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研究生:潘昭容
研究生(外文):Chao-Jung Pan
論文名稱:論析強制設置薪酬委員會對公司是否有利?
論文名稱(外文):DO FIRMS BENEFIT FROM THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MANDATE IN TAIWAN?
指導教授:林嬋娟林嬋娟引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chan-Jane Lin
口試委員:戚務君陳聖賢許文馨李艷榕
口試委員(外文):Wu-Chun ChiSheng-Syan ChenWen-Hsin HsuYen-Jung Lee
口試日期:2015-03-23
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
語文別:英文
論文頁數:104
中文關鍵詞:經理人薪資公司治理薪酬委員會獨立董事董事會經驗
外文關鍵詞:executive compensationcorporate governancecompensation committeesindependent directorsboard experience.
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我國於2010年11月通過證券交易法第十四之六條,規定股票已在證券交易所上市或於證券商營業處所買賣之公司應設置薪資報酬委員會。主管機關冀望藉此規定強化經理人薪酬資訊透明度、抑制肥貓現象以及讓經理人薪資與公司經營績效連結。因此,本文分成兩部分,檢視強制設置薪酬委員會是否真能達成此預期效果?
第一部分先探討強制設置薪酬委員是否有利於提升經理人薪酬績效敏感度,以及影響因素為何。為了檢視此研究議題,本文以臺灣上市櫃公司為研究對象,樣本期間為規定實施前後兩年(即2009年至2010年與2012年至2013年),並將薪酬委員會的獨立性與專業能力視為強制設置薪酬委員會有效性之決定因素。其中獨立性係以現任獨立董事衡量之,專業能力則是委員的人力與社會資本,即服務董事會年資和擔任董監事家數。實證結果顯示設置薪酬委員會確實能增進經理人薪酬績效敏感度,且主要是透過薪酬委員會之獨立性與專業能力達成此功效。
第二部分探討強制設置薪酬委員會對規定實施前有超額薪資現象或較差經營績效的公司(統稱為焦點公司)是否更為有利,以及其薪酬委員會特性在此之中的作用。針對此研究議題,本文比較焦點公司與標竿公司經理人薪酬績效敏感度之差異,其中標竿公司是指規定實施前較無不合理薪資水準或有較佳經營績效的公司。實證結果顯示相較於標竿公司,規定實施後超額薪資公司薪酬績效敏感度增加幅度較大,而績效差公司卻較小。另外,現任獨立董事或擁有較多人力及社會資本的委員在不同公司會扮演著不同的角色。具體而言,當他們擔任社會大眾所關注的超額薪資公司委員時,傾向於提高薪酬績效敏感度,反之,一旦擔任績效差公司委員時,則較無此傾向。


Article 14-6 of the amended Securities Exchange Act of Taiwan was passed in November of 2010 and mandated that a firm whose stock is listed on the stock exchange or traded over-the-counter shall establish a compensation committee. Regulators in Taiwan claim that this mandate can enhance the transparency of executive compensation, mitigate the “fat cat” phenomenon, and pay executives in line with firm performance and shareholder interests. Thus, this dissertation is divided into two parts to investigate whether this optimistic expectation of the regulators occurs as expected.
Part I of this dissertation examines whether this mandate can benefit firms by enhancing pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation as a whole and what are the channels of this mandate. To address the research questions, this dissertation uses Taiwanese-listed firms during the periods 2009 to 2010 and 2012 to 2013 as the sample. The independence and the competence of the compensation committee are considered to be the two channels which make the compensation committee mandate efficacious. The independence of the compensation committee is estimated by the compensation committee with incumbent independent directors. The competence of the compensation committee is estimated by the human and social capital of the members (i.e., long board service and multiple directorships). The empirical results show that this mandate indeed increases pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. This effect is mainly via the independence and the competence of the compensation committee.
Part II of this dissertation examines the extent to which firms that previously had overpayment or poor performance (generically called focal firms) benefit from this mandate and how compensation committee composition plays a role in this benefit. To address the research questions, this dissertation compares the change in the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation between focal firms and benchmark firms. Benchmark firms were less likely to overpay or to underpay or which had good performance before the mandate. The empirical results show that, compared to benchmark firms, the positive effect of this mandate on the pay-for-performance sensitivity is larger for overpaying firms and is smaller for poor-performing firms. This dissertation also finds that compensation committee members with more human and social capital and incumbent independent directors perform diverse functions in different firms. When they serve on overpaying firms that receive public scrutiny, they are more effective at increasing pay-for-performance sensitivity. Conversely, once they serve on poor-performing firms, this function vanishes.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT i
中文摘要 ii
ABSTRACT iii
PART I THE BENEFIT OF THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MANDATE 1
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 6
2.1 The Compensation Committee Mandate 6
2.2 The Benefit from the Compensation Committee Mandate 8
2.3 The Channels of the Benefit from the Compensation Committee Mandate 10
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 13
3.1 Data Source and Sample 13
3.2 Measurement of Dependent Variables 14
3.3 Measurement of Test Variables 15
3.4 Measurement of Control Variables 18
3.5 Empirical Model to Examine the Effect of the Mandate 19
3.6 Empirical Model to Examine the Channels of the Effect of the Mandate 20
4. MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS 21
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 21
4.2 Primary Results 23
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 24
5.1 The Effect of the Mandate on Director Compensation 24
5.2 The Effect of the Mandate on Compensation for the Highest-Paid Executives 25
5.3 The Effect of Other Factors on the Response to the Mandate 25
5.4 Excluding the Effect of CEO Turnover on the PPS 27
6. CONCLUSION 27
REFERENCES 30

