跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(35.172.223.30) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/07/25 09:51
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:詹舜丞
研究生(外文):Shun-Cheng Zhan
論文名稱:短時段次級頻譜市場之具真實標性質拍賣機制設計
論文名稱(外文):Design of Truthful Auction Mechanism for Short-interval Secondary Spectrum Access Market
指導教授:張時中張時中引用關係
口試委員:周俊廷蔡志宏于天立魏宏宇黃天立黃奎隆魏學文
口試日期:2014-07-01
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:電機工程學研究所
學門:工程學門
學類:電資工程學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
語文別:英文
論文頁數:129
中文關鍵詞:短時段次級頻譜市場仲介服務單一回合密封標拍賣VCG虛擬競標者具真實標性質個別理性收支平衡虛擬競標群差別式計價短時段次級頻譜市場線上拍賣平台
外文關鍵詞:SiSS marketbrokerage servicessingle-round and sealed bid auctionVCGvirtual biddertruthfulnessindividual rationalitybudget balanceVBGdiscriminatory settlement mechanismonline SiSS auction platform
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:122
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
由於可攜式智慧型裝置、無線寬頻接取技術及新興應用服務的發展,對於無線寬頻接取的需求快速地增加,全球行動數據流量預計在短短幾年內將有大於十倍的增長,無線及行動寬頻接取頻譜的短缺因此成為一全球皆面臨的挑戰。然而,許多頻譜量測結果卻顯示許多具執照的頻帶為低度使用或未充分利用。允許頻譜持有者分享頻譜接取權的次級頻譜市場是一能更佳利用無線通訊頻譜資源的潛在方法。鑒於動態頻譜接取及感知無線電技術的發展,本論文研究提出了一短時段次級頻譜接取市場,其允許執照持有者出租未使用或低度使用的頻譜單元給一群彼此競爭的行動虛擬營運商。出租頻譜單元的有效時間空檔為數十分鐘至數小時。
本論文研究首先介紹一短時段次級頻譜市場的設計架構,此架構提供了仲介的服務,包含有改善市場流動性、減輕市場資訊的不對稱及協調分享的過程。考慮到頻譜的短時段有效性,本論文研究了單一回合密封標的拍賣機制,並提出兩個具真實標性質的拍賣機制。第一個設計為以VCG拍賣為設計基礎的具真實標性質單邊拍賣,主要的創新設計有一累計型標單格式及一由頻譜仲介者創造的虛擬競標者,其標單則根據執照擁有者的底價來設定。累計型標單格式提供行動虛擬營運商最多的投標選擇,並允許行動虛擬營運上標得部分的頻道數目。虛擬競標者的導入保有了VCG真實標的性質並進一步達到個別理性及收支平衡。
第二個設計為一具真實標性質的雙邊拍賣,其不但可允許執照擁有者及行動虛擬營運商來分享及租用頻譜單元,更考慮了頻譜單元在空間及頻率上的異質性。為了能在空間維度上充份利用頻譜資源,將彼此不會互相干擾的行動虛擬營運商組成一群,並允許單一群中的行動營運商去共享頻譜資源是一常用的頻譜配置方法。然而,當行動虛擬營運商的需求為多個單元時,此一方法面臨如何決定群體標金及如何使拍賣具真實標性質的難題。所設計的雙邊拍賣具有兩個創新,第一個為依行動虛擬營運商標金所組成的虛擬競標群,一個虛擬競標群代表一群在空間需求上不衝突的行動虛擬營運商,其針對單一執照持有者進行單一頻譜單元的投標,一個虛擬競標群也是選標程序中的一基本實體。第二個創新為行動虛擬營運商間的差別式標金支付模式,對於一獲勝的虛擬競標群,其行動虛擬營運商平均分攤此虛擬競標群的標金做為所需支付的標金。對所有的執照持有者,每出租頻譜單元的營收皆為一相同的清算價格。此兩創新的結合達成在經濟上所需的特性如個體理性、收支平衡、執照持有者對於每單位底價的真實標及行動虛擬營運商對於需求數量及每單位標金的真實標。
除理論分析證明了單邊及雙邊拍賣設計皆達成在經濟上所需的特性,本論文亦提供了大規模的數值實驗分析。數值實驗結果顯示,相較於VCG拍賣,單邊拍賣所產生的單一頻譜單元收益平均高出31.3%。對於行動虛擬營運商,具累計型標單格式的拍賣能盡可能將頻譜單元租出並將行動虛擬營運商贏得單元數的取樣標準差維持在1.5之內。針對一短時段次級頻譜市場具200個行動虛擬營運商在競爭500個同質頻譜單元時,分配演算法的計算可在15秒內完成,驗證了能透過此設計有效利用短時段頻譜空檔的果效。針對雙邊拍賣設計,因允許多個互不衝突的行動虛擬營運商共享頻譜資源,儘管頻譜的租出數目占總幾數的比例皆低於0.6,所產生的收益仍比執照擁有者的期望值高出40%。而多個單邊拍賣及單一雙邊拍賣的分析比較結果顯示,不論是針對執照擁有者或行動虛擬營運商,多個單邊拍賣皆有高於單一雙邊拍賣的使用者效用。相較於雙邊拍賣只有0.568的頻譜租出比例,多個單邊拍賣0.936的租出比例能確實有效利用短時段頻譜空檔,且提高執照擁有者的出租意願。針對一有15個執照擁有者及30個行動虛擬營運商的短時段次級頻譜市場,兩種拍賣機制皆能在一分鐘的計算時間內完成頻譜分配,但多個單邊拍賣的求解時間將會比雙邊拍賣來得長。
