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研究生:賴運霆
研究生(外文):Yun-Ting Lai
論文名稱:審計委員會權益薪酬之決定因素
論文名稱(外文):The Determinants of Equity-Based Compensation for Audit Committee Member
指導教授:吳淑鈴吳淑鈴引用關係
指導教授(外文):Shu-Ling Wu
口試委員:高偉娟洪聖閔
口試委員(外文):Wei-Chuan KaoSheng-Min Hung
口試日期:2015-06-12
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
語文別:英文
論文頁數:40
中文關鍵詞:公司治理審計委員會權益薪酬代理問題委員會成員重疊
外文關鍵詞:Corporate governanceaudit committeeequity-based compensationagency conflictsoverlapping membership
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:211
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
由於權益薪酬之使用漸趨廣泛,其相關討論增加,再加上審計委員會職責逐
漸加重等因素,促使本研究欲找出哪些因素使得公司給予其審計委員會成員權益
薪酬。研究發現代理問題較嚴重之公司傾向不給予權益薪酬。薪酬委員會中成員
同時為審計委員會成員之比例則與給予權益薪酬之可能性呈顯著正向關係。而審
計委員會中董事同時為其他公司之高階主管之比例越高則公司傾向不給予權益薪
酬。本研究期能對審計委員會成員權益薪酬之相關議題做進一步的補充,幫助釐
清採用權益薪酬之決定因素。

Due to the controversy of the rising use of equity-based compensation and enhanced responsibilities of audit committee, this study examines the determinants that affect firm’s use of stock and option to remunerate audit committee members. My results show that firms having severer agency conflicts are significantly negatively associated with the presence of equity-based compensation for audit committee. Furthermore, firms with more compensation committee members serving on audit committee are significantly more likely to adopt stock and option plans for audit committee members. Moreover, if there are more audit committee members who are also top managers of other companies, the probability of equity remuneration for audit committees will be lower. Overall, the study contributes to the research about the determinants of audit committee member’s compensation.

摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
CONTENTS III
LIST OF TABLES IV
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 5
2.1 BACKGROUND 5
2.2 EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION OF AUDIT COMMITTEE 6
2.3 OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP ON AUDIT AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 9
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 11
3.1 AGENCY CONFLICTS 11
3.2 OVERLAP OF AUDIT COMMITTEE AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MEMBERS 12
3.3 AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS WHO ARE ALSO TOP EXECUTIVES OF OTHER COMPANIES 14
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 16
4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 16
4.2 VARIABLE DEFINITION 17
4.2.1 Proxy for agency conflict 17
4.2.2 Measure of committee overlapping 19
4.2.3 Measure of members who are also top executives 19
4.2.4 Other variables 20
4.2.5 Empirical model 21
5. RESULTS 24
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE TEST 24
5.2 MULTIVARIATE TEST ON OCCURRENCE OF EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION TO AUDIT COMMITTEE 30
6. CONCLUSION 34
REFERENCE 36


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