unable to breakeven. To make the contract feasible, the firm should increase the pledgeable income by changing the liquidation level. I show that both over liquidation and under liquidation may increase the total pledgeable income. The liquidation level in the optimal contract depends on market environments. After the firm designs the contract, the contract conversely affects the market competition through the capacity decision. Finally, I consider the conglomerate merger with efficient internal capital markets, which mitigates firms’ financial constraints and hence improves the efficiency of the liquidation decision. This theory provides an explanation for the US merger wave in 1980s.

口試委員審定書 i
謝辭 ii
中文摘要 iii
Abstract iv
Table of Contents v
List of Figures vi
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review 8
2.1 Financial Contract and Asset Liquidation 9
2.2 Capital Structure and Product Market Competition 14
2.3 Capacity and Entry Deterrence 17
3. The Model 19
4.The Liquidation Decision for an All-Equity Incumbent 22
4.1 Product Market Competition Equilibrium 22
4.2 The Role of Capacity in Entry Deterrence 27
5. The Optimal Financial Contract 31
5.1 Observable Contracts 32
5.2 Unobservable Contracts 41
6. Conglomerate Mergers 45
7. Discussions 51
7.1 Financial Contract Design 51
7.2 Capital Structure and Product Market Competition 54
8. Conclusion 57
References 60


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