此外,本論文採用Windows-Apache-MySQL-PHP (WAMPs)解法堆疊設計並實做一針對短時段次級頻譜市場的線上拍賣平台。此平台架構包含了負責網路間溝通的Apache超文字傳輸協定伺服器、開放原始碼的關聯式資料庫管理系統MySQL以及用以實現所設計拍賣演算法的伺服器端手稿語言PHP。除了展示所設計的拍賣機制具可實際應用性,此平台亦提供了一實驗環境用以測試使用者的真實競標行為。


Demands for mobile broadband access have increased rapidly because of the developments of portable smart devices, wireless broadband access (WBA) technologies and many new applications. Global mobile traffic is expected to have more than tenfold growth over a few years. Deficiency of spectrum availability for wireless and mobile access emerges as a significant challenge to be conquered worldwide. However, various spectrum usage measurements have indicated that most of the licensed spectrums are lowly utilized or not fully utilized. Secondary spectrum markets that allow spectrum owners to share access rights is a promising approach to better utilize spectrum for wireless communications. In view of the development of dynamic spectrum access (DSA) and cognitive radio (CR) techniques, this dissertation proposes a short-interval secondary spectrum (SiSS) access market that allows primary license holders (PLHs) to rent out unused or lowly utilized spectrum units to a few competing Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs). The availability of spectrum units for renting ranges from tens of minutes to hours.
This dissertation first introduces a design of SiSS market framework with brokerage services that improve market liquidity, mitigate information asymmetry and coordinate the sharing process. In view of the short-interval availability of spectrum, we study single-round and sealed bid auction for spectrum sharing between the PLHs and MVNOs and propose two truthful auction mechanisms. The first is a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction-based unilateral truthful auction. Key innovations are cumulative bidding format (CBF) and a virtual bidder by the spectrum broker, whose bids are based on PLH’s specification of per-unit reserve price. CBF provides MVNOs with maximal bidding options and allows MVNOs to win part of demands. Introduction of virtual bidder exploits the truthfulness of VCG and further achieves individual rationality and budget balance.
