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研究生:黃柏誠
研究生(外文):Huang, Po-Cheng
論文名稱:盈餘管理及公司治理對財務報表違規及會計師懲戒之影響—以中國上市公司為例
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Earnings Management and Corporate Governance on Financial Statement Frauds and CPA Sanctions-Evidence from China
指導教授:洪玉舜洪玉舜引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hung, Yu-Shun
口試委員:范宏書劉正田
口試委員(外文):Fan, Hung-ShuLiu, Jen-Ten
口試日期:105/06/17
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:輔仁大學
系所名稱:會計學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2016
畢業學年度:104
語文別:中文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:違規高管薪酬盈餘管理公司治理
外文關鍵詞:FraudExecutive CompensationEarning ManagementCorporate Governance
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本研究以中國A股上市公司為研究對象,旨在探討高管薪酬與盈餘管理對於財務報導違規的影響,再進一步探討公司治理及財務報導違規會對會計師懲戒機率的影響。實證結果顯示,高管薪酬越高,財務報導違規可能性越低。高管薪酬能舒緩代理問題,使高管較不會做出傷害公司利益的違規行為。此外,本研究進一步探討盈餘管理對財務報表違規影響方面,從本研究結果可以得知,盈餘管理程度越大,越容易被監管機關認為從事財務報表違規。
在會計師懲戒方面,實證結果顯示,當公司財務報表違規可能性越高,會計師面臨的懲戒機率越高。公司治理特徵對於會計師懲戒之影響,實證結果發現,當公司高管薪酬越高,會計師面臨的懲戒機率越低。股權集中度方面,發現第一大股東持股比例越高,有利於大股東對企業的監督,會計師被懲戒的機率越低;未流通國家持有股比例越高,會影響股東、董事會和監事會對企業應有的監督效果,增加會計師被懲戒的機率。董監事方面,董事會會議次數之實證結果無法支持假說。另外,當董監事持有公司股票較多,基於對自身權益的維護會更有動機去監督管理階層,降低會計師被懲戒的機率。

In this study, We use Chinese A-share listed companies. The purpose of study is to investigate the effect of executive compensation and earnings management on financial statement frauds. And further investigate the effect of corporate governance and financial statement frauds on CPA sanctions.
The empirical evidence shows that there is significant correlation between executive compensation and financial statement frauds. The executive compensation can relieve the agency problem, so that executives are less likely to harm the company. In addition, the study to further investigate the effect of earnings management on the financial statement frauds. The greater the degree of earnings management is more likely that companies are adjudged financial statement frauds.
In the respect of CPA sanctions, empirical results show that the higher possibility of financial statement frauds, the CPAs are less likely be sanctioned. In the respect of corporate governance, The empirical results show, when the company executive compensation is higher, the CPAs are less likely be sanctioned.
In ownership concentration aspect, The higher proportion of largest shareholder holdings, the lower the probability of CPA be sanctioned. The higher the proportion of shares held by the State, the CPAs are more likely be sanctioned.
In the respect of directors and supervisors, The empirical results of the number of board meetings can not support the hypothesis. The higher proportion of shares held by directors and supervisors, the CPAs are less likely be sanctioned.
第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究背景與動機 1
第二節、研究目的 4
第二章、文獻探討 5
第一節、高階管理階層薪酬與盈餘管理之關聯 5
第二節、高階管理階層薪酬與財務報表違規之關聯 5
第三節、盈餘管理與財務報表違規之關聯 8
第四節、會計師懲戒與財務報表違規之關聯 9
第五節、公司治理與財務報表違規之關聯 11
第六節、會計師懲戒與公司治理之關聯 14
第三章、研究方法 15
第一節、研究假說 15
第二節、樣本選取與資料來源 20
第三節、變數定義與衡量 26
第四節、實證模型 32
第四章、實證結果 35
第一節、敘述性統計與相關係數分析 35
第二節、實證分析結果 41
第五章、結論與建議 46
第一節、結論 46
第二節、研究限制與建議 48
參考文獻 49

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