臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討媒體報導公司年報申報之行為與公司治理間的關連性。雖然過去已有許多研究在探討媒體報導與證券市場股價反應間的關係，但大都以投資者及公司之觀點，研究媒體報導後投資人及股價之反應。由於公司治理與公司的資訊透明度息息相關，本研究以媒體的觀點出發，探討媒體決定報導公司盈餘相關資訊以及報導的次數是否與公司治理相關變數間具有關聯性。
資料選擇以2013年之上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，並將媒體報導行為分成是否報導與報導次數兩種類。本研究以羅吉斯迴歸(Logistic Regression)檢測媒體報導公司盈餘相關資訊與公司治理相關變數間是否具有關連性以及使用卜瓦松迴歸(Poisson Regression)檢測媒體報導公司盈餘相關資訊的次數與公司治理相關變數間是否具有關聯性。
實證結果發現媒體報導行為與公司治理的某些變數具有關聯性。當內部董事持股比率越高與董事會規模越大，媒體報導之可能性越高。然而當外部董事持股比率越高則媒體報導之可能性越低。另外也發現媒體在報導公司年報申報之次數與公司治理某些變數也具有關聯性。當公司董事會規模越大或是當機構投資人持股比率越高，實證結果顯示媒體報導次數也越多，然而當公司存在董事長兼任總經理之情形時，媒體報導的次數越少。

This study examines the association between media reporting behavior and corporate governance. Prior studies investigate how stock prices react after reported by media. This study examines how the attributes of corporate governance affect the media’s reporting behaviors. This study uses the sample of companies which were listed on the Taiwan Stock and Gretai Securities Market from 2013. The Logistic regression was used to test the association between the earning information reported by media and variables of corporate governance and the Poisson regression was used to test the association between the number of media report and the variable of corporate governance.
The results show that the media reporting behavior associate with some variables of corporate governance. When inside directors own higher percentage of stocks and the larger board size, the possibility of media to be reported is much higher. However, if outside directors own the higher percentage of stocks, the possibility of media to be reported is much lower. And the results show that the numbers of the report associate with some variables of corporate governance. When the board size are larger and institutional shareholding are higher, the possibility of media to be reported is higher. But when the companies have the chairman and CEO with the same person, the possibility of media to be reported is lower.

謝辭 I
摘要 II
ABSTRACT III
目錄 IV
圖目錄 VI
表目錄 VII
第壹章、緒論 1
第一節、研究背景與動機 1
第二節、研究目的 3
第三節、研究架構 4
第貳章、文獻回顧 6
第一節、盈餘資訊內涵 6
第二節、媒體資訊內涵 9
第三節、公司治理 11
第參章、研究方法 16
第一節、研究假說發展 16
第二節、觀念性架構圖 20
第三節、樣本選取與資料來源 20
第四節、變數定義與衡量 22
第五節、實證模型 28
第肆章、實證結果與分析 33
第一節、敘述性統計資料 33
第二節、相關性分析 35
第三節、迴歸結果分析 38
第四節、額外測試 42
第伍章、結論與建議 44
第一節、研究結論 44
第二節、研究限制與建議 46
參考文獻 47

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