The second is a bilateral truthful auction that not only supports PLHs and MVNOs to contribute and purchase multiple spectrum units, but also considers the spatial and frequency heterogeneity of spectrum availability. To exploit spectrum availability in the spatial domain, grouping conflict-free MVNOs and allowing them to share one same spectrum unit is a popular approach for spectrum allocation. However, when MVNOs have diverse demand amounts, such an approach encounters a challenge of how to determine the group bid and make the auction truthful. Our designs have two innovations. The first is the formation of virtual bidding group (VBG) based on MVNO bids. A VBG represents a group of spatially-separated MVNOs bidding on one spectrum unit of a PLH and acts as an entity for bid selection. The second is discriminatory payments by MVNOs that obliges MVNOs in a winning VBG to share the VBG bid as payment. All winning PLHs receive a clearing price for each rented spectrum unit. Integration of the two innovations achieve desirable economic properties of individual rationality, budget balance, PLH truthfulness with respect to per-unit reserve price bid and MVNO truthfulness with respect to demand amount and per-unit bid price.
In addition to proving the achievement of desirable economic properties, we provide extensive numerical experimentations for both of unilateral and bilateral auction designs. Numerical experimentations show that unilateral auction generates in average 31.3% higher per-unit revenue to the PLH than VCG. For MVNOs, the design with CBF rents as many spectrum units out as possible and keeps the sample standard deviation of winning quantity lower than 1.5. For a SiSS market of 200 MVNOs and 500 homogeneous spectrum units, computation time of clearing an auction is within 15 seconds, which justifies the feasibility of exploiting short-interval spectrum availability. For the bilateral auction, by enabling conflict-free MVNO to share same spectrum units, although spectrum rent-out ratio is below 0.6 in all test instances, the generated spectrum revenue is higher than the expected revenue by PLHs in about 40%. Comparative analysis between multiple unilateral auctions and one bilateral auction of the same set of available spectrum units and players show that, no matter from the perspective of PLHs or MVNOs, multiple unilateral auctions lead to a higher total utility than the bilateral auction. Compared with bilateral auction that has only 0.568 spectrum rent-out ratio, multi-unilateral auction has 0.936 spectrum rent-out ratio and can truly exploit short-interval spectrum availability, which raises PLHs’ willingness for sharing. For a SiSS market of 15 PLHs and 30 MVNOs, computation times of two designs are both less than one minute but the solution time of multiple unilateral auctions will be longer than the time of bilateral auction.
Furthermore, this dissertation designs and implements an online auction platform for SiSS market using a solution stack of Windows-Apache-MySQL-PHP (WAMP). The platform consists of an Apache HTTP server that runs in the background and handles the communication over players, an open-source relational database management system, MySQL, and a server-side scripting language, PHP, to implement the auction algorithms. In addition to demonstration of practicality of our design for application, the online auction platform provides an experimental environment for the human decision.


Abstract i
中文摘要 iv
Contents vii
List of Figures x
List of Tables xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation of Short-interval Secondary Spectrum Access Market 1
1.2 Literature Review 3
1.3 Scope of Dissertation 5
1.4 Organization of Dissertation 8
Chapter 2 Short-interval Secondary Spectrum Access Market Framework 9
2.1 Introduction of DSA and CR Technologies 9
2.2 Opportunity of SiSS Market 12
2.2.1 Supply Side Analysis 13
2.2.2 Demand Side Analysis 17
2.3 Design Challenges of SiSS Market 19
2.4 Broker-based SiSS Market Framework 21
