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研究生:辜怡萍
研究生(外文):KU,YI-PIN 
論文名稱:公司治理與盈餘管理關聯性之研究
論文名稱(外文):A Study on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
指導教授:張幸惠張幸惠引用關係
指導教授(外文):CHANG, HSIN-HUE
口試委員:謝志柔姚名麗
口試委員(外文):HSIEH,CHIH-JOUYAO,MIN-LI
口試日期:2016-05-26
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:銘傳大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系碩士在職專班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2016
畢業學年度:104
語文別:中文
論文頁數:72
中文關鍵詞:公司治理盈餘管理公司治理100指數
外文關鍵詞:Corporate GovernanceEarnings ManagementTWSE Corporate Governance 100 Index
相關次數:
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  • 下載下載:1
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
臺灣證券交易所於2015年6月29日推出「臺灣公司治理100指數」,納入100家公司治理較佳的企業,提供投資大眾作為選股參考。本研究旨在探討公司治理與盈餘管理之關聯性;以「臺灣公司治理100指數」成分股作為公司治理之代理變數,並以Modified Jones模型衡量裁決性應計數,代表盈餘管理程度。研究方法主要採用差異性檢定與多元迴歸分析。
差異性檢定結果顯示,公司治理成分股比控制組顯著地有較高的獨立董事比率。迴歸結果發現公司治理成分股負向影響盈餘管理,但未達顯著;然而,高獨立董事比率的公司治理成分股,其盈餘管理程度顯著較低。進一步,穩健性測試也顯示,在電子業中高獨立董事比率的公司治理成分股輕微地負向影響盈餘管理,而非電子業則否。上述結果隱含公司治理成分股的盈餘管理程度不一定較低,但是成分股中具有高獨立董事比率的公司,其財報透明度較高,特別是電子業。另外,本研究結果顯示,調整前盈餘負向顯著影響盈餘管理,隱含樣本公司採用洗大澡策略。

Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) launched Taiwan Corporate Governance 100 Index, consisting of 100 listed firms with better corporate governance practices, on June 29, 2015. Investors could pick stocks with good corporate governance based on this index. This study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. This study uses Taiwan Corporate Governance 100 Index as the proxy variable of corporate governance and applies the Modified Jones model to measure the discretionary accruals, representing the levels of earnings management. The difference test and multiplier regression analysis are used to conduct this study.
The difference test shows that corporate governance 100 has a higher percentage of independent directors than its control group. The regression results find that corporate governance 100 has a negative effect on earnings management but insignificant. However, corporate governance 100 with higher ratio of independent directors has a significant and negative impact on earnings management. Furthermore, robustness test shows that corporate governance 100 with higher ratio of independent directors in the electronic industry has a slightly negative effect on earnings management, but this relationship is positive in the non-electronic industry. These findings imply that corporate governance 100 with higher ratio of independent directors has more transparent financial reports, specifically in the electronic industry. In addition, this study finds that pre-reported earnings have a significant and negative effect on earnings management, which implies that the sample firms use a big bath strategy.

目錄

謝辭 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究流程與研究架構 3
第貳章 文獻探討 5
第一節 公司治理 5
第二節 盈餘管理 14
第三節 公司治理與盈餘管理 22
第叁章 研究方法 27
第一節 樣本選取及資料來源 27
第二節 相關變數定義及衡量方法 31
第三節 實證模型 37
第肆章 實證分析與結果 38
第一節 敘述性統計分析 38
第二節 差異性分析 40
第三節 相關性分析 42
第四節 迴歸結果 44
第五節 穩健性測試 49
第伍章 研究結論與建議 52
第一節 研究結論 52
第二節 研究限制 53
第三節 研究建議 53
附錄一 55
參考文獻 60




表目錄

表2-1 公司治理評鑑指標及配分 13
表2-2 公司治理評鑑排除標準 13
表2-3 台灣公司治理發展及推動時程 14
表3-1 公司治理100成分股 29
表3-2 樣本產業資料分布表 30
表3-3 變數彙總表 36
表4-1 研究樣本之敘述性統計 39
表4-2 差異性檢定 41
表4-3 Pearson相關係數分析 43
表4-4 迴歸結果 46
表4-5 迴歸結果(加入交乘項) 48
表4-6 迴歸彙總表 51



圖目錄

圖1-1 研究流程圖 4
圖2-1 世界銀行的公司治理架構 9


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