臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

經理人的個性會影響其所作的決策結果，甚至關係到企業營運或是利害關係人的利益，若經理人具備過度自信的特質，可能會因其過於樂觀而作出錯誤的決策。過去研究發現若經理人被歸類為過度自信，其宣告併購案時的市場反應為負向，因為這類過度自信的特質容易使其高估併購案帶來的綜效，甚至付出更高的溢價來收購目標企業，進而造成公司價值的損失。本研究以反面觀點來探討，這類過度自信之經理人，在宣告併購案撤回時，市場反應是否為正。因為先前之負面反應是市場解讀經理人的過度自信將會高估併購案的成果，進而影響股東價值，故當宣告併購撤回時，此類因素應會消失，進而產生正向的市場反應。
本研究以337間美國上市公司為樣本，並將樣本區分為過度自信以及非過度自信，另外也以各樣本之忙碌董事比例高低，觀察其在撤回併購時所造成的市場反應是否為正向。研究結果發現，過度自信之經理人在宣告撤回併購案時，市場所給予的反應顯著為正，且若其公司內部擁有較高比例之忙碌董事，相較於擁有較低比例忙碌董事的公司，在宣告撤回併購案時市場反應更為顯著，說明董事將因身兼過多職位，而難以執行其應有的監督功能，較無法制衡過度自信的經理人作出不理性之決策，進而造成公司價值損失，故在公司宣告撤回併購時，市場反應為正向。本研究建議企業應謹慎控制董事之席次，勿因董事在外兼任過多職位，而難以專注於企業本身之監督效果，進而增加代理問題發生的機會。

The CEO’s characteristics play a big role in the results of their decisions, it may even influence the company’s operation and stakeholders’ equity. If the CEO tends to be overconfident, they may make some wrong decisions due to being overoptimistic. Previous studies found that the market reactions at merger announcements are significantly negative for overconfident CEOs, because they may overestimate the synergy of the merger, or even pay too much premiums on target firms. This paper tries to approach from the opposite concept. The former negative reaction is because of CEO’s hubris that make some wrong merger decisions, when they announce merger withdrawal, the market reaction should be significantly positive.
This paper uses 337 United States Companies as samples and divides them into overconfidence and non-overconfidence groups. It also measures their multiple directorships ratio, and examine what kind of influence it will make on market reaction. Results show that, the market reaction is significantly positive for overconfidence CEOs who announce merger withdrawal, and for those CEOs who serve in high proportion of multiple directorships firm, the market reaction is significantly positive when they announce merger withdrawal. This proves that directors with multiple outside board seats may become too busy to demonstrate their monitor function, so firms should cautiously control their director’s board seats to reduce the agency cost.

第壹章 前言 1
1.1 研究背景和動機 1
1.2 研究目的 3
1.3 研究流程 4
第貳章 文獻回顧 5
2.1 過度自信與併購 5
2.2 董事於併購案的角色 7
2.3 撤回相關文獻 9
第參章 理論基礎與假設建構 11
3.1 過度自信 11
3.2 董事之監督功能 13
3.3 董事之資訊傳遞功能 15
第肆章 研究方法 17
4.1 研究架構 17
4.2 研究樣本 18
4.3 衡量過度自信 19
4.3 事件研究法 20
4.4 控制變數 22
第伍章 結果與討論 26
5.1 敘述統計 26
5.2 分群檢定 30
5.3 迴歸分析 33
第陸章 結論 37
6.1 研究結果 37
6.2 實務建議 39
6.3 研究限制 40

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