Chapter 3 Unilateral Truthful SiSS Auction Mechanism Design 24
3.1 Review of VCG Auction 24
3.2 Innovations of VCG-based SiSS Auction 26
3.2.1 Cumulative Bidding Format for MVNOs 27
3.2.2 Introduction of Virtual Bidder by Auctioneer 27
3.3 Auction Clearing Algorithm 28
3.3.1 Bid Selection 28
3.3.2 Payment Calculation 29
3.3.3 Illustrative Example and Discussion 30
3.4 Proofs of Economic Properties 33
3.4.1 Truthfulness 33
3.4.2 Individual Rationality 35
3.4.3 Budget Balance 36
3.5 Application to Unilateral Reverse Truthful SiSS Auction Mechanism 37
Chapter 4 Bilateral Truthful SiSS Auction Mechanism Design 39
4.1 Review of Existing Truthful Bilateral Auctions 40
4.2 Bidding Language of Players 42
4.3 Design of Truthful Bilateral Auction for Multiple Heterogeneous Spectrum 44
4.3.1 Grouping of Conflict-free MVNOs 44
4.3.2 Formation of Virtual Bidding Group based on MVNO Bids 46
4.3.3 Discriminatory Payments by MVNOs 48
4.3.4 Illustrative Example and Discussion 52
4.4 Proofs of Economic Properties 54
4.4.1 Individual Rationality 55
4.4.2 Budget Balance 55
4.4.3 Truthfulness 56
Chapter 5 Numerical Performance Evaluation 63
5.1 Analysis of Unilateral Forward Truthful SiSS Auction 63
5.1.1 Cumulative Bidding Format v.s. Single Bidding Format 65
5.1.2 Comparison with VCG Auction 70
5.1.3 Computation Efficiency 72
5.1.4 Effect of Reserve Price 74
5.2 Analysis of Bilateral Truthful SiSS Auction 75
5.2.1 Grouping Algorithm Comparison 77
5.2.2 Analyses of Spectrum Re-utilization, Revenue, MVNO Satisfaction and Utility and Computation Time 79
5.3 Comparison of One Bilateral SiSS Auction and Multiple Unilateral SiSS Auctions 86
Chapter 6 Implementation of Online SiSS Auction System 92
6.1 System Overview 92
6.2 Introduction of Design Functions 94
6.3 Introduction of User Interface 96
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 106
7.1 Conclusions 106
7.2 Future Work 108
Bibliography 111
Appendix A: Mathematical Formulation of Unilateral Reverse Auction 119
Appendix B: Unilateral Auction with Bidding Option for Specific Regions 121
Appendix C: Dynamic Programming Algorithm for Bid Selection and Payment Calculation 126
Appendix D: Heuristic Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Groups 128


[ACM12]ACMA. Radiocommunications (Trading Rules for Spectrum Licences) Determination 2012. 2012.
[ACM14]Australia Government. ACMA. [Online]. Available: http://archive.acma.gov.au/WEB/HOMEPAGE/PC=HOME.
[ADS11]M. Alanyali, A. A. Daoud, and D. Starobinski, “Profitability of Dynamic Spectrum Provision for Secondary Use,” in Proc. of 5th IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2011), pp. 136-145, Germany, 2011.
[AGS08]A. Attar, S. A. Ghorashi, M. Sooriyabandara, and A. H. Aghvami, “Challenges of Real-Time Secondary Usage of Spectrum,” The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 816-830, March, 2008.
[ALV06]I. Akyildiz, W. Y. Lee, M. C. Vuran, and S. Mohanty, “NeXt Generation/Dynamic Spectrum Access/Cognitive Radio Wireless Networks: A Survey,” Computer Network, vol. 50, no. 13, pp. 2127-2159, 2006.
[BaN04]M. Babaioff and N. Nisan, “Concurrent Auctions Across The Supply Chain,” Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 21, pp. 595-629, 2004.
[BrS12]J. E. Bryson and L. E. Strickling, “An Assessment of the Viability of Accommodating Wireless Broadband in the 1755 - 1850 MHz Band,” NTIA Report, 2012.
[CaM08]C. Camaran and D. D. Miguel, “Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) Basics: What Is Behind This Mobile Business Trend,” Telecom Practice, Oct. 2008.
[CaW10]C. E. Caicedo and M. B. H. Weiss, “The Viability of Spectrum Trading Markets,” in Proc. of 4th IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2010), pp. 1-10, Singapore, 2010.
[ChL07]J. M. Chaplin and W. H. Lehr, “The Path to Market Success for Dynamic Spectrum Access Technology,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 96-103, May 2007.
[ChZ14]T. Chen and S. Zhong, “Truthful Auctions for Continuous Spectrum with Variable Bandwidths,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 1116-1128, 2014.
