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研究生:鄭竣縯
研究生(外文):CHUN-YEN CHENG
論文名稱:公司治理對公司財務績效之研究-台灣上市櫃公司之事例
論文名稱(外文):The Corporate Governance and Financial Performance –Evidence from Taiwan’s Listed and OTC Firms
指導教授:李顯峰李顯峰引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsien-Feng Lee
口試委員:謝德宗賴錦璋
口試委員(外文):Der-Tzon Hsieh
口試日期:2015-06-03
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:經濟學研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
語文別:中文
論文頁數:59
中文關鍵詞:公司治理股東權益報酬率董事會金融風暴
外文關鍵詞:Corporate GovernanceROEthe Board of Directorsthe financial turmoil
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回顧1997 年亞洲金融風暴重挫許多國家之經濟與金融發展,喚醒亞洲國家對於公司治理(Corporate Governance)的重視。90年代後,亞洲企業公司治理制度的不完善,被認為是導致金融風暴發生的眾多原因之一。世界銀行(1999)對公司治理之定義:從公司角度而言,公司治理指公司在符合法律與契約之規範下,建立促成公司價值極大化的機制,以及指公司的決策機構-董事會,亦即公司董事會必須平衡股東及各種利害關係人的利益,以創造公司長期利益。另以公眾的觀點來討論公司治理機制,以促進整體社會投資人之福祉,督促企業在遵守契約及法律的前提下,建立一套監督的機制,以達成企業價值極大化的目標,這樣的觀點意指企業的最高決策機構,也就是「董事會」,必須維護所有利害關係人與股東之間的權益,創造企業的長期利潤,達到永續經營的目標。
根據公司法第202條規定:「公司業務之執行,應由董事會決議行之」,由此可知董事會為一個企業決策的最高層級,董事會之結構及獨立性會直接地影響到公司價值,而公司治理是在保障利害關係人與股東的權利,其中股權結構會產生代理問題,故公司董事會之目的為監控經理人的行為,減少代理問題,進而創造公司價值。在前述之時空背景下,而有公司治理機制建立的必要性及存在性,乃是為了防範與降低代理成本,建立對公司管理及監督的機制,延續公司的經營及追求公司投資人最大收益。
以上種種緣由遂有本研究產生,過去研究公司治理的變數不多,例如Morck et al(1988)、McConnell and Servaes(1990)、Yermack(1996),常以股權結構作為公司治理變數,進而探討股權結構與公司績效的關聯性,本文在此加上董監結構以及外部人影響,探討是否對於公司績效有關聯性,本研究選取2005年至2013年間,共9年的全台灣上市櫃公司資料,剔除資料缺漏不全者,選取金融業、傳統產業及電子業為我們主要的分析對象,共分為四大群體,分別是整體、金融業、傳統產業及電子業,分別分析公司治理下對於公司經營績效的影響以及在不同產業間有何區別,本文加入9項解釋變數與2項控制變數且以股東權益報酬率為經營績效變數,利用追蹤資料(Panel Data)分析法分別找出各群體適合的檢定方式以進行分析。
本文找出對公司經營績效影響方向不同產業間的差異,得出出群體二(金融業)在經理人持股比率為負向,群體四(電子業)為正向。董監事質押比率在群體二(金融業)為正向,群體四(電子業)為負向。在獨董佔董監比率方面群體二(金融業)為負向,群體三(傳統產業)為負向。法人機構持股比率方面在群體三(傳統產業)為正向,且在群體四(電子業)亦為正向,結果一致。在公司規模方面,群體三(傳統產業)為正向,異於群體二(金融業)及群體四(電子業)的負向。至於在負債比率方面,群體二(金融業)為正向,群體三(傳統產業)為負向。


