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研究生:彭紹曾
研究生(外文):Shao-Tseng Peng
論文名稱:法院外債務協商的賽局分析
論文名稱(外文):The Game Theoretic Analysis of Workout
指導教授:王泰昌王泰昌引用關係
指導教授(外文):Taychang Wang
口試委員:劉嘉雯洪聖閔
口試日期:2015-07-27
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計與管理決策組
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
語文別:中文
論文頁數:82
中文關鍵詞:財務困難法院外債務協商賽局理論策略行動最後通牒賽局重複賽局社會規範
外文關鍵詞:Financial DistressWorkoutGame TheoryStrategic MovesUltimatum GameRepeated GamesSocial Norms
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對於真實世界中的企業來說,財務困難 (financial distress)的發生,無疑地將對企業的永續經營產生立即性的威脅。財務困難企業 (financially distressed enterprises)面臨此一難關,必須盡其所能地與債權人進行法院外債務協商,以期完成負債重組 (financial restructuring)。另一方面,對於債權人而言,除了必須與財務困難企業進行債務協商,亦必須與其他債權人針對可能出現的利益衝突,尋求解決之道。

本研究的目的,即是針對債權人之間最常見的利益衝突:「無擔保債權人對有擔保債權人實施要脅」,以賽局理論的觀點模擬參賽者的思維邏輯,並選擇以靜態賽局及動態「最後通牒賽局」(Ultimatum Game)為分析架構,預測參賽者理性的策略選擇,以及賽局的均衡結果,並與實務觀察結果加以比較,若有不同,探討其中差異之原因。

本研究發現,賽局理論預測的結果,與實務中所觀察到的現象並不完全相同。即使不利於短期利益,現實世界裡的銀行債權人,還是願意以互惠式的合作,取代賽局理論所假設的理性自利,在看似對立的賽局中達成合作性的結果。

針對前述的差異,本研究認為,現實世界中的銀行債權人於進行決策選擇時,並非完全理性地只比較可量化的利益,還會考量銀行債權人因違反社會規範及行業規範所衍生的無形成本,以及因違反規範而失去自未來重複賽局中獲益的機會成本。


The occurrence of financial distress will undoubtedly pose immediate threat to the survival of enterprises. Challenged by difficult situation, financially distressed enterprises need to initiate out-of-court restructuring, or “workout” process, to restructure their debts. On the other hand, creditors of financially distressed enterprises not only need to be in negotiation with the debtor, but sometimes, voluntarily or not, deal with the potential conflict of interests with their peers.

The purpose of this study is to examine, from a game theoretic perspective, one of the most frequently observed conflicts among creditors- a hold-up by an unsecured creditor against a secured creditor. A static game and a dynamic “ultimatum game” model are used as the analytic framework to predict players’ rational choices and the equilibrium of the game. The differences, if any, between the theoretic prediction and practical observation will be discussed.

The study finds that, what’s suggested by theories doesn’t make it a reality. Bank creditors in a seemingly hostile situation are willing to tango with each other reciprocally when there are potential mutual benefits that can be shared in the future, even at the cost of a short-term loss.

A probable explanation may be seen from the perspective of “social norms”. Other than quantifiable benefits that can be derived from total rationality, bank creditors do take into consideration of unquantifiable cost, including the punitive cost incurred from violating social norms and business protocol, and the opportunity cost of potential long-term gain as a result of being expelled from the repeated games in the future.


審定書 ii
誌謝 iii
中文摘要 iv
THESIS ABSTRACT v
目錄 vii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節、研究動機 1
第二節、研究架構 2
第二章 財務困難發展歷程 3
第一節、財務困難潛伏期 3
第二節、財務困難醞釀期 6
第三節、財務困難爆發期 7
第三章 債務(權)性質 9
第一節、無擔保債權 9
第二節、有擔保債權 10
第四章 債權人屬性 14
第一節、按與企業間契約關係 14
第二節、按是否取得擔保物權 22
第五章 我國法院外債務協商實務簡介 25
第一節、債務協商程序 25
第二節、協商對象順序選擇 26
第三節、主辦銀行與主力銀行團會議(代表行) 28
第四節、債務協商機制 29
第五節、債務協商條件 31
第六章 無擔保債權人vs. 有擔保債權人的「要脅賽局」 33
第一節、情境說明 36
第二節、參賽者 37
第三節、參賽者的策略選擇 37
第四節、賽局屬性 40
第五節、優勢策略分析與均衡策略 44
第六節、策略行動 46
第七節、實務觀察 51
第七章 有擔保債權人vs. 無擔保債權人的「分餅賽局」 53
第一節、情境制約因素 53
第二節、最後通牒賽局 55
第三節、最後通牒賽局的實證 56
第四節、賽局規則 59
第五節、賽局屬性 61
第六節、反推法分析 62
第七節、策略行動 64
第八節、實務觀察 65
第九節、分餅賽局實務觀察與最後通牒實驗結果差異分析初探 66
第八章 非合作賽局出現合作性結果成因探討 70
第一節、行業規範觀點 70
第二節、重複賽局觀點 73
第三節、小結 74
第九章 結論與建議 75
第一節、研究結論 75
第二節、後續研究建議 75
參考文獻 78


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