[CHS13]Z. Chen, H. Huang, Y. Sun and L. Huang, “True-MCSA: A Framework for Truthful Double Multi-Channel Spectrum Auctions,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 12, no. 8, pp. 3838-3850, August 2013.
[Cis14]Cisco, “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2013–2018,” White Paper, 2014.
[CLZ14]Y. Chen, P. Lin, and Q. Zhang, “LOTUS: Location-aware Online Truthful Double Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access,” in Proc. of 7th IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2014), pp. 510-518, USA, April 2014.
[CZW14]Y. Chen, J. Zhang, K. Wu, and Q. Zhang, “TAMES: A Truthful Double Auction for Multi-Demand Heterogeneous Spectrums,” to be appeared in IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 2014.
[DID11]J. D. Deaton, R. E. Irwin, and L. A. DaSilva, “The Effects of A Dynamic Spectrum Access Overlay in LTE-Advanced Networks,” in Proc. of 5th IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2011), pp. 488-497, Germany, 2011.
[Eri12]Ericsson, “Traffic and Market Report,” Market Report, Jun. 2012.
[Eri15]Ericsson, “Ericsson Mobility Report,” June 2015.
[FCC03]FCC, “Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets,” Technical Report (FCC 03-113), 2003.
[FCC10]FCC, “Mobile Broadband: The Benefits of Additional Spectrum,” FCC Staff Technical Paper, October 2010.
[FCC13]FCC, “The Broadcast Television Spectrum Incentive Auction,” FCC Staff Technical Paper, 2013.
[FCC14]FCC. Incentive Auctions. [Online]. Available: http://www.fcc.gov/incentiveauctions.
[FCD14]FCC Commission Document. FCC Increases 5GHz Spectrum for Wi-Fi, Other Unlicensed Uses. [Online]. Available: http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-increases-5ghz-spectrum-wi-fi-other-unlicensed-uses. March 31, 2014.
[FCZ12]X. Feng, Y. Chen, J. Zhang, Q. Zhang, and B. Li, “TAHES: A Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrums,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol.11, no. 11, pp. 4038-4047, Nov. 2012.
[GBC08]S. Gandhi, C. Buragohain, L. Cao, H. Zheng, and S. Suri, “Towards Real-Time Dynamic Spectrum Auctions,” Computer Networks, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 879-897, March 2008.
[GDS14]M. Guo, A. Deligkas, and R. Savani, “Increasing VCG Revenue by Decreasing the Quality of Items,” to appear in Proc. of Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Canada, 2014.
[Gir01]B. Girdlestone, “Trends in Global Capacity Availability and Trading,” OECD Workshop, Berlin, 2001.
[HCB11]T. Harrold, R. Cepeda, and M. Beach, “Long-Term Measurements of Spectrum Occupancy Characteristics,” in Proc. of 5th IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2011), pp. 83-89, Germany, 2011.
[HLH04]J. L. Hartley, M. D. Lane, and Y. Hong, “An Exploration of the Adoption of E-Auctions in Supply Management,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 153-161, May 2004.
[HNH09]E. Hossain, D. Niyato, and Z. Han, Dynamic Spectrum Access in Cognitive Radio Networks, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009.
[HRH00]B. F. Hobbs, M. H. Rothkopf, L. C. Hyde, and R. P. O’Neill, “Evaluation of a Truthful Revelation Auction in the Context of Energy Markets with Nonconcave Benefits,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 5-32, 2000.
[IDA15]Infocomm Development Authority (IDA) of Singapore, “Spectrum Management Handbook,” Issus 1 Rev 2.6, February 2015.
[IEE14]IEEE 802.22 Working Group on Wireless Regional Area Networks. [Online]. Available: http://www.ieee802.org/22/.
[ILO14]ILOG Optimization Academic Initiative. IBM. [Online]. Available: http://www-01.ibm.com/software/integration/optimization/cplex.
[Isl08]M. H. Islam, et al., “Spectrum Survey in Singapore: Occupancy Measurements and Analyses,” in Proc. of 3rd International Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications (CrownCom 2008), pp. 1-7, Singapore, May 2008.
