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研究生:陳景池
研究生(外文):CHEN,JING-CHIH
論文名稱:薪酬配適度與公司績效關聯性影響以限制員工權利新股為例
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of the Association between Compensation and Firm Performance:Evidence from Restricted Stock Grants
指導教授:戴怡蕙戴怡蕙引用關係
指導教授(外文):TAI,YI-HUI
口試委員:曾家璿李德冠
口試委員(外文):TSENG,CHIA-HSUANLEE,TE-KUAN
口試日期:2016-06-16
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:銘傳大學
系所名稱:會計學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2016
畢業學年度:104
語文別:中文
論文頁數:31
中文關鍵詞:薪酬制度配適度公司績效限制員工權利新股
外文關鍵詞:Fitness of Compensation PlanFirm PerformanceRestricted Stock Grants
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:2
  • 點閱點閱:202
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
本研究以2012年至2014年採用「限制員工權利新股」制度之上市櫃公司為研究樣本。本研究探討薪酬制度配適度越高是否公司績效就越好,換言之,越適合採用「限制員工權利新股」制度的公司,若採用該制度是否公司績效就會提升。實證結果和預期相符,越適合採用「限制員工權利新股」制度的公司,若採用該制度確實公司績效有顯著提升。本研究結果有助於補充文獻不足,並可供實務界參考之用。
This study uses listed companies adopting restricted stock grants from 2012 to 2014 as samples. This research investigates that whether the fitness level of compensation plan is higher, the frim performance will be better. In other words, if the firm is suitable for adopting restricted stock grants and such firm adopts this compensation plan, the firm’s performance will be enhanced or not. The empirical results are consistent with our expectations. If the firm is suitable for adopting restricted stock grants, its performance will be enhanced when the firm adopting this compensation plan. The results of this paper will serve as a supplement to literature as well as a reference for the practice field.
目錄 I
表目錄 II
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與背景 1
第二節 研究目的與貢獻 2
第二章 限制員工權利新股制度 4
第三章 文獻探討與假說設定 7
第一節 薪酬配適度 7
第二節 薪酬配適度與公司績效關聯性之影響 7
第四章 研究設計 9
第一節 樣本與資料來源 9
第二節 變數定義與衡量 11
第三節 實證模型 13
第五章 實證結果 15
第一節 敘述統計值與相關係數分析 15
第二節 迴歸分析 17
第三節 額外分析 18
第六章 結論與建議 20
第一節 結論 20
第二節 未來研究建議與研究限制 20
參考文獻 22

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