本篇論文要討論的問題是：「生物體若要能客觀地、準確地表徵世界，需要滿足哪些條件？」對此問題我將先討論兩派不同的立場，並在文末給予回應。
第一派的學者認為客觀表徵需預設語言能力。學者Quine認為，習得語言就是習得一套概念架構。唯有透過此概念架構，感知到的物體才能正確地被分類並從環境中被分離出來，此時感知者才擁有客觀表徵的能力。學者Davidson認為客觀性來自於主體際性（intersubjectivitiy）。他認為，客觀表徵必須預設能將真實從表象中分離出來的能力，而唯有當個體能透過語言相互分享資訊時，感知者才能判斷心理表徵是關於真實還是關於表象，進而將兩者分離。
第二派的學者認為個體僅需透過感知系統便能客觀地表徵世界，不需預設額外的語言能力。學者Burge認為感知表徵即是一種客觀表徵。反個體主義（anti-individualism）主張，若欲解釋心理狀態的本質，便需考慮個體如何與環境進行互動。依此脈絡，知覺作為經驗表徵便已具備客觀面向。此外，Burge指出，經驗證據也顯示，尚未具備語言能力的嬰兒和沒有語言能力但有知覺系統的動物，已能夠客觀地表徵世界。
我認為，相較於Quine與Daivdson的理論，Burge的理論擁有較強的解釋力、較為正確。但我進一步指出，若知覺系統是認知可穿透的（cognitively penetrable），Burge的理論將出現瑕疵。主要問題是出在他沒有區分存在性表徵和表象性表徵。僅有存在性表徵才具備客觀性，表像性表徵並不具備客觀性。故唯當我們將討論範圍限定在存在性表徵時，Burge的理論才正確。

My aim in this work is to discuss the requirements that must be fulfilled in order to acquire the objective representation, which is, to represent the physical world accurately. I analyze two different approaches toward the objectivity.
The first approach is the statement that the objective representation requires cognitive abilities. Both Quine and Davidson argue that the additional cognitive ability, especially, the linguistic ability, is necessary for objective representation. Quine asserts that the language provides a framework which makes the perceptual information become categorized and the categorized information is the beginning of objectivity. Davidson believes that the objectivity starts from intersubjectivity. He argues that when two subjects can check the information with each other, they are able to represent the reality from the appearance. The linguistic ability is required for people to share information with each other.
On the contrary, according to the second approach, represented by Tyler Burge, perceptual systems can represent the world objectively without involving any additional cognitive abilities. Burge considers perception as objective. One support for this position comes from the position of anti-individualism. The anti-individualist insists that the nature of mental state is dependent on the environment-individual relations. According to anti-individualism, perceptual representations involve objective aspects. The other support comes from the empirical research on perception. The infant and animal studies indicate that infants and some animals exhibit the ability of objectivity even if they do not have linguistic ability.
I propose that Burge’s theory is superior to Quine’s and Davidson’s theories. However, in the end, I indicate that the cases suggesting that perception is cognitively penetrable might be counterexamples to Burge’s theory. I argue that there are two different ways to represent a physical entity, which are, to represent the existence and to represent the appearance. I think that Burge’s theory is correct only when we limit our discussion to how the creature represents the existence, but not how the creature represents the appearance.

Table of Contents:
Acknowledgments.................................. i
ChineseAbstract..............................ii
Chinese Synopsis................................... iv
EnglishAbstract................................ xiv
Table of Contents.............................. xvi
Table of Figures..................................xviii
Overall Introduction................................... 1
Chapter 1. What is the Problem of Perceiving the World Objectively? ................... 3
1.1. The Problems in Epistemology ................. 3
1.1.1. The Challenge from Skepticism .................. 3
1.1.2. Rationalism vs. Empiricism................................. 4
1.1.3. The Nature of Perception.............. 5
1.1.4. Indirect Realism and Sense-Data Theory of Perception........ 8
1.2. Objectivity as a Nature of Perception ........................ 10
1.2.1. What Does It Mean for Something to be Objective? ................................. 10
1.2.2. Representing Mental Objects as the Precondition for Objectivity ............. 13
1.2.3. Additional Cognitive Ability as the Precondition for Objectivity.............. 14
Chapter 2. A Review of Theories of Perceiving Objectively: the Requirement of Exercising the Linguistic Ability ........................ 17
2.1. Quine’s View on Objectivity ................ 17
2.1.1. The Ideas of Referential Device ............... 17
2.1.2. The Pre-individuative Stage ................ 19
2.1.3. The Individuative Stage: The Divided Reference ...................................... 21
2.2. Davidson’s View on Objectivity ................ 23
2.2.1. The Holistic Structure of Meaning ............ 23
2.2.2. Linguistic Ability as the Requirement of Thought ..................................... 25
2.2.3. The Distinction and Irreducibility of Three Varieties of Knowledge ........ 27
2.2.4. Linguistic Ability as the Requirement of Objectivity ................................ 30
Chapter 3. Scientific Research Against the Views that Objectivity Requires the Linguistic Ability ................................................ 34
3.1. Scientific Research on Perceptual Constancies ............................................... 34
3.1.1. Research on Perceptual Constancies Contradicts Quine’s and Davidson’s Theory....................................... 35
3.1.2. The Perceptual Constancies are Low Level Cortical Process .................... 36
3.1.3. The Perceptual Constancies in Infants ....................................................... 37
3.1.4. The Perceptual Constancies in Animals ..................................................... 37
3.2. The Research on Concept Formation in Infants............................................... 39
3.2.1. The Ability of Object Individuation in Infants........................................... 39
3.2.2. Piaget’s Theory of the Object Concept Developing in Infants................... 42
3.2.3. The Object Concept in Infants: Recent Research....................................... 45
Chapter 4. Perceiving Objectively: The Argument from Tyler Burge ................... 49
4.1. Anti-individualism: an Alternative Position .................................................... 50
4.1.1. The Definition of Anti-Individaulism ........................................................ 51
4.1.2. The General Ground for Anti-individualism....... 53
4.1.3. Anit-individualism Regarding Perception........ 54
4.2. Perception is a Form of Objective Representation.... 57
4.2.1. Against the Deflation of Representation .................................................... 57
4.2.2. Perceptual Representation is Primitive and Objective ............................... 60
Chapter 5. Looking for a More Comprehensive Theory ........................................ 65
5.1. The Problem Raised by the Issue of Cognitive Penetrability of Perception .... 65
5.1.1. The Issue of Cognitive Impenetrability and Penetrability .......................... 66
5.1.2. Is Perception Cognitively Penetrable or Impenetrable? Review of Studies
on Visual Perception ...... 71
5.2. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception is a Challenge to Burge’s Theory . 74
5.2.1. The Threat from Cognitive Penetrability ................................................... 74
5.2.2. The Possible Reply from Burge ........................... 79
Overall Conclusion ............... 82
Bibliography ..................................... 85

Table of Figures:
Figure 1.1 Müller-Lyer Illusion…………………………………………...…………..7
Figure 1.2 The Illustration of Indirect Realism……………………………………….9
Figure 3.1 Ponzo Illusion……………………………………………………………..35

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