[JuP06]A. I. Juda and D. C. Park, “The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution,” in Proc. of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’ 06), USA, 2006.
[JZZ09]J. Jia, Q. Zhang, Q. Zhang, and M. Liu, “Revenue Generation for Truthful Spectrum Auction in Dynamic Spectrum Access,” in Proc. of Tenth ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc 2009), pp. 3-12, USA, May 2009.
[Kri10]V. Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press, Second Edition, 2010.
[KVC11]A. Kerans, D. Vo, P. Conder, and S. Krusevac, “Pricing of Spectrum Based On Physical Criteria,” in Proc. of 5th IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2011), pp. 223-230, Germany, 2011.
[Lim10]R. Lima, “IBM ILOG CPLEX What Is Inside of the Box?,” EWO Seminar, 2010.
[LMS06]D. Lehmann, R. Muller and T. Sandholm, “The Winner Determination Problem” in Combinatorial Auctions, edited by P. Cramton, Y. Shoham and R. Steinberg, MIT Press, 2006.
[MaT90]S. Martello and P. Toth, Knapsack Problems - Algorithms and Computer Implementations, John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1990.
[MiM99]J. Mitola III and G. Q. Maguire, “Cognitive radio: making software radios more personal,” IEEE Personal Communications, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 13-18, Aug. 1999.
[Mit99]J. Mitola III, “Cognitive radio for flexible mobile multimedia communications,” in Proc. of IEEE International Workshop on Mobile Multimedia Communications (MoMuC''99), pp. 3-10, USA, Nov. 1999.
[MPB15]M. Mazoochi, M. A. Pourmina, and H. Bakhshi, “A Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Hybrid Spectrums,” Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal, vol. 80, Issue 3, pp. 1011-1026, Feb. 2015.
[MyS83]R. B. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite, “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 29, pp. 265-281, 1983.
[MZW10]X. Meng, Y. Zhu, and X. Wu, “Improved Dynamic Programming Algorithms for the 0-1 Knapsack Problem,” in Proc. of 3rd IEEE International Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology (ICCSIT 2010), pp. 19-22, China, 2010.
[NCC14]National Communications Commission. 4G Mobile Auction Results. [Online]. Available: http://www.ncc.gov.tw/english/content_field_detail.aspx?site_content_sn=215&is_history=0&pages=0&sn_f=69.
[NGM15]Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN), “NGMN 5G White Paper,” A Deliverable by the NGMN Alliance, Feb. 2015.
[NHH09]D. Niyato, E. Hossain, and Z. Han, “Dynamic spectrum access in IEEE 802.22- based cognitive wireless networks: a game theoretic model for competitive spectrum bidding and pricing,” IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 16, issue 2, pp. 16-23, April 2009.
[NiR99]N. Nisan and A. Ronen, “Algorithmic Mechanism Design,” in Proc. of 31st ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 129-140, 1999.
[NRI11]Nomura Research Institute (NRI) Taipei Branch, “MOTC Optimal Planning of Taiwan’s Mid- to Long-Term Radio Spectrum - Summary,” Assessment Report, Dec. 2011.
[NSN14]Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN), “Optimising Spectrum Utilisation towards 2020,” NSN White Paper, March 2014.
[NZG14]New Zealand Government. Radio Spectrum Management. [Online]. Available: http://www.rsm.govt.nz/cms.
[OEC14]OECD, “New Approaches to Spectrum Management,” OECD Digital Economic Paper, no. 235. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz44fnq066c-en. 2014.
[Ofc11]Office of Communications (Ofcom), “Simplifying Spectrum Trading - Spectrum Leasing and Other Market Enhancements,” Final Statement Report, June 2011.
[Ofc15]Office of Communications (Ofcom), “Promoting Investment and Innovation in the Internet of Things,” Report of Summary of Responses and Next Steps, Jan. 2015.