Recalling the 1997 Asian financial crisis plunged the economic and financial development in many countries, waking Asian countries of corporate governance (Corporate Governance) attention. After 1990''s, the Asian Corporate Governance imperfect system, is considered to be one of the many reason of the financial turmoil. Definition of World Bank (1999) corporate governance: From the company perspective, corporate governance refers to the norms of law and in compliance with the contract, the company set up to promote the value maximization mechanism, and that the company''s decision-making institution , the Board of Directors, namely the Board of Directors must balance the benefits of shareholders and various stakeholders in order to create long-term benefits of the company.
Another view to the public to discuss corporate governance mechanisms to promote investment in human well-being of society as a whole, and urge enterprises to comply with the contract and the law under the premise of the establishment of a monitoring mechanism in order to achieve the goal of maximizing the value of enterprise, this view of the highest decision-making institution means business, that is, the "Company", must safeguard the benefits of all stakeholders and shareholders to create long-term profits, and achieve sustainable development goals.
According to article 202 of the Companies Act provides that: "the implementation of the company''s business, the line of the resolution by the board", can be seen as the highest level of the board of directors of a business decision, structure and independence of the board of directors will have a direct impact on the value of the company, and the company Governance is to protect the rights of interested parties and shareholders, ownership structure which will have agency problems, so the purpose of the board of directors of the company to monitor the manager''s behavior, reduce agency problems, thereby creating company value.
In the foregoing of the space-time background, and there is the need for corporate governance and the establishment of existence, but in order to prevent and reduce agency costs, the establishment of the company''s management and supervision mechanism, keeping the company''s business and the pursuit of one of the greatest investment income.
All these reasons then have produced this study, few previous studies of corporate governance variables, such as Morck et al (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Yermack (1996), usually in the ownership structure of corporate governance variables, and then discusses equity Structure and Performance of relevance.In this article with directors, supervisors and structure as well as external people, and to explore whether the company''s performance has relevance, this study selected 2005 to 2013, a total of nine years in Taiwan listed counters company information, Excluding incomplete data gaps, select the financial industry, traditional industry and electronics industry as our main object of analysis is divided into four groups, namely, the whole financial sector, traditional industries and electronics industries, respectively Under Corporate Governance for the company affect performance and what is the difference between different industries. This paper added nine explanatory variables and two control variables and to ROE for business performance variables, the use of tracking data (Panel Data) analysis method was used to identify the various groups for the test mode for analysis.
This article find the differences between industries affect the operating performance of the company in a different direction, draw the two groups (finance) manager shareholding ratio in the negative direction, the group of four (electronics) is positive. Directors and supervisors pledge ratio in group two (financial sector) is positive, the group of four (electronics) is negative. In terms of the ratio of independent directors accounting for directors, supervisors and group of two (financial sector) is negative, the group of three (traditional industries) is negative. Legal aspects of institutional ownership groups of three (traditional industries) is positive, and groups of four (electronics) is also positive, all the results is same. In terms of company size, group three (traditional industries) is positive, different from group two (finance) and group IV (electronics industry) negative. As for the debt ratio aspect, group two (financial sector) is positive, the group of three (traditional industries) is negative.


中文摘要……………………………………………………………. I
Abstract……………………………………………………………... III
第一章 緒論…..…………..………………………………………… 1
1.1 研究背景…………………………………………………… 1
1.2 研究動機…………………………………………………… 5
1.3 研究目的………………………………………….……....... 6
1.4 研究流程…………………………………………………… 7
第二章 文獻探討…………………………………………………… 8
2.1 公司治理相關文獻回顧……………………………............ 8
2.2 與公司治理有關之變數文獻回顧……………………….... 9
2.3 與公司治理有關之經營績效變數………………………… 14
2.4 各國公司治理機構之整理………………………………… 14
第三章 研究方法與設計….……..………………….…………........ 18
3.1 變數之選取與定義………………………………................ 18
3.1.1股權結構………………………………………… 19
3.1.2董監結構………………………………………… 21
3.1.3 外部人影響…………………………………....... 24
3.1.4 控制變數……………………………………....... 25
3.1.5 經營績效變數………………………………....... 26
3.2 研究方法說明……………………………………………… 27
3.3本文實證研究架構…………………………………………. 32
第四章 實證分析結果….……..………………………………......... 33
4.1樣本來源與結構……………………………………………. 33
4.2 敘述統計量分析………………………………….. ……….. 38
4.3 實證結果…………………………………………………… 42
4.3.1 模型適用檢定………………………………....... 42
4.3.2 共線性檢定……………………………………... 44
4.3.3 迴歸結果分析…………………………………... 46
4.3.4 Chow test分析結果……………………………... 48
第五章 結論與檢討……………………………………………….... 50
5.1 結論………………………………………………………… 50
5.2 檢討與研究限制………………………………..………….. 51
參考文獻…………………………………………………………….. 53


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