PART II THE EFFECT OF FIRM-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS ON THE BENEFIT FROM THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MANDATE 45
1. INTRODUCTION 45
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 50
2.1 Which Firms Benefit More from the Compensation Committee Mandate 50
2.2 The Role of the Committee Members in the Benefit from the Mandate 51
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 56
3.1 Data Source and Sample 56
3.2 Measurement of Dependent Variables 57
3.3 Measurement of Test Variables 57
3.4 Measurement of Control Variables 62
3.5 Empirical Model to Examine the Difference of the Benefit from the Mandate 63
3.6 Empirical Model to Examine the Role of the Committee Members 64
4. MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS 65
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 65
4.2 Primary Results for Overpaying Firms 66
4.3 Primary Results for Poor-Performing Firms 69
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 72
5.1 The Effect of the Mandate on Director Compensation Practices 72
5.2 Excluding the Effect of CEO Turnover on the PPS 73
5.3 Alternative Measurement of Executive Compensation 73
5.4 Alternative Measurement of Firm Performance 74
5.5 Alternative Measurement of Overpaying Firms 74
5.6 Deleting Observations without Related Compensation Committee Member Data 75
5.7 Controls for Other Factors 75
5.8 Controls for Potential Endogeneity 76
6. CONCLUSION 77
REFERENCES 80

LISTS OF TABLES

PART I THE BENEFIT OF THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MANDATE 36
Table 1. Industry Breakdown 36
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 37
Table 3. The Characteristic of Compensation Committee Members (Individual Level) 38
Table 4. Pearson Correlation 39
Table 5. Empirical Results for the Benefit from the Mandate 40
Table 6. Empirical Results for The Channels of The Benefit from The Mandate 41
Table 7. Additional Analysis Related to Director Compensation 42
Table 8. Additional Analysis Related to Other Factors 43
PART II THE EFFECT OF FIRM-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS ON THE BENEFIT FROM THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MANDATE 87
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Subsamples 87
Table 2. Empirical Results for a Three-Way Partition- The Difference in the Benefit from the Compensation Committee Mandate 89
Table 3. Empirical Results for a Three-Way Partition- The Effect of Compensation Committee Composition on This Benefit 91
Table 4. Empirical Results for Alleged Sample 93
Table 5. Additional Analysis Related to Director Compensation in Focal Firms 97
Table 6. Additional Analysis Related to Overpaying Firms 101
Table 7. Additional Analysis Related to the Pre-Regulation Period 103
Table 8. Additional Analysis Related to the Potential Endogenity 104


PART I
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Guthrie, K., Sokolowsky, J., and Wan, K. 2012. CEO compensation and board structure revisited. Journal of Finance 67(3): 1149-1168.
Hillman, A. J., and Dalziel, T. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review 28: 383-396.
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Johnson, S. G., Schnatterly, K., and Hill, A. D. 2013. Board composition beyond independence: Social capital, human capital, and demographics. Journal of Management 39(1): 232-262.
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Kor, Y. Y., and Sundaramurthy, C. 2009. Experience-based human capital and social capital of outside directors. Journal of Management 35: 98-1006.
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Laksmana, I. 2008. Corporate board governance and voluntary disclosure of executive compensation practices. Contemporary Accounting Research 25(4): 1147-1182.
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PART II
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Bayazitova, D., and Shivdasani, A. 2012. Assessing TARP. The Review of Financial Studies 25(2): 377-407.
Bebchuck, L., and Weisbach, M. 2009. The state of corporate governance research. Review of Financial Studies 23: 939-961.
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Chalevas, C. G. 2011. The effect of the mandatory adoption of corporate governance mechanisms on executive compensation. The International Journal of Accounting 46: 138-174.
Chen, X., Cheng, Q., and Wang, X. 2014. Does increased board independence reduce earnings management? Evidence from recent regulatory reforms. Review of Accounting Studies, Forthcoming.
Chen, Q. 2011. An issue for the establishment of the compensation committee. Accounting Research Monthly 308: 62-66.
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Coles, J., Daniel, N., and Naveen, L. 2008. Boards: does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics 87: 329-356.
Conyon, M., and He, L. 2011. Executive compensation and corporate governance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance 17: 1158-1175.
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Core, J., Guay, W., and Larker, D. 2008. The power of the pen and executive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 88 (1): 1-25.
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