[PCA12]PCAST. Realizing the Full Potential of Government-Held Spectrum to Spur Economic Growth, Report to the U.S. President. [Online]. Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/pcast. July 2012.
[PeP04]J. M. Peha and S. Panichpapiboon, “Real-Time Secondary Markets for Spectrum,” Telecommunications Policy, vol. 28, no. 7-8, pp. 603-618, Aug. 2004.
[PMF12]S. Paris, F. Martignon, I. Filippini, and A. Capone, “A Truthful Auction for Access Point Selection in Heterogeneous Mobile Networks,” in Proc. of IEEE International Communications (ICC 2012), pp. 3200-3205, Canada, June 2012.
[Qua14]Qualcomm. The 1000x Mobile Data Challenge. [Online]. Available: http://www.qualcomm.com/1000x.
[RCL10]B. Rastegari, A. Condon, and K. Leyton-Brown, “Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions,” Artificial Intelligence, vol. 175, pp. 441-456, 2010.
[Rob79]K. Roberts, “The Characterization of Implementable Choice Rules,” in Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont, pp. 321-349, North-Holland, 1979.
[Rot07]M. H. Rothkopf, “Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical,” Operations Research, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 191-197, March 2007.
[SAB10]S. Sodagari, A. Attar, and S. G. Bilen, “Strategies to Achieve Truthful Spectrum Auctions for Cognitive Radio Networks Based on Mechanism Design,” in Proc. of 4th IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2010), pp. 1-6, Singapore, 2010.
[ScF09]M. V. D. Schaar and F. Fu, “Spectrum Access Games and Strategic Learning in Cognitive Radio Networks for Delay-Critical Applications,” Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 97, no. 4, pp. 720-740, April 2009.
[SpB08]Spectrum Bridge, Inc., “The Secondary Spectrum Market: A Licensing & Leasing Primer,” White Paper, Sept. 2008.
[Spe14]SpecEx. Spectrum Bridge, Inc. [Online]. Available: http://spectrumbridge.com/ProductsServices/search.aspx.
[SSC10]Shared Spectrum Company (SSC), “General Survey of Radio Frequency Bands (30MHz to 3GHz),” Measurement Report, Vienna, Virginia, Sept. 2010.
[SSC14]Shared Spectrum Company (SSC). Spectrum Reports. [Online]. Available: http://www.sharedspectrum.com/papers/spectrum-reports/.
[Sta14]StarUML. [Online]. Available: http://staruml.sourceforge.net/en/.
[TBZ11]T. M. Taher, R. B. Bacchus, K. J. Zdunek and D. A. Roberson, “Long-Term Spectral Occupancy Findings in Chicago,” in Proc. of 5th IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2011), pp. 100-107, Germany, 2011.
[UMT11]UMTS Forum, “Mobile Traffic Forecasts 2010-2020,” Forecast Report, Jan. 2011.
[VMB10]V. Valenta, R. Marsalek, G. Baudoin, M. Villegas, M. Suarez, and F. Robert, “Survey on Spectrum Utilization in Europe: Measurements, Analyses and Observations,” in Proc. of 5th International Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications (CrownCom 2010), pp. 1-5, France, June 2010.
[WAC10]M. B. H. Weiss, M. Al-Tamaimi and L. Cui, “Dynamic Geospatial Spectrum Modelling: Taxonomy, Options and Consequences,” Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Arlington VA, 2010.
[WaL11]B. Wang and K. J. Ray Liu, “Advances in Cognitive Radio Network: A Survey,” IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 5-23, Feb. 2011.
[Wei11]M. B. H. Weiss, “Spatio-Temporal Spectrum Holes and Secondary User,” in Proc. of 5th IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2011), pp. 216-222, Germany, 2011.
[WGC11]J. Wang, M. Ghosh, and K. Challapali, “Emerging Cognitive Radio Applications: A Survey,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 49, Issue 3, pp. 74-81, March 2011.
[WNH09]A. M. Wyglinski, M. Nekovee, and Y. T. Hou, Cognitive Radio Communications and Networks: Principles and Practice, Elsevier, Dec. 2009.
[ZCL12]S. C. Zhan, S. C. Chang, P. B. Luh, and H. H. Lieu, “Truthful Auction Mechanism Design for Short-interval Secondary Spectrum Access Market,” in Proc. of 12th International Conference on ITS Telecommunications (ITST 2012), pp. 140-145, Taiwan, Nov. 2012.
[ZhS07]Q. Zhao and B. M. Sadler, “A Survey of Dynamic Spectrum Access,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 79-89, 2007.
[ZhW13]W. Zhong, and J. Wang, “Energy Efficient Discrete Spectrum Sharing Strategy Selection in Cognitive MIMO Interference Channels,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 61, no. 14, pp. 3705-3717, 2013.
[ZhZ09]X. Zhou and H. Zheng, “TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions,” in Proc. of IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM 2009), pp. 999-1007, Brazil, 2009.
[ZhZ10]X. Zhou and H. Zheng, “Breaking Bidder Collusion in Large-Scale Spectrum Auctions,” in Proc. of 11th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc 2010), pp. 121-130, USA, 2010.
[ZLJ13]H. Zhang, B. Li, H. Jiang, F. Liu, A. V. Vasilakos, and J. Liu, “A Framework for Truthful Online Auctions in Cloud Computing with Heterogeneous User Demands,” in Proc. of IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM 2013), pp. 1510-1518, Italy, 2013.
[ZWQ13]T. Zhang, F. Wu, and C. Qiao, “SPECIAL: A Strategy-Proof and Efficient Multi-Channel Auction Mechanism for Wireless Networks,” in Proc. of IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM 2013), pp. 525-529, Italy, 2013.
[ZXT11]W. Zhong, Y. Xu, and H. Tianfield, “Game-Theoretic Opportunistic Spectrum Sharing Strategy Selection for Cognitive MIMO Multiple Access Channels,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 59, no. 6, pp. 2745-2759, 2011.


QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
無相關論文
 
1. 2.虞國興、康世芳、胡名雯(2003/10),<我國自來水市場解除管制可行性研究>,《公平交易季刊》,第十一卷第四期 頁31-80。
2. 11.邱瑞焜(2003/7),「天然氣界專業人才的養成」,『瓦斯季刊』第64期。
3. 15.簡添松(93/1),「美國天然氣產業及市場自由化發展」,『能源季刊』第34卷第一期,頁56-70。
4. 16.高紹惠(92/10),「美國天然氣市場發展透視」,『瓦斯季刊』第65期,頁62-66。
5. 17.邱瑞焜(93/4),「美國面臨冬季天然氣短缺問題」,『瓦斯季刊』第
6. 18.徐守正(91/05),「崛起與殞落-由安隆公司談能源產業自由化後的事業體經營」,『能源報導』91年5月號。
7. 19.郭博堯(91),「世界天然氣發展情勢」,『國家政策論壇』第1期。
8. 22.王尚博(94/10),「我國開放天然氣管網可行性探討-運用成本低於加總者理論之評估結果-」,『能源季刊』第35卷第4期。
9. 23.梁敬修(93/1),「中日韓瓦斯協會圓桌會議紀實」,『瓦斯季刊』第66期。
10. 25.簡添松(92/10),「韓國天然氣產業自由化動向」,『能源季刊』第33卷第4期。
11. 26.劉國琛、王尚博(94/10),「英國天然氣市場自由化之借鑑」,『能源季刊』,第35卷第4期。
12. 27.簡添松(93),「歐盟天然氣市場自由化之發展」,『能源季刊』第32卷第2期。
13. 31.林所里(91/7),「對我國天然氣產業政策之期望」,『瓦斯季刊』第60期。
14. 32.吳再益、林唐裕(91/7),「天然氣管線開放代輸可行性探討」,『瓦斯季刊』第60期。
15. 33.鍾立鶴(92),「從天然氣輸送方式談管線共用」,『瓦斯季刊』第62期。
 
無相關點閱論文